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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores how Palestinian youth in Lebanon construct their identities in the 
context of statelessness.  Specifically, the study examines how Palestinian youth in 
south Lebanese refugee camps and gatherings understand and perform their identities 
vis-à-vis nationality, gender and religion; how the discursive resources of identity are 
appropriated and articulated in everyday life within the camps and how Palestinian 
identities in Lebanon have shifted across exilic generations, all in the absence of 
formal state structures. 
 
Acknowledging that Palestinian young men and women are meaningful actors in their 
own right, I have engaged in interpretivist inquiry and sought to capture and 
reconstruct the subjective meanings placed on social life by Palestinian youth in 
Lebanon through a case study.  Given this methodological perspective, I have used 
semi-structured interviews, focus groups and Participatory Learning and Action 
(PLA) approaches as research methods within this study.  In light of the vulnerability 
of Palestinians as a refugee population situated within the larger context of Western 
imperialism and colonialism in the Middle East, I have drawn on post-structuralist, 
post-colonialist and feminist theoretical frameworks to interrogate the data. 
The findings of this study show that Palestinian youth in Lebanon construct their 
identities through nationalist discourses of shared history, kinship, culture and 
religion.  This is accomplished over time through the production and reproduction of 
symbolic systems in and through the institutional sites of the school, the family, 
political organizations, the media and religious institutions.  Through these processes, 
Palestine is constructed as different from „Other‟ nations and „Palestinian-ness‟ as 
distinct from „Other‟ national identity positions.  However, the processes of national 
signification described above produce identities that are in a constant state of flux and 
transformation across time and space.  Moreover, internal contestations are produced, 
particularly in relation to religion, gender and generation, which trouble and 
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problematize the notion of a singular and homogenous Palestinian identity.  The case 
study research presented in this thesis explores how Palestinian young people come to 
understand themselves and learn to navigate their lives both in relation to and in 
distinction from external „Others‟ and dominant „imaginings‟ of „Palestinian-ness‟. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
 
I come to this study with personal as well as professional interests and experiences in 
the areas of diversity and social inclusion/exclusion, migration, citizenship and 
multicultural education.  The following section discusses my rationale for 
undertaking this study at the levels of the personal, the contextual, the theoretical and 
the methodological, making reference to the broader implications and relevance of the 
study of identity in the modern world.  I conclude the chapter with an outline of the 
structure of the thesis and an overview of each thesis chapter. 
  
1.1  Rationale  
 
Seeds of my interest in identity 
This study, at least in part, emerged out of my own personal interest in identity, how 
it is constructed and what it means for daily life.  As a Canadian, I have always 
struggled to define for myself, and for others, what constitutes Canadian identity.  
Unlike in many other countries, there are no definable characteristics, such as shared 
history, ethnicity, language, religion or culture, which bind Canadians into a nation.  
As such, there is no identifiable Canadian cuisine, Canadian traditional dance or 
Canadian traditional dress.  Rather, as a settler country, Canada is a composite of the 
cultures of the immigrants that populate it, and Christmas, Hanukkah, Chinese New 
Year, Eid al Fitr and Divali are all celebrated in public schools in Canada.  Moreover, 
the languages of Chinese, Punjabi, Italian and Ukrainian, among many others, are all 
spoken in Canada, particularly in urban areas.  Yet, there is also an underlying 
hegemonic English and French cultural foundation to Canadian society, as well as an 
acknowledgement, if not always an overt inclusiveness, of indigenous cultures.  
However, as the U.S., Australia and New Zealand, among other countries, have been 
similarly constituted, what specifically makes Canada, and myself, „Canadian‟?  This 
question first led me to an interest in the study of national identity and the ways it is 
constructed, performed and contested.       
13 
 
 
Through my career trajectory as an English as a Second Language (ESL) and 
Citizenship educator in public schools and colleges in Canada, my interest in identity 
only grew stronger.  Many of my students were recent arrivals from war-torn 
countries, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia.  These students tended to 
maintain strong emotional ties to the homeland, while they struggled to develop 
competency in Canadian national languages and to socially and culturally integrate 
into mainstream Canadian society.  On the other hand, students in my classroom also 
included second generation Canadians, who were born in Canada, yet whose parents 
originally hailed from far-away countries such as Vietnam and Cambodia.  These 
students also experienced significant, yet very different, challenges in relation to 
identity, belonging, home and intergenerational relations.  Moreover, I noted how 
male and female students often seemed to experience the processes of migration, 
resettlement and integration in very different ways.   
 
Through these personal and professional experiences, several questions arose for me 
around the issue of identity.  For example, what did it mean for these individuals to 
be(come) Canadian?  How did diverse groups of people come to feel Canadian?  As 
an educator, what part did I play in this process?  What implications did feeling 
Canadian, and being seen as Canadian by others, have on these peoples‟ lives?  How 
was being/becoming Canadian experienced differently by males and females, by 
people of different ethnic origins and by people associated with specific racial or 
religious categories?  This led me to interrogate identity more broadly through 
questions such as, how is the nation produced and reproduced in our souls, minds and 
bodies?  What is the role of formal and non-formal education institutions in this 
process?  How do ethnicity, religion and gender intersect with national identity?  How 
are identities contested, negotiated and accommodated?  And finally, how does 
identity shift across generations in the context of diaspora?  These questions only 
intensified in me after I lived abroad for many years and married a Palestinian refugee 
from Lebanon.  Through these experiences, issues of identity, social 
14 
 
inclusion/exclusion, „hybridity‟ and citizenship became a significant part of my daily 
life.   
 
Identity in the modern world   
Beyond my personal concerns, questions of identity, home and belonging have broad 
and far-reaching implications and relevance in our modern world.  The production 
and performance of identity is particularly significant within the context of 
globalization and the current entanglement of the national with the global.  Regional 
and international migration has brought diverse groups together to negotiate their 
views of the world, value systems and social practices within the bounded reality and 
lived experience of nationhood (Benei, 2008).  Pluralism in many societies has 
increased the need for effective strategies to manage social integration within national 
boundaries, which has led to debates around the policy and practice of assimilation, 
multiculturalism, segregation and even extermination (Woodward, 1997).  Moreover, 
national boundaries have also been challenged and permeated by global mass media 
and the internet.  Emanating largely from „the West‟, global media has challenged 
traditional views, values and social practices around the world.  However, in recent 
times, other groups have begun to use the media as a tool to reassert their identities 
and create a counter narrative to challenge Western hegemony.  For example, Qatar-
based Al Jazeera has become a broadcaster of global reach in both English and Arabic 
(Sackur, 2006).  Moreover, extremist groups, such as Al Qaeda, have begun to use the 
internet in their global recruitment efforts (Corera, 2004).  In response, American-
based CNN and the BBC have recently developed Arabic and Farsi language websites 
and begun broadcasting in these languages in an attempt to win the hearts and minds 
of Arabic/Farsi-speaking populations in their efforts to win “the war on terror” 
(Byford, 2003).   
 
Within nations, competing imaginings of identity have resulted in the production and 
reproduction of majorities and minorities, at times leading to violent confrontation.  
In the last two decades, issues of identity, inclusion and exclusion have been at the 
centre of ethnic conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe (Former Yugoslavia and parts 
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of the former Soviet Union) and in Africa (The Great Lakes Region, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and in the Horn of Africa) (Williams, 
2004). There has also been widespread sectarian violence in the Middle East (Iraq, 
Lebanon), South Asia (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) and Northern Ireland (BBC, 2006; 
Price, 2001; BBC, 2000).  Closer to home, social alienation has been cited as a prime 
cause for the „identity crisis‟ experienced by young British-born Muslims. This has 
arguably helped to contribute to the rise of religious extremism and violence in the 
Muslim community in contemporary Britain (Hardy, 2006).  At the same time, many 
Britons have been swept up in the discourse of „Islamophobia‟, and support for right-
wing political movements, such as the British National Party (BNP), has steadily 
increased (BBC, 2009).  All of these developments have made the analysis of identity 
and inclusion increasingly important and relevant in our modern world.   
 
Palestinians in Lebanon  
As a study of identity, social inclusion/exclusion, „hybridity‟ and shifting identities, 
the Palestinian case is a particularly interesting one.  Palestinians are scattered around 
the world and living as resident aliens in a perpetual state of dislocation.  Palestinians 
resident in Lebanon are particularly challenged, as they have been living there as 
stateless refugees for more than 60 years without even the most basic civil, political, 
social and economic rights (Suleiman, 2006).  As such, they have had to rebuild their 
lives and create a sense of home, belonging and identity for themselves and their 
families in the absence of a Palestinian state and its institutions.  Moreover, they have 
had to do this in the context of chronic conflict, poverty, marginalization and 
uncertainty.   
 
For Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, concepts of identity, belonging and home are 
particularly complex.  Older Palestinians who experienced Al Nakba (the loss of their 
homeland) directly, have lived their lives largely in the liminal, awaiting the return to 
their „homeland‟.  These Palestinians have found themselves perpetually in a state of 
dislocation as transmigrants whose daily lives depend on multiple and constant 
interconnections across international borders and whose public identities are 
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configured in relation to more than one nation-state (Ahmed, 1999).  However, for 
Palestinian generations born into exile, the situation is even more complex.  For 
younger Palestinians, Palestine remains central to their understandings of home and is 
imagined as the place to which they will finally belong. At the same time, their 
connections to, and understandings of, „the homeland‟ have been passed down to 
them through acts of remembering rather than firsthand lived experience (Mason, 
2007).  In this way, concepts of home, belonging and identity have many layers for 
members of different Palestinian exilic generations in Lebanon.   
 
To add a further layer of complexity to the situation, there is not one, but rather 
several Palestinian identities that correspond to widening circles of group 
membership based on politics, religion, class and gender, among others.  Different 
social contexts may trigger an individual to think, feel or act on the basis of a 
gendered, religious or political identity.  However, memberships in these different 
groups may also result in competing or conflicting narratives (Woodward, 1997).  For 
example, membership in a male-dominated group struggling for the nationalist cause 
may put Palestinian women in conflict with other feminists and feminist agendas.  On 
the other hand, alliance with feminists hailing from different political, ethnic and 
religious platforms may alienate Palestinian women from Palestinian men and the 
nationalist cause.  Thus, Palestinian women are constantly confronted with conflicting 
loyalties and forced to choose between allegiances to political determination and self-
actualization, political and social citizenship, and tradition and progress (Yuval-
Davis, 1997).  In a similar way, Palestinian Christians are often forced to choose 
between allegiance to the „Christian West‟ or other Arab Muslims, just as Muslims 
are caught between the competing discourses of Palestinian nationalism, pan-
Islamism and secularism.  
 
All of this raises very interesting questions about the processes of identity 
construction and regulation amongst Palestinian young people in Lebanon.  For 
example, what does being Palestinian in Lebanon mean, and how is it experienced 
and performed by different groups of people in Palestinian society?  How do 
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Palestinians in Lebanon construct and regulate national identity in the absence of state 
institutions, such as schools?  How is Palestinian identity experienced and performed 
by Palestinian young people in comparison with their parents/grandparents?  
 
In response to these questions, I have used data gleaned from fieldwork in three 
Palestinian refugee camps and two Palestinian gatherings in south Lebanon to 
examine the ways in which Palestinian youth construct their identities through 
different formal and non-formal institutions in Palestinian society.  Specifically, I 
have interrogated how Palestinian youth in south Lebanese refugee camps understand 
and perform their identities vis-à-vis nationality, gender and religion, how the 
discursive resources of identity are appropriated and articulated in everyday life 
within the camps and how Palestinian identities in Lebanon have shifted across exilic 
generations. 
My intention in this research has been to study Palestinian youth‟s experiences and 
perceptions from the perspective of their consciousness of them.  Because these 
realities are multiple, subjective, fluid and changing within specific temporal and 
spatial contexts, they are not reducible to simplistic interpretation (Creswell, 1998).  
Therefore, I have sought „thick descriptions‟ of the experiences and perceptions of 
Palestinians in Lebanon through memory, image and meaning (Geertz, 1973).  This 
has helped me to understand Palestinian subjective experience, gain insights into 
people's motivations and actions, and challenge structural or normative assumptions 
and conventional wisdom about „truth‟ and „reality‟ in this context.  Moreover, it has 
allowed me to privilege subjectivity and emphasize the importance of personal 
perspective and interpretation in knowledge production.   
 
Acknowledging that Palestinian young men and women are meaningful actors in their 
own right, I have engaged in interpretivist inquiry and sought to capture and 
reconstruct the subjective meanings placed on social life by Palestinian youth in 
Lebanon through a case study.  Given this methodological perspective, I have 
employed semi-structured interviews, focus groups and Participatory Learning and 
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Action (PLA) approaches as research methods within this study.  In light of the 
vulnerability of Palestinians as a refugee population situated within the larger context 
of Western imperialism and colonialism in the Middle East, I have used post-
structural, post-colonial and feminist theory as a theoretical framework to interrogate 
the data (see Chapter 4, Methodology). 
 
Working from within a post-colonial and feminist paradigm, I refute the possibility of 
a researcher starting without any preconceptions or biases (Husserl, 1970).  Rather, I 
recognize that the researcher is always socially, culturally and historically situated 
and constructs knowledge from his/her own personal location in the world.  This 
means that my account of life in Palestinian camps is inherently ideological, political 
and permeated with my own values and assumptions (Rouse, 1996).  In this way, I 
acknowledge that I am always implicated in knowledge production within this study.   
Consistent with this, it is imperative for me to make clear how unequal power 
relations between myself (a Canadian researcher in higher education at a UK 
university) and the researched (young stateless Palestinian refugees) have impacted 
interpretations and meanings.  First of all, as the researcher, I have held the upper 
hand at every stage of the research process by deciding what research questions 
would be asked, who would be interviewed, what data would be collected and how 
that data would be analysed, interpreted and represented.  Secondly, my positioning 
as a Westerner located within the complex social relations of Palestinian camps in 
Lebanon within the wider context of regional and global politics clearly has 
implications for any knowledge I have constructed about Palestinians in Lebanon 
through the research process.  As a Western researcher conducting research in „the 
East‟, I have had the power to (mis)represent the research participants according to 
my own agenda.  In this way, my researcher identities and my discursive 
positioning(s) have influenced the research process and what I can claim to know 
about Palestinians in Lebanon. 
The following section provides an overview of each thesis chapter.  
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1.2  Overview  
 
The research study is divided into seven chapters:   
 
In the Context chapter (Chapter 2), I provide a historical overview for the reader on 
how and why Palestinians came to live in Lebanon as stateless refugees.  Next, I 
explore the ways in which Palestinians have either been integrated in or excluded 
from participation in Lebanese political, economical and social life over the last 60 
years and address the reasons for this inclusion/exclusion.  I then move on to a 
discussion of the social service provision for refugees in the camps through UNRWA 
and non-formal institutions in Palestinian society, making specific reference to 
Education service provision for young people.  Finally, I provide a detailed 
description of the refugee camps and gatherings  in which this study is situated. 
 
In the Literature Review (Chapter 3), I provide the conceptual framework for the 
study and explore the academic literature and current theoretical debates around the 
broad concept of identity.  I begin the chapter with a discussion of the ways in which 
notions of sameness and difference are played out through the organizing concepts of 
nation and home and implicated in the construction of specific aspects of identity, 
such as kinship, culture, ethnicity, religion and gender (see Chapter 5, Boundaries).  
Next, I narrow the focus of the discussion and undertake a micro-level examination of 
how identity is constructed through the appropriation and articulation of discursive 
resources and performances both within and through social institutions (see Chapter 
6, Institutions).  Finally, I broaden the discussion back out to examine the concept of 
agency and discuss its importance for the construction, maintenance and performance 
of identities in shifting time and space (see Chapter 7, New Identities).  I conclude the 
chapter with the research questions that I seek to explore about how social life is 
created, experienced and given meaning by Palestinian young people in refugee 
camps and gatherings in south Lebanon.   
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In the Methodology chapter (Chapter 4), I provide a detailed description of the 
research design and data analysis for this case study.  I then go on to provide a 
rationale for my decision to undertake interpretivist research.  Following this, I 
present methodological reflections which explore how my researcher identities, and 
the ways in which they were strategically exercised, impacted the study.  I conclude 
the chapter with a discussion on ethical issues that arose during the research and the 
ways in which they were negotiated. 
 
I discuss the main emergent themes in chapters 5, 6 and 7.  These themes have 
emerged out of my personal life experiences, engagement with the literature, the 
research questions and my analysis of the empirical data. 
 
In the first of the empirically-based chapters (Boundaries, Chapter 5), I use empirical 
data to analyze how Palestinian youth (male and female) understand and perform 
their identities in refugee camps in Lebanon (research question 1).  I do this through a 
macro-level analysis of how identity is constructed through „difference‟ in Palestinian 
society.  First, I examine how difference is constructed between Palestinians and 
external „Others‟ through the construction of physical, structural and symbolic 
boundaries in Palestinian society.  Next, I look at how Palestinians construct 
difference through shared cultures and discourses of „Palestinian-ness‟.  Finally, I 
explore how Palestinians themselves contest these discourses and construct internal 
„Others‟.  I argue that although identity is constructed through the erection of 
boundaries between groups, the construction of these boundaries is ultimately 
problematic.  On one hand, the assertion of difference attempts to erase similarities 
between groups, such as between Palestinians and Lebanese.  On the other hand, 
Palestinian identities are not unified, and there are contradictions within them which 
have to be negotiated.   
 
In the next chapter (Institutions, Chapter 6), I narrow the focus and use empirical data 
to undertake a micro-level analysis of how the discursive resources of Palestinian 
identity are appropriated and articulated in everyday life within the camps in the 
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context of statelessness (research question 2).  I do this through an examination of 
how institutions such as the school, the family, political organizations, the media, and 
religious institutions all function as sites of Palestinian identity production and 
performance.  Within this discussion, I highlight the ways in which Palestine and 
„Palestinian-ness‟ are culturally, socially and symbolically produced and regulated in 
Palestinian society through the use of symbolic systems, the performance of ritual and 
embodiment.  I then examine how these processes are also implicated in the 
production of internal „Others‟.  I argue that there are vast challenges and 
complexities entailed in the process of trying to represent the diversity of the 
Palestinian experience through a single, hegemonic identity.  Rather, the concept of 
authenticity is highly problematic in the Palestinian context, and it challenges the 
very essence of Palestinian nationalist „imagining‟.   
 
In the last of the empirically-based chapters (New Identities, Chapter 7), I use both 
empirical and historical data to explore how Palestinian identities in Lebanon have 
shifted across exilic generations (research question 3).  To do this, I examine how 
constructions of „Palestinian-ness‟ have shifted over time through changing 
discourses of ethnicity, religion, gender and home in Palestinian society.  I argue that 
a homogenized and fixed Palestinian identity does not exist.  Rather, the boundaries 
of difference are continually being repositioned in relation to different points of 
reference according to changing life conditions.  Moreover, Palestinian youth are 
constantly investing in temporary subject positions based on positions of advantage 
within specific contexts.    
 
In the Conclusion (Chapter 8), I summarize the key findings of the research study and 
discuss how it makes important empirical, theoretical and methodological 
contributions to knowledge.  Then, I suggest implications of the study at the levels of 
the personal, the contextual and the theoretical.  Finally, I offer suggestions for 
further research with Palestinian youth in different geo-political, temporal and 
methodological contexts and with different demographic populations. 
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In the next chapter, I discuss the particular socio-political context in which this study 
is situated.   
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Chapter 2 – Context 
 
 
In this chapter, I provide a historical overview for the reader on how and why 
Palestinians came to live in Lebanon as stateless refugees.  Next, I explore the ways 
in which Palestinians have either been integrated in or excluded from participation in 
Lebanese political, economical and social life over the last 60 years and address the 
reasons for this inclusion/exclusion.  I then move on to a discussion of the social 
service provision for refugees in the camps through both formal and non-formal 
institutions in Palestinian society, making specific reference to Education service 
provision for young people.  Finally, I provide a detailed description of the three 
Palestinian refugee camps and two Palestinian gatherings in which this study is 
located. 
 
Before beginning, it must be said that providing a „historical‟ account of Palestinians 
in Lebanon is a challenge as, from a post-colonialist perspective, Palestinian history 
has largely been written through the lens of Western imperialism and colonialism in 
the Middle East (see Chapter 3, Literature Review).  In this way, Palestinians are 
particularly vulnerable to the hegemonic „gaze‟ of the Western researcher and the 
power of research to construct them as „Other‟ through representation (Said, 1978) 
(see Chapter 4, Methodology).  Considering the socio-political context in which 
Palestinians have had to live their lives, it is particularly imperative for me to make a 
conscious effort to avoid reproducing neo-colonial research postures and practices 
and replicating hegemonic historical discourses of Palestinians in this thesis.   
 
From a feminist perspective, it is also imperative for me to consider the extent to 
which historical accounts of Palestine and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have been 
gendered.  For example, due to patriarchal relations, women‟s voices in historical 
accounts have often been suppressed or silenced altogether.  In this way, history has 
come to ignore or misrepresent girls and women (Mohanty, 1991).  Moreover, the 
ideas, opinions and experiences of males have often been mistakenly taken to 
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represent those of the entire community, rather than just the dominant group 
(Scheyvens and Storey, 2006).  Therefore, it is important for me to acknowledge that 
there are multiple histories of this region and that instabilities of history and 
geography have had, and continue to have, real impacts on people‟s lives.  In this 
way, I acknowledge that the historical account presented here of Palestinians in 
Lebanon is narrated from a particular perspective and is invariably skewed by 
available historical resources (Hill Collins, 1991).   
 
The following is one account of how and why Palestinians came to be exiled in 
Lebanon and their experiences there. 
 
2.1  Al Nakba (the ‘Catastrophe’) 
 
Between the sixteenth century and the end of the First World War, Palestine was an 
integral part of the Ottoman Empire.  As this empire began to disintegrate prior to the 
end of the First World War, European powers began to vie for control of the Arab 
Ottoman provinces.  In 1916, Sir Henry McMahon began to correspond with Al Amir 
Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca, promising that Great Britain would recognize and 
support the independence of the Arabs, should they revolt against the Ottomans.  A 
few months later, a contradictory agreement (known as the Sykes-Picot agreement) 
was drafted between Sir Mark Sykes (Secretary to the British War Cabinet) and the 
French diplomat François George-Picot dividing the lands of the Arab Ottoman 
Empire into territories controlled by Britain and France and placing Jerusalem under 
international administration under the management of Russia.  In 1917, less than a 
year after the Sykes-Picot agreement had been signed, the Balfour Declaration was 
signed pledging British support for the establishment of a „national home for the 
Jewish people‟ in Palestine (Chatty and Hundt, 2005).   
Over the next three decades, the population of Jews in Mandated Palestine increased 
dramatically from a small minority to approximately a third of the total population of 
2,115,000 (Chatty and Hundt, 2005, p.14).  In 1947, the UN proposed the partitioning 
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of Palestine into two independent states, one Palestinian Arab and the other Jewish, 
with Jerusalem to be internationalized (Resolution 181 (II) of 1947) (UNISPAL, 
2007b).  According to the partition plan, the Jewish state was to comprise 56.4 % of 
the territory while the area allocated to the Palestinian Arab state was 42.5%.  At the 
time the resolution was passed, Jews owned 7% of the total land area in Palestine and 
Palestinian Arabs owned the rest and comprised 66% of the population (Chatty and 
Hundt, 2005, p. 14).  The day after the partition plan was announced, armed conflict 
spread throughout Palestine.  However, the Zionist paramilitary organizations, 
particularly the Haganah and its international volunteers, were militarily superior to 
the local Palestinian forces and the neighbouring Arab armies combined.  Thus, the 
Jewish state envisaged in the partition plan proclaimed its independence in 1948 as 
„Israel‟ and expanded its territory to occupy 77 per cent of Palestine and the larger 
part of Jerusalem. The second state, „Palestine‟, never came into being (UNISPAL, 
2007a).  In this way, “1948 marked two contrasting historical experiences: for the 
Zionists, it was the culmination of the dream of creating a state for world Jewry, as a 
means to put an end to European anti-Semitism; for Palestinians it was the time of 
expulsion and destruction of their land and society” (Chatty and Hundt, 2005, p. 15).   
As a result of the conflict, over half of the indigenous Palestinian population fled or 
were expelled to neighbouring countries by Jewish armed militias, including the 
Haganah, Irgun and Stern Gang.  To the north, Lebanon received 110,000 of these 
refugees, primarily from the Galilee region, which included the districts of Acre, 
Bisan, Safad, Tiberias and Haifa (Chatty and Hundt, 2005, p. 11).  On June 16, 1948, 
the Israeli cabinet adopted a plan preventing the return of these Palestinian Arab 
refugees to their homes, which were now located in the newly created State of Israel.  
At the same time, Arab governments refused to formally integrate Palestinian 
refugees, believing that this would threaten their right of return to their homes in 
Palestine.  The majority of Palestinians themselves believed that their expulsion 
would end in a matter of days, or at most, a few weeks.  Therefore, most refugees left 
their belongings behind and many left the doors to their houses open believing they 
would soon return home (Chatty and Hundt, 2005). 
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2.2  The Lebanese Civil War 
 
The newly arrived Palestinian refugees originally received a warm reception in 
Lebanon from both the Lebanese authorities and the public, as the international 
community, through the United Nations, worked to find a political solution to the 
crisis (Suleiman, 2006).  Various UN resolutions were drafted, including UN 
resolution 194 of December 11, 1948, confirming the right of the Palestinians to 
return (UNISPAL, 2007b).  However, once it became clear that a political solution 
would not be achieved in the short term, the Lebanese public and governmental 
response to the refugees grew harsher.  The arrival of a large number of Palestinian 
refugees into Lebanon was seen to pose a grave threat to the 1943 National Pact
1
, 
which divided political power in Lebanon along sectarian lines (confessionalism), 
mainly between the Maronite Christians
 
and the Sunni Muslims.  The arrival of 
110,000 Palestinian refugees, mostly Sunni Muslims and constituting one tenth of the 
population of Lebanon, threatened the delicate balance of power.  This proved to be a 
significant contributing factor in the sectarian violence that soon erupted, plummeting 
Lebanon into a 16 year long civil war (Suleiman, 2006).   
Sometimes described as being Muslim versus Christian, the Lebanese Civil War was 
actually a multifaceted conflict in which there was nearly as much intra-confessional 
(intra-sectarian) and ethnic violence as there was violence between Muslims and 
Christians.  Starting in 1975, the war resulted in an estimated 130,000 to 250,000 
civilian fatalities over the course of the next 15 years.  Another one million people 
(approximately one third of the population) were wounded, half of whom were left 
with lifetime disabilities (Fisk, 2001). 
                                                 
1
 The 1943 National Pact allocated political power on a confessional system based on the 1932 
Lebanese census. According to the National Pact, the President of Lebanon should be a Maronite 
Christian, the Prime Minister, a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Parliament, a Shi‟ite Muslim.  
Efforts to alter or abolish the confessional system of allocating power have been at the centre of 
Lebanese politics for decades. Those religious groups most favoured by the National Pact have sought 
to preserve it, while those who have seen themselves at a disadvantage have sought either to revise it 
or to abolish it. Nonetheless, many of the provisions of the National Pact were codified in the 1989 
Ta‟if Agreement, which has perpetuated sectarianism as a key element of Lebanese political life (Fisk, 
2001). 
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Palestinians directly witnessed, participated in and were victims of the Lebanese Civil 
War.  In 1969, the Cairo Agreement between the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
(PLO) leader Yasser Arafat and the Lebanese government, brokered by Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser, gave the PLO the right to conduct military operations 
against Israel from inside Lebanese territory in co-ordination with the Lebanese army.  
Under the agreement, the (then) 16 official Palestinian camps in Lebanon, home to 
300,000 Palestinian refugees, were removed from the jurisdiction of the Maronite-
dominated Lebanese army and placed under the full authority of the PLO.  However, 
as Palestinian fighters poured in to Lebanon from Jordan after the Black September
2
 
conflict, soon much of south Lebanon fell under their effective rule.  At this time, the 
PLO founded a variety of social institutions and economic corporations that 
employed large numbers of Palestinian youth and adults.  Moreover, the PLO and its 
factions also recruited a large number of Palestinian adults and youth into the service 
of its armed militias.  As Arafat set about building a „state-within-a-state‟ in south 
Lebanon to create a secure base for the PLO, the Lebanese authorities in the region 
were gradually pushed into irrelevancy.  However, although the PLO was 
undoubtedly Lebanon‟s most powerful fighting force at the time, it was little more 
than a loose confederation of armed groups, and Arafat proved unable to control rival 
factions.  Palestinian radical factions, operating as a law unto themselves, quickly 
alienated south Lebanese Shi‟ite and Christian villagers.  However, the PLO was 
welcomed by the Sunnis, who thought of them as a natural ally in sectarian terms, and 
by the Druze through a close personal relationship between Arafat and the Druze 
leader, Kamal Jumblatt
3
 (Fisk, 2001).    
The growing strength of the Palestinians in Lebanon put them into direct conflict with 
Lebanese political factions, specifically the Maronite-dominated Phalangist (Al 
Kataeb) party.  Between 1975 and 1976, there were numerous assassinations and 
                                                 
2 
 September 1970 is known as „Black September‟, when King Hussein of Jordan moved to quash the 
militancy of Palestinian organizations within Jordan and restore his monarchy's rule over the country.  
The violence resulted in the deaths of thousands of people, the vast majority of them Palestinian.  
Armed conflict lasted until July 1971 when the PLO and thousands of fighters were expelled to 
Lebanon (Shlaim, 2007). 
3
 Kamal Jumblatt was later assassinated by an unknown assailant in 1977.  
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reprisal killings between the Phalangists and the PLO.  The most significant of these 
events was the infamous bus massacre, known as the Ain Al Remmaneh incident, 
which is commonly identified as the spark that set off the Lebanese Civil War. 
On April 13, 1975, unidentified gunmen opened fire in a drive-by shooting on 
members of the Phalangist party as they left a church service in the Christian Ain Al 
Remmaneh section of East Beirut.  The attack was believed to have been an attempt 
on the life of Pierre Gemayel
4
 (leader of the Phalangist Party), who blamed it on 
Palestinians.  Hours later, Gemayel‟s supporters retaliated by killing 26 members of 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC), a 
faction of the PLO, who were traveling on a bus through Ain Al Remmaneh on the 
way back to the Palestinian refugee camp of Tal Al Za‟tar in northeast Beirut.  As 
news of the murders spread, armed clashes between Palestinian militias and the 
Phalangists erupted throughout the city. Soon Lebanese National Movement militias 
(led by Kamal Jumblatt) entered the battle alongside the Palestinians.  Sporadic 
violence grew into a civil war in which 80,000 people were killed during the next 
year and a half (Fisk, 2001).   
 
The Lebanese civil conflict became international with the intervention of 
neighbouring states.  In 1976, with the country in turmoil and the Maronites on the 
verge of defeat, (Maronite) Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh called for Syrian 
intervention in Lebanon on the grounds that Beirut‟s port would soon be closed due to 
the conflict and Syria would be cut off from receiving a large portion of its imports.  
Syria responded by ending its prior affiliation with the Palestinian Rejectionist Front, 
a radical Palestinian offshoot of the PLO, and began supporting the Maronite-
dominated Lebanese government.  In addition to wanting to protect its economic 
interests, Syria had its own political and territorial interests in Lebanon, which 
harbored cells of Islamists and the anti-Ba‟thist Muslim Brotherhood, both threats to 
                                                 
4
 Pierre‟s son, Bachir Gemayel, was assassinated on September 14, 1982 after being elected to the 
Lebanese Presidency.    
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the secular, Ba‟thist5 Syrian government of Hafez Al Assad.  Syria‟s occupation of 
Lebanon also provided it with a possible route of attack on Israel.  At the Lebanese 
President‟s request, Syrian troops entered Lebanon and easily overcame the Lebanese 
National Movement militias and Palestinian defenses.  With Damascus supplying 
arms, Maronite forces managed to break through the defenses of the Tal Al-Za‟tar, 
Jisr Al Basha and Dbayeh refugee camps in East Beirut, which had long been under 
siege.  A massacre of about 2,000 Palestinians followed, which put Syria under heavy 
international criticism from the Arab world.  However, in October 1976, Syria 
accepted an Arab League mandate to keep 40,000 of its troops in Lebanon as the bulk 
of an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) charged with disentangling the combatants in the 
civil war and restoring calm.  However, other Arab nations soon lost interest, and 
Syria was left in sole control of Lebanon, now with the ADF as a diplomatic shield 
against international criticism.  Syria remained in Lebanon for the next 29 years and 
only withdrew from the country in 2005 under international pressure after the 
assassination of the former Lebanese president Rafik Hariri (BBC, 2005).   
Another major international player in the Lebanese Civil War was the State of Israel.  
In 1978, Israel invaded Lebanon in Operation Litani under the pretext of removing 
the PLO threat from south Lebanon.  During this operation, Israeli troops took and 
occupied most of the area south of the Litani River.  At this time, the UN Security 
Council passed Resolution 425 calling for immediate Israeli withdrawal from 
Lebanese territory and created the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), charged 
with maintaining peace.  Israeli forces withdrew from Lebanon the same year but 
retained control of the southern region of the country by managing a 12 mile (19 km) 
wide „security zone‟ along the border. To hold these positions, Israel installed the 
South Lebanese Army (SLA), a Maronite-Shi‟ite proxy militia under the leadership of 
Major Sa‟ad Haddad, and supplied it with arms and resources.  Violent exchanges 
resumed between the PLO, Israel, and the SLA, with Israel conducting air raids 
against PLO positions in south Lebanon, the PLO attacking SLA positions and firing 
                                                 
5 The Ba‟ath party is a secular Arab nationalist movement, founded in the 1940‟s, which desired to 
unify all Arab countries into one State and to combat Western colonial rule.  It was strongest in Syria 
and Iraq, coming to power in both countries in 1963.   
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rockets into northern Israel, and the SLA continuing its efforts to consolidate power 
in the border region.  However, this was just a prelude for the violence and 
destruction that was to come (Fisk, 2001). 
In 1982, Israel launched what it referred to as „Operation Peace for Galilee‟, its most 
devastating assault on Lebanon, under the pretext of demolishing PLO strongholds in 
the south and establishing an expanded „security‟ zone to put northern Israel out of 
range of PLO rockets.  Israeli forces quickly penetrated 25 miles (40 km) into 
Lebanon, moving into East Beirut with the tacit support of Maronite leaders and 
militia.  On June 26, a UN Security Council resolution was proposed demanding “the 
immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces engaged around Beirut, to a distance of 10 
kilometers from the periphery of that city, as a first step towards the complete 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, and the simultaneous withdrawal of the 
Palestinian armed forces from Beirut, which shall retire to the existing camps”.  
However, the United States was quick to veto the resolution because it wanted to 
remove any chance of the PLO being preserved as a viable political force.  Instead, 
Washington supported Israel‟s objective of destroying the PLO before it could 
negotiate a withdrawal agreement (Chomsky, 1999).   
On August 20, 1982, a multinational force landed in Beirut to oversee the PLO 
withdrawal from Lebanon.  However, Israel reported that some 2,000 PLO militants 
were hiding in Palestinian camps on the outskirts of Beirut.  Ariel Sharon (then 
Israel‟s Defense Minister) and Israeli Chief of Staff, Rafael Eitan, met with 
Phalangist leaders to discuss ways to rid the Palestinian camps near Beirut of 
„terrorists‟.  On September 16, 1982, the „Israeli Defense Forces‟ (IDF) completely 
surrounded the Sabra and Shatila camps in West Beirut and controlled all of the 
entrances and exits of the camps by means of checkpoints. The IDF also occupied a 
number of multi-story buildings as observation posts.  Phalangist militia then entered 
the camps and massacred an estimated 700-3,000 Palestinians over the next 4 days 
(UNISPAL, 2007a).  The massacres resulted in an international outcry and calls for 
the international community to assume responsibility for stabilizing Lebanon.  As a 
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result, the multinational forces that had begun exiting Lebanon after the PLO‟s 
evacuation returned as „peace keepers‟.   
 
Israel occupied Lebanon, particularly the south, for the next 18 years and withdrew to 
the UN designated border, known as the „Blue Line‟, only in 2000.  Israel still 
occupies territories in the south which are claimed by Lebanon, namely the mainly 
Shi‟ite „seven villages‟ (Tarbikha, Saliha, Malkiyah, Nabi Yusha, Kades, Hunin, and 
Ibl Qamh) and the Sheba‟a Farms6.   
The 1982 Israeli invasion had profound and long-lasting consequences for 
Palestinians, Lebanon and the entire Middle East.  After Israel partially withdrew 
from Lebanon, the Palestinians attempted to rebuild their powerbase in the camps in 
the south and in Beirut.  As more Palestinians regrouped in Lebanon, Syria‟s anxiety 
grew, as it did not want Arafat to rebuild his power base in Lebanon or give Israel the 
pretext for another invasion.  Therefore, Syrian President Hafez Al Assad recruited 
the powerful Shi‟ite Lebanese Resistance Battalions (AMAL) militia to dislodge 
Arafat's loyalists from the camps.  The benefit of this alliance for Hafez Al Assad was 
more complete control of Lebanon through his Lebanese allies.  On the other hand, 
the benefit for AMAL was revenge for decades of what was seen as „Palestinian 
arrogance‟ and control of Lebanon.  In 1985, AMAL began a brutal two-year siege of 
Sabra, Shatila and Burj Al Barajneh camps in Beirut and Rashidieh camp near the 
southern Lebanese city of Tyre, which became known as the War of the Camps.  
During this period, AMAL prevented supplies of food and medicine from entering the 
camps and camp residents from leaving.  On April 7, 1987, AMAL finally lifted the 
siege and handed its positions in the camps over to the Syrian army. This devastating 
period witnessed the largest waves of Palestinian emigration from Lebanon (Fisk, 
2001).   
                                                 
6
 The Sheba‟a farms is an area of land with disputed sovereignty located on the border between 
Lebanon and the Israeli-occupied and controlled part of the Golan Heights (claimed by Syria). The 
area measures about 9 km (5.5 mi) in length, and averages 2.5 km (1.5 mi) in width, coming to about 
22 km² (8 sq mi). 
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Israel‟s 1982 invasion and occupation of Lebanon is also popularly held to be the 
major catalyst for the creation and rise of the Iranian and Syrian-supported Lebanese 
Shi‟ite organization, Hezbollah.  Since Hezbollah‟s foundation, there has been 
continual conflict with Israel, culminating in all-out warfare in July, 2006.  At this 
time, Israel invaded Lebanon again under the pretext of removing Hezbollah from its 
bases in south Lebanon, south Beirut and the Beka‟a Valley.  The conflict officially 
ended on August 14, 2006, when the UN Security Council issued resolution 1701 
ordering a ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel.   
Hezbollah‟s rise has had important implications for Palestinian resistance in Lebanon, 
in the Occupied Territories (West Bank and Gaza) and more generally.  Although 
they are not organizationally linked, Hezbollah provides military training as well as 
financial and moral support to the Gaza-based Palestinian Sunni organization (and 
PLO rival), the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) (Harik, 2004).  In 2006, 
Hamas was successful in the Palestinian parliamentary elections over the previous 
ruling party, Fatah, the largest faction of the PLO.  However, these election results 
were not recognized by many Western governments.  Hamas is currently gaining 
strength and popularity in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon (Levitt, 2006).  
 
The Ta‟if Agreement and its implications for Palestinians in Lebanon 
The official end of the Lebanese Civil War came in 1989 with the signing of the Ta‟if 
accord
7
, which reaffirmed the National Pact and the sectarian division of political 
power, despite the fact that significant demographic changes had taken place within 
the country (Suleiman, 2006).  As a result of this agreement, and the strengthening of 
the Lebanese government, the position of Palestinians in Lebanon has become much 
more precarious since 1989.  Since the signing of the Ta‟if agreement, Palestinians 
                                                 
7
 Negotiated in Ta‟if, Saudi Arabia, the Ta‟if Agreement was drafted to end the decades-long 
Lebanese Civil War, politically accommodate the demographic shift from a Christian to a Muslim 
majority, reassert Lebanese authority in south Lebanon (then occupied by Israel), and legitimize the 
Syrian presence in Lebanon, though the agreement stipulated that the Syrians were to withdraw after 
two years.  It was signed on October 22, 1989 and ratified on November 4, 1989 (Fisk, 2001).   
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are no longer allowed to have a military presence or bear arms outside the camps 
(although they are allowed to bear arms and keep order within the camps).  Moreover, 
Palestinians, particularly those in south Lebanon, are restricted in their movements 
and are now required to pass through Lebanese army checkpoints on their way in and 
out of the camps.  Today, Lebanese politicians across the political and religious 
spectra are in agreement that permanent Palestinian settlement, imposed or voluntary, 
would devastate the Lebanese nation.  This is because the naturalization of such a 
large number of Sunni Muslims would upset the delicate sectarian balance carefully 
reconstructed in Lebanon following the end of the civil war (Suleiman, 2006).  
Lebanon has 18 officially recognised religious sects, and power-sharing between 
them has always been complex.  According to the Constitution, the Lebanese 
President must be Maronite, the Prime Minister, Sunni and the Speaker of the 
Parliament, Shi‟ite.  Christians fear an increased Muslim population, and the Druze 
and Shi‟ite communities fear a larger Sunni population.  Consequently, any move 
towards permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees is considered to be an 
infringement of the Constitution and a threat to the post-war national reconciliation 
process.  As a result, the Lebanese government has adopted a rejectionist stance, 
refusing to participate in multilateral negotiations with Israel and refusing to 
introduce measures which would allow the further entrenchment of this “unwanted 
burden” (El Khazen, 1997, p. 276).   
 
In addition to the demographic challenges that naturalization would cause, strong 
resistance to permanent settlement comes from a section of the Lebanese population 
who lays blame on the Palestinians for the civil war and Israel‟s repeated invasions of 
Lebanon.  On the other hand, many Lebanese sympathetic to the plight of the 
Palestinians believe that naturalization of Palestinians in Lebanon would only 
legitimate Israel‟s land claims and, thus, remove any incentive for the international 
community to find a political solution to the refugee crisis (Sayigh, 2001).  Most 
Palestinians, themselves, view their existence in Lebanon as temporary and insist on 
their right to return to their homeland (Holt, 2006). 
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2.3  Palestinians in Contemporary Lebanon  
 
Almost all Palestinians in Lebanon rely entirely on the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) as the sole 
provider of education, health, relief and social services (UNRWA, 2003).  Therefore, 
being officially recognized by UNRWA as a „Palestinian refugee‟ is extremely 
important for all individuals.  However, only “persons whose normal place of 
residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes 
and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict (and their 
descendents)” are considered to be Palestinian refugees (UNRWA, 2003).  Under this 
definition, other Palestinians, such as those who fled their homes during the 1967 
Arab-Israeli War (Six-Day War), are not considered to be refugees and are, therefore, 
not automatically entitled to receive humanitarian assistance from UNRWA.  
 
The number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon registered with UNRWA currently 
sits at 409,714, or an estimated 10 per cent of the population of Lebanon (UNRWA, 
2003).  There are also an estimated 10,000 more refugees who remain unregistered 
(Chatty and Hundt, 2005, p.11).  The majority of refugees live in 12 official camps (4 
were destroyed in the civil war) run by UNRWA.  Palestinians in Lebanon have the 
highest ratio of camp residence at 56%, followed by the Gaza Strip at 54% (Chatty 
and Hundt, 2005, p.19).  In addition, about 40,000 refugees live in unofficial 
settlements close to UNRWA camps (known as „gatherings‟) or have integrated into 
Lebanese towns and cities (Abbas, 1997, p. 380).  The Lebanese government‟s 
Department of Palestinian Affairs acknowledges that 200,000 Palestinians live in 
camps only capable of holding 50,000 people (Schade-Poulsen, 2001, p. 12).  The 
result is decaying slums that consist of narrow corridors running between poorly 
constructed concrete buildings which still show the marks of war.  As all of the camps 
are overcrowded, they contain virtually no open or green spaces that can be used for 
recreational purposes or sporting activities (Ugland, 2003).   
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The health situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is generally poor.  The initial 
temporary status of the camps, in addition to poor planning and resource constraints, 
has led to the perpetuation of health hazards, such as exposed water pipes, open 
sewage, unpaved flooded roads and haphazard electrical extensions.  The 
combination of high population density, a shortage of drinking water, lack of proper 
infrastructure and the mismanagement of solid waste has led to an increase in the 
number of children with serious illnesses.  Only 7% of Palestinians are covered by 
health insurance, as compared with 42% of Lebanese.  Instead, 98% of Palestinians 
utilize UNRWA health services.  However, as UNRWA puts a strong emphasis on 
preventive rather than curative health care, most Palestinians do not have adequate 
access to hospitals and outpatient services (Ugland, 2003, p. 88).  In addition to 
physical health, Palestinians in Lebanon suffer excessive psychological, mental and 
emotional distress due to Lebanon‟s long history of conflict and warfare.  In a recent 
comprehensive health survey, Palestinians of all ages reported feeling high levels of 
anxiety and depression (Ugland, 2003, p. 74).     
 
Although UNRWA provides social services for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA‟s 
mandate, unlike that of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR), does not include protection.  Consequently, Palestinians in Lebanon are 
denied international legal and physical protection and remain dependent on Lebanese 
government policy.  Moreover, despite Palestinians being resident in Lebanon for 60 
years, there is no legal code regulating the rights and obligations of refugees.  Rather, 
regulation is administered through ad hoc decrees.  Without a clear legal framework, 
the status of Palestinians in Lebanon is extremely precarious (Shiblak, 1996).  For a 
number of Palestinian refugees, even the status of residency is unclear or prohibited.  
Under Lebanese regulations, registration with UNRWA and receipt of UNRWA 
rations are prerequisites to the issuance of refugee documents and permission to 
remain.  Therefore, those refugees who did not register with UNRWA in 1948, who 
became refugees as a result of the 1967 Six-Day War or who have since lost the right 
to receive UNRWA rations, are under constant threat of deportation (UNISPAL, 
2007a).   
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The Lebanese government continues to place restrictions on Palestinian refugees in 
all areas of public life, including employment, property ownership and travel.  While 
each aspect of public life is subject to specific legislation, an underlying 
discriminatory method employed by the Lebanese authorities is the „principle of 
reciprocity‟.  Under this legal principle, which dates back to ministerial decree 17561 
of July 10, 1962, Palestinians are placed on par with foreigners, who theoretically 
have access to treatment equal to that of Lebanese citizens.  However, under the 
principle of reciprocity, this is only available to foreigners hailing from countries that 
offer reciprocal treatment to Lebanese citizens.  As Palestinians have no country, they 
are effectively excluded from this arrangement (Sayigh, 2001).   
 
In addition to the principle of reciprocity, the Lebanese government places severe 
restrictions on Palestinians‟ participation in every aspect of public life.  Through the 
requirement of work permits and membership in professional associations and the 
principle of national preference, Palestinians are essentially barred from employment 
in over 70 occupations and restricted to working for low wages in trade, construction, 
manufacturing and seasonal agriculture (Suleiman, 2006).  The only possible legal 
professional opportunities for Palestinians in Lebanon include working for UNRWA, 
the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) or NGOs.  Low labour force participation, 
labour under-utilization and lack of access to the labour market mean that Palestinian 
households are among the poorest in Lebanon (Ugland, 2003).  UNRWA provides 
additional financial and material support to the most impoverished members of the 
Palestinian community, who are classified as Special Hardship Cases (SHCs).  11% 
of Palestinians in Lebanon are classified as SHCs, which is the highest proportion in 
any of UNRWA fields of operation, which include Jordan, Syria, the West Bank and 
Gaza (UNRWA, 2003, p. 1).   
 
The housing conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are also among the worst 
in the region.  Under the law of March, 2001, a revision of law 11614 of 1969, 
“anyone who does not have citizenship in a recognized state” is not permitted to own 
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property in Lebanon.  This is because property ownership among Palestinians would 
raise the spectre of permanent settlement (Suleiman, 2006).  Moreover, Palestinians 
have experienced massive destruction of homes, community service facilities, and 
water, sewage and electricity infrastructures as a result of armed conflict, especially 
in the last 20 years.  However, they have been unable to legally construct, reconstruct 
or rehabilitate dwellings, schools and infrastructure facilities due to Lebanese 
government fears of permanent settlement (Ugland, 2003).   
 
Palestinians in Lebanon also face severe restrictions in relation to travel and freedom 
of movement.  Within Lebanon, Palestinians are consistently subjected to 
demoralizing inspections by Lebanese soldiers at checkpoints leading into the camps, 
which frequently cause long queues (Suleiman, 2006).  Moreover, Palestinians are not 
permitted to visit Lebanese towns and villages in the borderlands with Israel.  
International travel for Palestinians is also a particularly lengthy, costly and 
bureaucratic process, which severely restricts their freedom of movement.  For 
example, between 1995 to 1999, Palestinians resident in Lebanon who had travelled 
abroad to find employment were required to obtain special re-entry visas to return to 
their homes (Suleiman, 2006).    
 
2.4  UNRWA and Formal Education 
 
Since 1950, UNRWA has been mandated to provide essential social services for 
Palestinian refugees, and the agency‟s largest single area of activity is Education, 
constituting around 55% of it budget (Chatty and Hundt, 2005, p. 38).  Education is 
highly valued among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon as it provides them with 
transferable skills that can be used to find work in the Arab Gulf countries (Ugland, 
2003).  In Lebanon, UNRWA runs 84 schools, which educate 42,022 students 
(UNRWA, 2003, p. 1).  However, UNRWA‟s education system in Lebanon is fraught 
with technical problems, due largely to the agency‟s dependence on international 
donations for operations (UNRWA, 2007).  UNRWA schools are inadequate in 
number and are generally in a state of disrepair.  Although Lebanese government 
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schools are open to Palestinian children, in practice most are prevented from 
attending through quota systems or discriminatory practices.  Due to the low access of 
Palestinian students to Lebanese government schools, and the prohibitively high cost 
of private schools, Lebanon is the only field of operations where UNRWA offers 
secondary education.  However, with only 3 secondary schools in the entire country, 
UNRWA itself admits that it “cannot hope to meet the high demand for secondary 
education among refugees in Lebanon” (UNRWA, 2001, p. 2).   
Even for those youth fortunate enough to attend secondary school, UNRWA is 
severely limited in its capacity to provide quality education.  Because of the political 
instability and ongoing conflict in the region, schooling for Palestinians is often 
disrupted.  In Lebanon, young people lost months and some even more than a year of 
schooling because of the prolonged civil conflict and the 1982 and 2006 Israeli 
invasions. Schools have come under fire or been destroyed and used as military 
outposts and detention centres. In response, UNRWA has prolonged the school year, 
when allowed to do so by the Lebanese government, and provided extra classes to 
compensate for lost instruction time. However, such lengthy disruptions have had a 
negative influence on the quality of education that UNRWA has been able to provide 
(UNRWA, 2007).  Moreover, the lack of psychological counselling available in 
UNRWA schools means that most Palestinian young people are not provided with the 
support they need to cope with the trauma of chronic regional conflict and violence 
(Ugland, 2003).   
Quality education for Palestinian refugees is also challenged due to population 
demographics.  School enrolments are increasing as the refugee population grows, 
and overcrowded classrooms are commonplace. To maximize use of limited 
resources, UNRWA is forced to run many of its schools on double shifts with two 
separate groups of students and teachers sharing a single school building. This is far 
from ideal as it reduces the number of instruction hours and adversely affects the 
participation of pupils in extra-curricular school activities, where they are present 
(UNRWA, 2007).    
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Another challenge to quality education for Palestinian refugees is in the area of 
school curriculum. One of UNRWA‟s aims, as stated in its Medium Term Plan 2005-
2009, is to give Palestinian refugees a basic education comparable to that provided in 
host government schools, so that they are on an equal footing in gaining access to 
educational and employment opportunities (UNRWA, 2005). Consequently, under 
agreements made with the host authorities, UNRWA has to use the curricula and 
textbooks of the countries/territories where it operates, and students sit for national 
exams at each stage of the education cycle.  Consequently, Palestinians have no input 
into what they learn or how they are assessed, and they are invisible in the curriculum 
(UNRWA, 2007).     
 
A further challenge to quality education for Palestinian refugees lies in the area of 
teacher education. The majority of teachers employed in the UNRWA system are 
locally recruited Palestinian refugees, themselves, who are not adequately trained as 
teachers.  This is particularly the case in Lebanon, where only a small pre-service 
two-year teacher training programme was instituted in September, 1998 to train 
teachers to teach the first three primary grades.  Thus, educational staff do not have 
adequate training to address the needs of youth or to provide counselling for young 
people who have been traumatized by years of conflict and war. Moreover, the 
standard of teaching is further negatively affected by the high workload and poor 
salaries paid to teachers leading to low morale (UNRWA, 2007).   
 
The incidence of premature school departure is on the rise in UNRWA schools in 
Lebanon.  Generally, the drop-out rates of students in UNRWA schools in Lebanon 
are double those in other UNRWA fields of operation.  In a survey, economic 
conditions (29%), disinterest in education (19.5%), family conditions (16.5%) and 
harsh treatment by teachers (3.2%) were cited as the main reasons for leaving school 
early (Sirhan, 1997, p. 391).  Gendered identities are of significance here.  Girls are 
more likely than boys to leave education prematurely and to attribute their departure 
to tradition or a lack of support received from their families or the school system 
(Abu-Habib, 1996).  The lack of support experienced by young women in relation to 
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education is symptomatic of the rise in influence of traditional attitudes and values in 
Palestinian society.  As a result, young women, especially those not academically 
gifted, are expected to stay at home to help with the housework or to marry at a young 
age (Zakharia and Tabari, 1997).  The high level of unemployment experienced even 
by well-educated Palestinians has also led to a decrease in the social value of 
education.  Palestinian doctors and engineers who are unemployed or work as casual 
labourers indicate to parents and youth that despite the great expense of higher 
education, the financial rewards are extremely limited in Lebanon (Ugland, 2003).   
 
2.5  Non-formal Institutions  
 
Since the end of the civil war, there has been a growth in the number of NGOs who 
fill the vacuum left by UNRWA cutbacks.  There are now 76 NGOs, both Arab and 
international, who provide assistance to the Palestinian community.  However, there 
is a lack of planning and coordination between the organizations, with an 
overrepresentation of services in the health and pre-school sectors.  NGO projects 
offer few cultural or youth activities for young people who, without school-based 
extra-curricular or summer activities, are restricted to the home, in the case of 
females, or are left to loiter in the streets, in the case of males.  Of the 41 youth clubs, 
most do not have a centre or financial resources, and most of the sports clubs have no 
playgrounds or coaches (Ajial, 2001, p. 6).  The lack of recreational and training 
opportunities for youth in the camps encourages social disorder and delinquency to 
increase unchecked (Ajial, 2001). 
 
Social and political disenfranchisement, combined with high unemployment and a 
lack of youth activities has arguably led to an increase in religious fundamentalism, 
especially amongst young men.  Since the collapse of the peace process and the 
beginning of the Al-Aqsa intifada, traditional responses of camp residents (holding 
rallies, collecting donations and passively watching news broadcasts) have been 
joined by increased membership in and support for political Islamist organizations, 
such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The growth in popularity of political 
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Islamist groups is symptomatic of underlying social problems, such as family 
breakdown, intra-community violence and crime.  The camps, rife with poverty, 
social disorder and fundamentalism, do not provide Palestinian youth with an 
environment conducive to educational engagement and achievement. Instead, 
political activity seems to provide both security and a sense of belonging for young 
men (Smyth, 1996). 
 
For Palestinian girls and young women, life in the camps is especially challenging.  
Due to the patriarchal structure of Palestinian society, girls are „policed‟ into adhering 
to a dress code of modesty, largely through the discourses of Islam.  Moreover, they 
are not culturally permitted to move freely in public places socially constructed as 
„male‟, such as the street, the coffee shop, the internet café, the sports field and the 
mosque.  Consequently, outside of school hours, girls are largely restricted to staying 
at home or visiting the homes of female relatives and neighbours.  In the home, girls 
endure stifling confinement within small and overcrowded living spaces, which often 
lack natural light and adequate ventilation (Ugland, 2003).  Within this environment, 
girls are responsible for performing all household chores as well as taking care of 
younger siblings, the sick and older relatives.   
 
In contrast, males are culturally responsible for earning the household income and 
protecting the family.  However, in the Palestinian context, men‟s ability to be 
appropriately gendered as „masculine‟ has been seriously undermined by the social, 
economic and political upheavals that have occurred in Lebanon over the last sixty 
years.  Men‟s loss of ability to protect and provide for their families, and their 
dependence on the „charity‟ of the Lebanese government and UNRWA, has 
„emasculated‟ them in the eyes of their wives and children.  This has encouraged 
many men to adopt „hyper-masculine‟ subject positions, which has often resulted in 
tensions in the home and domestic violence against women (Peteet, 2006) (see 
Chapter 3, Literature Review). 
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It is within this context of marginalization, chronic poverty, conflict and uncertainty 
that Palestinian young people in Lebanon have had to construct their identities. 
 
In the next section, I provide a detailed description of the three Palestinian refugee 
camps and two Palestinian gatherings in south Lebanon in which this study is 
situated.   
 
2.6  Camp profiles 
 
For this study, I conducted research in three official UNRWA refugee camps close to 
the south Lebanese port city of Tyre (Sur in Arabic): Rashidieh, Burj A-Shemali 
(Burj el-Shamali) and Al Bas (El Buss).   
 
Figure 2.1 
 
http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/lebanon.html accessed May 13, 2009 
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Rashidieh camp is located on the Mediterranean seashore 5 km from Tyre and 
contains 25,580 registered refugees (UNRWA, 2003).  The older part of the camp 
was built by the French Government in 1936 to accommodate Armenian refugees.  
The newer camp was built by UNRWA in 1963 to house Palestinian refugees 
evacuated from villages in northern Palestine.  Rashidieh camp was heavily affected 
by the Israeli invasion and occupation between 1982-1987, which resulted in the total 
or partial destruction of nearly 600 homes and the displacement of over 5,000 
refugees. UNRWA has not been able to assist in shelter rehabilitation or 
reconstruction due to a ban on the entry of building materials imposed by the 
Lebanese Government since 1998.  The only source of income for the camp‟s 
residents comes from work in seasonal agriculture or construction (UNRWA, 2003).  
There is one secondary school in Rashidieh for 2,805 enrolled students (2003/2004).  
This is one of only three secondary schools for Palestinians in all of Lebanon.  
Students from the neighbouring camps (Al Bas and Burj A-Shemali) also feed into 
this secondary school.  In addition, there are a number of NGOs which provide non-
formal education, skills-training courses and awareness-raising sessions on health, 
social, legal and gender issues and human rights (UNRWA, 2003).   
Burj A-Shemali (Burj el-Shemali) camp is located 3 km east of Tyre.  The camp was 
established after the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict to provide tented shelter for Palestine 
refugees from northern Palestine. UNRWA started providing services in the camp in 
1955. The camp also houses displaced Palestine refugees from other parts of 
Lebanon.  This camp suffered severe damage during the years of civil war, and much 
of the infrastructure has been destroyed.  Again, UNRWA has not been able to assist 
in shelter rehabilitation due to a ban on the entry of building material imposed by the 
Lebanese Government since 1998.  Unemployment is extremely high in Burj A-
Shemali.  Men work seasonally in agriculture, construction and manual labour, 
whereas women generally work in seasonal agriculture and domestic service 
(UNRWA, 2003) 
Al Bas (El Buss) camp is located 1.5 km south of Tyre.  The camp was originally 
built by the French Government in 1939 to accommodate refugees from Armenia.  In 
44 
 
1948, Palestinian refugees arrived from the Galilee region.  Due to its location and 
small size, this camp was spared much of the violence experienced by the other two 
camps during the years of civil war.  As in the other camps, the refugees from Al Bas 
mainly work as day-labourers or as seasonal workers in agriculture and construction 
(UNRWA, 2003) 
In addition to conducting research in the 3 official UNRWA camps described above, I 
also conducted some interviews in two „unofficial camps‟ or Palestinian gatherings 
close to Tyre: Al Mashuq (3 km east of Tyre) and Al Qasmieh (7 km northeast of 
Tyre).  While these „gatherings‟ are located outside of the official camps and are not 
homogenously „Palestinian‟, UNRWA still maintains some institutions there, such as 
schools, and provides some limited services to the community.   
 
In the next chapter, I discuss the theoretical framework in which this study is situated.   
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Chapter 3 – Literature Review 
 
 
In this chapter, I provide the conceptual framework for the study and explore the 
academic literature and current theoretical debates around the broad concept of 
„identity‟ as informed by post-structuralist, post-colonialist and feminist perspectives.  
I begin the literature review with a discussion of the ways in which identity is framed 
by notions of sameness and difference and how this is played out through the 
organizing concepts of nation and home and implicated in the construction of specific 
aspects of identity, such as kinship, culture, ethnicity, religion and gender.  This raises 
important questions about how people construct identity in the context of forced 
migration, exile and statelessness (see Chapter 5, Boundaries).  Next, I narrow the 
focus of the discussion and undertake a micro-level examination of how identity is 
constructed through the appropriation and articulation of discursive resources and 
performances both within and through social institutions (see Chapter 6, Institutions).  
Finally, I broaden the discussion back out to examine the concept of agency and 
discuss its importance for the construction, maintenance and performance of identities 
in shifting time and space (see Chapter 7, New Identities).  I conclude the chapter 
with the research questions that I seek to explore about how social life is created, 
experienced and given meaning by Palestinian young people in refugee camps in 
south Lebanon.   
   
3.1  Introduction 
 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 1 (Introduction), identity is an important subject of 
analysis because it locates each of us in the world and presents a link between us and 
the society in which we live (Woodward, 1997).  On a personal level, how we 
experience social life influences the formation of our self-image and the development 
of our self-confidence (Hall, 1987).  On this foundation, we construct our personal 
goals and aspirations.  For example, a confident young person may be more likely to 
pursue higher education or professional goals than someone who has less self-belief.  
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In this way, our identities help to shape our level of participation in social life and 
influence the form that this participation takes.   
 
Reciprocally, our social identities help to construct us as individuals. All of us have 
multiple individual and social identities which are constructed in relation to one 
another (Giddens, 1984).  How we are positioned in relation to gender, ethnicity, race, 
class and age, among others, provides us with the parameters through which we may 
exercise our choices and develop our talents and abilities.  Moreover, our place in the 
world also determines what groups we are included in and what groups we are 
excluded from.  Group membership is important because it gives us a sense of 
belonging and regulates our access to resources, information, opportunities and power 
(Giddens, 1984).  For example, being male or a member of a dominant social group 
may open up more opportunities for education or employment in the „public sphere‟ 
than being female or a member of a minority group.  In all of these ways, identity has 
real social and material consequences for our daily lives.  Moreover, socially and 
culturally constructed categories of identity, such as race, ethnicity, gender, religion, 
nationality, sexual orientation and class do not act independently of one another.  
Rather, they interact on multiple and often simultaneous levels contributing to 
systematic social inequality (Hill Collins, 1991). 
 
In order to know who we are, we must first know who we are not.  In other words, 
identity can only be understood in terms of relationships.  As Woodward argues,  
 
identity relies for its existence on something outside itself: namely another 
identity which it is not…something that both differs from it, yet provides the 
conditions for it to exist (Woodward, 1997, p.9).   
 
Thus, an individual is constructed through his/her relationship to another person at a 
particular time and within a particular system of relationships.  Therefore, to be 
Palestinian is to be not Lebanese or not Israeli.  Identity is, thus, marked by 
„difference‟, and difference is underpinned by exclusion and the erection of physical, 
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structural and symbolic „boundaries‟ between communities.  Construction of these 
boundaries can be seen to be both positive and negative.  In one sense, difference is 
both necessary for the production of meaning and the formation of language and 
culture.  At the same time, the construction of boundaries can also result in a 
heightened degree of social exclusion, xenophobia, hostility and aggression toward 
the „Other‟ (Hall, 1997).  This can be particularly true of the exile.  As Said argues,  
 
With very little to possess, you hold on to what you have with aggressive 
defensiveness.  What you achieve in exile is precisely what you have no wish 
to share, and it is in the drawings of lines around you and your compatriots 
that the least attractive aspects of being an exile emerge: an exaggerated sense 
of group solidarity as well as a passionate hostility toward outsiders, even 
those who may in fact be in the same predicament as you (Said, 1984, p. 51).   
 
In this way, notions of sameness, difference and boundaries are particularly relevant 
to the construction and maintenance of Palestinian identities in refugee camps and 
gatherings in Lebanon. 
 
In the next section, I will discuss how, in the 21
st
 century, boundaries between 
communities, and between Palestinians and „Others‟, are constructed on the basis of 
„the nation‟. 
 
3.2  Nation 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 (Context), Palestinians live in exile as stateless refugees in 
Lebanon.  Therefore, for Palestinians, boundaries around their community are largely 
constructed through discourses of nationalism and attachment to a specific 
geographical location (the territory presently occupied by the State of Israel).  The 
construction of the nation of „Palestine‟ provides Palestinians both with a physical 
and symbolic point of origin, a space of belonging and the security of an ultimate 
destination.  Moreover, national identity provides Palestinians with a sense of 
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collective belonging, rootedness and centeredness.  While important for all people, 
these elements are particularly significant for refugees forced to live in exile.    
 
As nations must be constructed on the basis of something, it is through the concept of 
difference and the erection of boundaries between communities that nations are 
forged.  One of the first requirements of a nation is that individuals must share certain 
characteristics, and at least some of these characteristics must be exclusive enough to 
distinguish one nation from another (Anderson, 1991).  However, this difference 
between communities may be marked in different ways.   
 
In the next section, I discuss how construction of the nation is often marked through 
narratives of shared kinship, culture, ethnicity and religion, as well as the crosscutting 
discourse of gender.  I also discuss the implications these narratives have on the 
construction of Palestinian identities in Lebanon (see Chapter 5, Boundaries).   
 
Kinship 
In modern nationalisms, nations often have their basis in biology and are constructed 
around the genealogical origin of a specific people.  In this narrative, only a group of 
people who share common kinship ties can be classified as a nation.  This is the most 
exclusive form of nationalism, as „blood‟ alone is seen as the only legitimate marker 
of belonging to the nation.  From this perspective, boundaries between nations are 
natural, permanent and fixed (Hall, 1997).   
 
As notions of „citizenship‟ are constructed through genealogical inheritance in ethnic 
nationalist discourse, this has specific implications for deciding who can be, and who 
cannot be a „citizen‟ (Muller, 2008).  Indeed, national identity based on shared 
biology lies at the very heart of the „Palestinian/Israeli conflict‟ and the issue of „right 
of return‟ for Palestinian refugees.  For example, Israel‟s Law of Return grants every 
ethnic Jew the right to settle in Israel and automatically acquire citizenship.  
However, at the same time, Palestinians in the diaspora are denied their right to return 
„home‟, as they are viewed by the State of Israel as an ethnically distinct people group 
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(Hadary, 1999).  Moreover, ethnicity interacts with gender in this discourse to 
construct particularly exclusive notions of citizenship based on either matrilineal 
inheritance, as in the case of Israel, or patrilineal inheritance, as in the case of 
Lebanon (and other Arab societies) (Cook, 1994).  For example, in Lebanon, children 
automatically inherit the nationality of their father.  Therefore, a child born to a 
Lebanese father and a Palestinian mother will automatically obtain Lebanese 
citizenship.  On the other hand, a child born to a Lebanese mother and a Palestinian 
father will legally remain Palestinian, stateless and unable to benefit from the rights 
of Lebanese citizenship such as education, health care and employment.  In the case 
of Israel, only children born of a Jewish mother are considered to be sufficiently 
Jewish to be eligible for Israeli citizenship (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001).   
 
Despite the importance of kinship in the construction of nations in the Levant region, 
this biological determinist line of thinking is highly questionable from a critical race 
theoretical perspective.  First of all, it is the social meanings we attach to biological 
differences between individuals, rather than the differences themselves, that signify 
(Winant, 2000).  Secondly, it is naïve and historically inaccurate to assume that 
bloodlines have remained pure throughout the centuries.  Particularly in the Levant, 
political borders have shifted and territories have been redistributed throughout 
history.  This has resulted in significant intermarriage between communities, such as 
among the numerous people groups who populated the ancient land of Palestine.  This 
means that the possibility of biological purity in the modern Levant is nothing more 
than a discursive myth used to construct boundaries between groups (Renan, 1990).  
In other words, the biological basis on which the nations in this region have been 
constructed is highly suspect. 
 
History and culture 
Another narrative used to construct the nation is the notion of a fixed and authentic 
national identity rooted in shared history and culture.  In this narrative, nations are 
seen as entities with a centuries-old history, and nationalism attempts to fashion this 
pre-history into a sense of common identity (Smith, 1999).  The construction of a 
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common national identity is accomplished through individuals‟ acceptance of stories 
written by their „narrative ancestors‟ and claiming them as part of their own personal 
history.  In this sense, it is not important if these historical „facts‟ are valid or 
verifiable.  Rather, what signifies is the act of individuals seeing themselves in what 
others have said and written, taking it up and claiming it as their own (Ricoeur, 1988).  
In this way, many nationalisms are based on historically flawed interpretations of past 
events, and nations tend to overly mythologize small, inaccurate parts of their history 
to create a collective consciousness.  Two such historicized nation-building doctrines 
related to this study that are imagined in cultural absolutes and oppositions are 
„Zionism‟ and „Phoenicianism‟.    
 
Zionism is an example of a historicized nation-building narrative used to legitimize 
the existence of a nation and its present occupancy of a particular territory.  The 
political movement of Zionism originally supported the „re-establishment‟ of a 
„homeland‟ for the Jewish people in Palestine and continues to support the modern 
State of Israel.  Zionism is partly based upon religious tradition linking the Jewish 
people to the land of Israel, a land promised to the Jews by God, according to the 
Bible.  During the early years of the State of Israel, the Zionist mantra of „a people 
without a land for a land without a people‟ was often quoted to encourage Jewish 
immigration to, and colonization of, the „empty‟ land of Palestine (Christie, 1998).  
However, not only was this narrative historically inaccurate, it created a revisionist 
version of history where,  
 
Israeli citizens have been trained not to „see‟ Palestinians. It is not that they 
are not there, but political, visual, cultural, and legal barriers have been 
erected that obscure the view (Petrovato, 2006, p.1).   
 
Moreover, for Zionists, Israeli national culture is assumed to be shared with previous 
generations of Jews and passed down as an historical „inheritance‟ to all Jews 
throughout the diaspora.  Therefore, in their quest to inhabit their „natural‟ identity, 
Zuckermann notes how once Zionists move to Israel, many refuse to speak their 
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diasporic mother tongues and adopt Hebrew as their „authentic‟ „native‟ language.  
Moreover, many immigrants give themselves new „authentic‟ Hebrew names 
(Zuckermann, 2006).   
 
Phoenicianism is another example of a historicized nation-building doctrine that is 
imagined in cultural absolutes and oppositions.  Phoenicianism relates to the ongoing 
debate in Lebanon over the ethnic origin of the Lebanese people.  A form of Lebanese 
nationalism, Phoenicianism promotes the concept that the Lebanese are „pure‟ 
descendants of the Phoenician people, whom they view as separate and distinct from 
the other ancient residents of the region, such as the Palestinians (Abu-Khalil, 1998).  
Although Phoenicianists come from all Lebanese religious sects, Phoenicianism is 
mostly embraced by Maronite Christians who are anxious to dissociate themselves 
from „Arabism‟ and its Islamic connections by becoming the legitimate „heirs‟ to the 
ancient Phoenician tradition (Kaufman, 2004).  In this way, ethnic nationalist 
discourse works to erect boundaries between Palestinians and their neighbors, both in 
Israel and in Lebanon, making homemaking and belonging for Palestinians in 
Lebanon a formidable task (Abu-Khalil, 1998).   
 
Ethnicity and religion 
As the examples above reveal, ethnicity and religion are both important boundary 
markers in the context of nation-building, particularly in the Middle East.  However, 
the relationship between ethnicity and religion is a complex one.   
 
For some scholars, religion is merely a subset of ethnicity.  For example, Horowitz 
argues that ethnic groups are defined by ascriptive differences, whether they be color, 
appearance, language or religion (Horowitz, 1985).  Indeed, ethnicity and religion 
share many features in common.  Like ethnicity, religion is a social construct which 
functions to unite, organize and mobilize individuals within a specific context and for 
a specific purpose, such as nationalism.  Additionally, both ethnic and religious 
identities attempt to trace themselves „back‟ to a specific place (ie: Jerusalem), time 
(ie: antiquity) and ancestor(s) (ie: the prophet(s) in order to “derive an ideological 
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lineage and to provide a guide for future actions” (Kinnvall, 2004, p.756).  In this 
way, both ethnicity and religion offer individuals a kind of immortality, as the group 
continues on even after the passing of the individual.  Furthermore, ethnic and 
religious identities often overlap, which means that it is not always clear whether 
people are organizing based on shared attachments to religion or ethnicity (Stewart, 
2009).  For example, Sunni Muslim religious identity forms the core of Arab ethnic 
identity.  Therefore, individuals unite and act on the basis of both of these identities at 
different times and in different situations.  However, the relationship is quite 
complex, as ethnic and religious identities do not always conveniently and neatly 
align.  For example, in the so-called Arab World, some ethnic groups, such as the 
Kurds and the Berbers, are Sunni Muslims but non-Arabs.  On the other hand, groups 
such as the Assyrians and Chaldeans are Arabs but non-Muslims.  In addition, there 
are many non-Sunni Muslim faiths in the Arab world, including various Shi‟ite sects 
and the Druze.  All of this problematizes the „essentialized‟ conflation of „Arab‟ with 
„Sunni Muslim‟ in contemporary political discourse (Islamic Human Rights 
Commission, 2004).   
 
Despite the similarities and often overlapping nature of ethnicity and religion, there 
are some significant differences between them which have important implications for 
nation-building in the Middle Eastern context.  First, while ethnicity encompasses 
cultural signifiers, such as language, customs and behaviors relating to everyday life, 
religion (at least in the context of the three monotheistic religions of Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam) is primarily concerned with people‟s relationship with God.  
In this relationship, the world is polarised into „good‟ and „evil‟ with non-adherents of 
the faith being constructed as the apostate „Other‟.  On the one hand, belief in one 
stable „truth‟ through religion provides a sort of „ontological security‟ for individuals 
living in an otherwise chaotic and changing world, particularly in the context of 
globalisation (Giddens, 1991).  On the other hand, the essentialist polarization 
between „believers‟ and „non-believers‟ can help to fragment national communities 
through the construction of supra-nationalisms (Christendom; Islamic Umma 
[nation]) and sub-nationalisms (Maronite/Sunni/Shi‟ite/Druze Lebanon). Moreover, it 
53 
 
can also fuel conflicts.  When existing conflicts related to political, social or 
economic inequalities are discursively framed as religious, they are given „divine 
sanction‟, and supporters come to believe they are doing „God‟s will‟ by attacking the 
„evil Other‟.  This is particularly salient in the Middle Eastern context where both 
Israelis and Palestinians, not to mention many Lebanese groups (ie: Hezbollah), have 
framed their claims to specific territory and defended their (para)military actions 
against „Others‟ as „holy war‟ or jihad (Harik, 2004).         
 
Another key difference between ethnicity and religion is that, certainly in a Middle 
Eastern context, religious identity is largely constructed as fixed and unchangeable.  
For example, in Islam, an individual is „born‟ a Muslim, and conversion from Islam 
to another religion is considered to be an apostasy punishable by death (Esposito, 
2004).  Moreover, religious identities are generally constructed in more exclusive 
terms than ethnic identities.  For instance, a child of a „mixed marriage‟ can be both 
half-Lebanese and half-Palestinian and be equally fluent in Arabic, English and 
French.  However, that same child cannot be both half-Muslim and half-Christian.  
Rather, he or she will be required to choose (or be allocated) one religion or another.  
In addition, religious differences between people often imply very different ways of 
understanding the world, whereas ethnic differences often do not.  For example, 
observance of „sexual purity‟ before marriage may be required of adherents of a 
particular religious sect.  On the other hand, there may be a diversity of acceptable 
sexual mores and behaviors within a particular ethnic group.  In other words, it can be 
argued that there is less ambiguity vis-à-vis group boundaries in relation to religion 
than to ethnicity.  However, the situation is more complex than it may first appear, as 
religious conversion (as a spiritual experience) is indeed possible in many religions, 
whereas ethnic conversion is usually not.  Moreover, ethnic difference may also 
imply different ways of seeing the world, such as the differing world-views 
associated with language.  On the other hand, there is a lot of commonality in 
perceptions and beliefs among the major world religions (Stewart, 2009).   
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A further difference between ethnicity and religion is that while religion is a social 
construct, it is a very formal one with formal religious organizations and institutions.  
Thus, while ethnic groups have to work hard at creating these structures, „ready-
made‟ organizations and institutions, such as churches, mosques and synagogues, 
assist religious groups in unifying, organizing and mobilizing followers.  Moreover, 
the extensive influence and control of these religious institutions over adherents‟ 
behavior inevitably leads to politicization, with religious organizations either 
collaborating with the state or coming into conflict with it (Stewart, 2009).  Religious 
organizations are also often in a much stronger position than ethnic ones to secure 
external support through links with other co-religionists around the world.  For 
example, Islamic organizations in Lebanon and Palestine receive financial and 
organizational support from all over the „Muslim World‟, whereas Christians in the 
same region primarily receive support from the so-called „Christian West‟ (Stewart, 
2009).  On the other hand, ethnic groups who are geographically located within a 
specific territory generally have a narrower base of support.  However, in the context 
of globalization and transnationalism, support for ethnic groups can be increased if 
there is a large diasporic community which can mobilize both material and human 
resources.  Indeed, it is through the involvement of the Arabic and Jewish diasporic 
communities around the world that the „Palestinian/Israeli conflict‟ has transcended 
geographical borders and taken on global dimensions. 
 
As previously mentioned, there is a strong tendency for religious and ethnic 
affiliations to overlap in many nations.  However, people often form a stronger 
attachment to one particular identity position than another within a particular context.  
For example, individuals can be effectively organized and mobilized under a single 
religious umbrella despite there being many ethnic differences between them.  An 
example of this is the State of Israel where all ethnic divisions between „citizens‟ are 
subordinated to their shared Jewishness.  Having said this, ethnic divisions between 
the Mizrahim
8
, the Sephardim
9
 and the Ashkenazim
10
 continue to run deep in 
                                                 
8 Jews descended from the Jewish communities of the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
9 Jews descended from the Jewish communities of the Iberian Peninsula.    
55 
 
contemporary Israeli society (Shohat, 1999).  On the other hand, adherents of the 
same religion can also be organized and mobilized into conflicting groups based on 
the „difference‟ of ethnicity.  For example, the Kurds, who are overwhelmingly Sunni 
Muslim, have been waging armed resistance against the governments of the 
predominately Sunni nation-states of Turkey, Syria and northern Iraq in the interests 
of ethnic self-determination and the creation of a new ethnic state of „Kurdistan‟ 
(Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2004).   
 
When both ethnic and religious identities mark the boundaries of difference between 
„insiders‟ and „outsiders‟, Stewart (2009) argues that there are two features which 
help to determine which identity will become the most salient for mobilization.  First, 
the number and relative size of groups, or demographics, can influence how people 
mobilize.  Where there is a large number of different ethnicities, effective 
mobilization along ethnic lines may become difficult, and organization through some 
overarching identity, such as religion, may prove to be more strategic.  For example, a 
shared adherence to Islam has helped to unify diverse ethnic groups within the so-
called „Arab World‟.  However, the converse is also true, and during the 1970‟s and 
80‟s, many Palestinian organizations, such as the PLO, the PFLP and the DFLP11, 
found it more strategic to subordinate religious divisions amongst Palestinians and 
focus on their shared experience of ethnic oppression and common goals of ethnic 
self-determination and future statehood.     
 
The second feature which helps to determine which identity will become the most 
salient for mobilization in a particular context is „shared oppression‟.  As Stewart 
(2009) argues, where strong inequalities and discrimination occur along ethnic or 
religious lines, this will tend to politicize that identity and encourage mobilization.  A 
relevant example of this is how the historic marginalization and persecution of Shi‟ite 
                                                                                                                                           
10 Jews descended from Jewish communities of Germany, northern France, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Russia 
and the former Eastern Europe.   
11
 
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP) are Marxist, secular, Palestinian nationalist political and paramilitary organizations.
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Muslims in south Lebanon encouraged the strengthening of religious identities in this 
community.  This ultimately took a political form and led to the creation of the Amal 
and Hezbollah political/paramilitary organizations (Nasr, 2006; Harik, 2004).  On the 
other hand, the forced removal of Palestinians from their homes during Al Nakba 
helped to construct boundaries between Palestinians and „Others‟ on the basis of 
ethnic communal suffering and „loss‟, regardless of religion.  However, within the 
context of current political and social conditions, and the overall „Islamicization‟ of 
the region, Sunni Islam is fast becoming a much more significant marker of 
Palestinian identity.  This indicates that identity alliances can slip and reconfigure as a 
strategic response to shifting environmental conditions.  This will be discussed later 
in this chapter (3.5 see New Identities).   
 
As discussed above, ethnic and religious nationalist discourses are prevalent in 
modern nationalisms, including Palestinian nationalism.  However, they are highly 
problematic from a number of perspectives.  First, ethnic/religious nationalists tend to 
base national identity on the collective use of a single historical narrative rather than 
being inclusive of multiple histories.  For example, reflecting on his own memories of 
the Hindu-Muslim riots during the India-Pakistan partition in the 1940‟s, Sen recalls 
how: 
 
The broad human beings of January were suddenly transformed into the 
ruthless Hindus and fierce Muslims of July…A great many persons‟ identities 
as Indians, as subcontinentals, as Asians, or as members of the human race, 
seemed to give way - quite suddenly – to sectarian identification with Hindu, 
Muslim, or Sikh communities…The same people were suddenly different 
(Sen, 2006, p. 2, 9-10).   
 
In the Levant region, identities have been similarly essentialised based on attachments 
to nation or religious sect.  For example, in the „Israeli/Palestinian‟ conflict, Jews and 
Arabs have been constructed as binary opposites (Kalmar and Penslar, 2005).  
However, as Kalmar and Penslar note, prior to the dismemberment of the Ottoman 
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Empire, the population of what is now Israel was multicultural, and Muslims, 
Christians and Jews inhabited the land.  Though, at the creation of the modern State 
of Israel as an officially „Jewish‟ state, nearly all native Palestinian Jews became 
„citizens‟ of Israel, while other inhabitants became collectively known as Palestinians.  
Today, the people inhabiting the territory are generally regarded to fall into two 
categories that are assumed to be mutually exclusive: „Jews‟ and „Arabs‟. However, 
Arabs may be adherents of any religion, and there are Muslim Arabs, Christian Arabs 
and Jewish Arabs, among others.  Moreover, Israeli Jews hail from dozens of 
countries around the world, including many from the so-called Arab World, such as 
Iraq, Yemen, Morocco and Algeria.  Therefore, the construction of Israel as „Jewish‟ 
has created a false dichotomy, positioning Israeli Jews in opposition to Palestinian 
Arabs, even though many inhabitants of the land identify themselves as both Jewish 
and Arab (Kalmar and Penslar, 2005).  The privileging of a singular historical 
narrative is also problematic in that the construction of Israel as a „Jewish‟ state 
homogenizes and essentializes all Israeli identities.  As Sen astutely adds,  
 
It would be a long-run victory of Nazism if the barbarities of the 1930‟s 
eliminated forever a Jewish person‟s freedom and ability to invoke any 
identity other than his or her Jewishness (Sen, 2006, p. 8).   
 
Beyond its significance in regional conflicts, the privileging of singular identities has 
also incited and inflamed conflict between the Arab World and „the West‟ and served 
as the theoretical underpinning for the „clash of civilizations‟ theory.  From this 
perspective, humanity can be pre-eminently classified into distinct and discrete 
civilizations, such as the so-called „Muslim World‟ or „Western civilization‟.  
Moreover, it is assumed that all relations between human beings can be seen in terms 
of relations between these different civilizations (Huntington, 1996).  However, this 
thesis is problematic for a number of reasons.  First, it denies the extensive interaction 
between different civilizations throughout history and the mutual influence that these 
societies have had on the development of culture.  Moreover, the essentialized 
distinction between „East‟ and „West‟ homogenizes populations and presumes that 
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there is no room for intellectual diversity within communities.  For example, all 
Muslims are frozen as a static, inward-looking, culture-bound population that is 
„incompatible with modernity‟ (Alexander, 2002).   Likewise, all Muslims are 
assumed to have the same political views, lifestyles and cultural tastes (Sen, 2006).  
Moreover, Sen argues that in the contemporary world, in the context of 
„Islamophobia‟ and the „War on Terror‟, there is a general failure to distinguish 
between „Islamic history‟ and the „history of Muslim people‟.  In other words, the 
Western search for the „moderate Muslim‟ confounds moderation in politics with 
moderation in religious faith.  For example, a person with a strong religious faith may 
have tolerant politics, while the converse may also be true.  For Sen,  
 
Muslims, like all other people in the world, have many different pursuits, and 
not all of their priorities and values need be placed within their singular 
identity of being Islamic (Sen, 2006, p.14).   
 
Again, this critique is particularly problematic for the construction of Israel as a 
„Jewish‟ state, as Israelis have many identities in addition to their „Jewishness‟.  
Moreover, it also problematizes Palestinian Islamist political organizations, such as 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which have equated being Palestinian with being (Sunni) 
Muslim (Levitt, 2006). 
 
Another highly problematic aspect of nation-building based on shared history is the 
inevitable search for „truth‟ and „authenticity‟.  As Spivak questions, who speaks for 
whom, and who can speak for whom?  This is because any national origin has long 
become obscured and unrecoverable.  Moreover, the historical past is always and 
inevitably read through contemporary interests and concerns (Spivak, 1988).  In this 
way, meanings and identities are constantly shifting, transforming and emerging.  
This means that in another time or in another context, a meaning will become a 
different meaning because of new interactions between relevant „signifieds‟ and 
„signifiers‟ (Dimitriadis and Kamberelis, 2006).  In other words, meanings and 
nations cannot be simply „recovered‟ from an „authentic‟ past, as they no longer exist 
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as they once were.  Rather, they have been, and will continue to be, transformed into 
something new.   
 
For Kalmar and Penslar (2005), an example of the shifting nature of identities is how, 
historically, Jews have been constructed variably as both „occidental‟ and „oriental‟ in 
the Western world.  Identification with the ancient Israelites and the Biblical lands 
allowed Jews throughout the centuries to be seen, both by themselves and by those in 
the West, as an „oriental‟ people.  However, in the twentieth century, this perception 
was challenged in the West only as the result of the Jewish-Arab conflict in the 
Middle East, through which the Jews generally came to be thought of as a Western 
people (Kalmar and Penslar, 2005).  In a similar way, the discourse of Zionism was 
used by both Jews and Europeans to „return‟ an „oriental‟ people back to their 
„oriental homeland‟.  On the other hand, Palestinians, viewing the Jews as a Western 
people, have generally viewed Zionism as an example of „Orientalist‟ ideology in the 
service of Western colonialism.  In other words, for many Palestinians, the creation of 
the State of Israel is linked to the West‟s imperialist project in „the Orient‟ (Kalmar 
and Penslar, 2005).    
 
Further problematizing the search for authenticity in the construction of nations is that 
the identification of past culture with present culture is often largely symbolic.  For 
example, the archaeological site of the temple of Baalbek, an exceptional example of 
Imperial Roman architecture, is managed by the Lebanese government and is 
considered to be an important Lebanese national symbol, even though Lebanon and 
Lebanese people did not exist when it was constructed several millennia ago.  In 
addition to archaeological sites, modern nations have similarly appropriated ancient 
literature, art and even entire civilizations as „national heritage‟ (Smith, 1986).  For 
example, antiquity has been used to legitimate the existence of the modern State of 
Israel in the territory formerly inhabited by the ancient Israelites.  This appropriation 
of history has created a powerful common mythology on which the nation has been 
constructed (Smith, 1986).     
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However, the appropriation of ancient symbols in order to construct authenticity for 
the nation is not unproblematic, as modern nations are largely ethnically and 
culturally heterogeneous.  Moreover, „history‟ has largely been written from a male 
perspective, thereby silencing female accounts.  In this way, a historical connection 
with a particular place or artifact may constitute continuity for one group, but it may 
not for others.  For example, the Western („Wailing‟) Wall in Jerusalem, dating back 
to 19 BCE, is considered to be an important symbol of Israel‟s „Jewish‟ and male12 
foundations, even though the modern state comprises a population that is religiously 
heterogeneous.  Similarly, Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, which was constructed in 
the seventh century, has been adopted as an enduring symbol of the modern nation of 
Palestine, even though this symbol is largely only inclusive of Muslim, male
13
 
Palestinians.  In this way, Al Aqsa mosque has helped to appropriate Islam as a key 
signifier of Palestinian national identity and difference.   
 
As discussed above, what is important here is not the degree of actual difference that 
exists between communities.  Rather, what signifies is how this difference is 
constructed, regulated and enacted by the community.  For example, in the case of 
Lebanese and Palestinians, even small differences in pronunciation are enough to 
categorize individuals as members of the Lebanese or Palestinian communities, 
despite the numerous historical, cultural and linguistic similarities which both groups 
share.  On the other hand, the internal diversity found within both the Lebanese and 
Palestinian communities is far greater than the differences between them.  For 
example, in Palestinian narrative, all Lebanese are constructed as „Other‟ under the 
umbrella of national identity despite the splintering of socio-economic experiences 
                                                 
12  In ancient times, females occupied only a raised gallery along three sides of the court of the Jerusalem Temple. 
There, they  were allowed to observe religious ceremonies but never participate in them (Bach, 1999). 
13 In Islamic worship, although women are allowed to go to mosques, many do not do so out of fears of 
unchastity.  Those who do worship separately from men.  Muslims explain this by citing the need to avoid male 
distraction during prayer prostrations that raise the buttocks while the forehead touches the ground.  Separation 
between sexes ranges from men and women on opposite sides of an aisle, to men in front of women (as was the 
case in the time of Muhammad), to women in second-floor balconies or separate rooms accessible by a door only 
for women (Mattson, 2006). 
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and cultural segmentation among Palestinians themselves (Hobsbawm, 1990).  This is 
an example of how nations work to construct notions of ethnicity through the drawing 
of boundaries between groups and the negating of difference within communities 
(Alexander, 2002).   
 
It is clear that in the modern Levant, a plethora of nations-states have been founded 
on the „genie in a bottle‟ understanding of the construction of nations.  As Wilford 
sardonically states,  
 
Once the cork is removed – whether through revolution, economic crisis, war, 
conquest or the collapse of empire – the hitherto trapped essence of national 
identity is released and quickly assumes its „given‟ shape (Wilford, 1998, p.9).   
 
However, as I have discussed, these biological or historical determinist explanations 
for national identity are highly problematic and leave many questions about 
„authenticity‟ unanswered.   
 
A more helpful explanation is that nations are social constructs and „imagined 
communities‟ which are rooted in shared culture.  Nations are „imagined‟ because 
most people who define themselves as members of a nation: 
  
will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of 
them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion (Anderson, 
1991, p.6). 
 
In this way, “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; 
rather, it invents nations where they do not exist” through shared notions of 
„difference‟ (Gellner, 1964, p. 168).   
 
Moreover, Renan argues that the nation is a shared sentiment, “a soul, a spiritual 
principle…a moral consciousness” that unites members in the hope of a shared 
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destiny and which is constructed through a „daily plebicite‟ (Renan, 1990, pp. 19-20).  
As members of the nation participate in the life of the nation, they show their consent 
to its existence and to their own continued membership.  In this way, knowledge of 
the nation is not simply handed down to individuals by governments.  Rather, 
„citizens‟ construct stories of the nation and are in turn constructed by these available 
cultural narratives.  In this way, members of the nation are co-producers in the 
construction of meaning (Dimitriadis and Kamberelis, 2006).   
 
Gender 
Up until now in this discussion, I have largely treated national identity as a singular 
phenomenon.  However, it is important to acknowledge how the processes of 
nationalism affect different people in different ways.  For example, although gender 
does not produce categories of people in uniform ways, it positions subjects 
differently vis-à-vis national and ethnic membership and rootedness.  Moreover, 
gender, itself, is intersected with class, race and sexual orientation, among others, 
which means that there will be a multiplicity of constructions of, and orientations 
towards the nation.   
 
Like nation, gender is also a social construction that is „performed‟ within the 
practices of culture.  As Butler argues, gender:  
 
is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly 
rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of 
substance, of a natural sort of being.  A political genealogy of gender 
ontologies, if it is successful, will deconstruct the substantive appearance of 
gender into its constitutive acts and locate and account for those acts within 
the compulsory frames set by the various forces that police the social 
appearance of gender (Butler, 1990, pp. 43-44).   
 
For Butler, “there is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender…identity is 
performatively constituted by the very „expressions‟ that are said to be its results” 
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(Butler, 1990, p. 25).  In other words, gender is not „being‟ but „doing‟ in word, deed, 
dress and manner.  Thus, both „femininity‟ and „masculinity‟ are not natural states 
but, rather, daily performances of gender scripts which are located in a specific time 
and place.  In this way, Palestinian gender performances shift and transform as the 
nation is continually repositioned within sociopolitical discourse.  Moreover, gender 
performance also helps to construct the nation. 
 
Metaphorically, the construction of „masculinity‟ is often symbolically linked with 
the construction of the nation.  As Enloe argues, the nation has largely been 
constructed as a male project and imagined as a „brotherhood‟ which has sprung from 
“masculinised memory, masculinised humiliation and masculinised hope” (Enloe, 
1989, p. 44).  Moreover, Mayer notes the relationship between gender and 
colonialism by suggesting that nationalism developed in reaction to imperialism, and 
to imperialism‟s “feminization and infantilization both of the colonies themselves and 
of indigenous men” (Mayer, 2000, p. 14).  For example, as the colonial powers 
challenged their „masculinity‟, indigenous men emphasized both control over their 
own bodies as well as control over „their‟ women‟s bodies.  In this way, “men‟s sense 
of masculinity has, increasingly, come to depend on preserving women‟s femininity, 
modesty and religiosity” (Mayer, 2000, p.15).   
 
In the Middle Eastern context, both Jewish and Palestinian history has been burdened 
by colonialism and a continuous struggle for survival.  In this way, national myths of 
creation, wars, survival and heroic endeavours have become integral to the 
Jewish/Palestinian experience and central to the formal and informal education of 
both peoples.  For both Israelis and Palestinians, this has resulted in “a militarized 
nationalism and an almost exclusively male cult of heroism” (Mayer, 2000, p. 15).  
For example, Mayer argues that since its inception, the idea behind Zionism has been 
the creation of a “Muscle Jew who is the antithesis of the pejoratively „feminized‟ 
diaspora Jew” (Mayer, 2000, p. 15).  In this way, Israeli „hyper-masculinity‟ and the 
nation have reciprocally worked to construct one another.  In a similar way, Yuval-
Davis argues that the symbolic „emasculation‟ of Palestinian men throughout the 
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Israeli occupation has resulted in the construction of a hegemonic Palestinian 
masculinity that depends for its existence on the domination of Palestinian women 
(Yuval-Davis, 1997).   
 
The discourses of gender and nation also intersect to construct specific „femininities‟.  
For example, biological determinist discourses of nationalism have often positioned 
women as „biological reproducers‟ of the nation.  This has resulted in the ‘battle of 
the cradle‟ over women‟s sexual reproduction, regulating under what conditions, 
when, how many and whose children women will bear.  Within this discourse, the 
state (through family planning), orchestrates “control over both women‟s sexuality 
and the public articulation of nationalism” (Mayer, 2000, p.7).  Moreover, the forms 
this takes are “historically specific and regulated by socio-religious norms, 
technological developments, economic pressures, and political priorities” (Peterson, 
1994, p. 78).  For instance, if „citizens‟ are required to populate the nation, pro-
natalist policies may be instituted to restrict contraceptive knowledge and techniques, 
deny abortions, and provide material rewards for having children.   
 
In this way, biological determinist discourses of nationalism have played a significant 
role in the construction of both Palestinian and Israeli „femininities‟ as well as 
gendered configurations of the nation.  For example, in the early years after the 
establishment of the State of Israel, Ben Gurion‟s government instituted an award to 
be given to „heroine‟ mothers who gave birth to ten or more children to provide a 
„Jewish‟ citizenry for the new state.  Moreover, in his role as the Israeli foreign 
minister, Shimon Peres was reported in the Israeli press as saying “politics is a matter 
of demography, not geography” (quoted in Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.27).  Arguing from 
a similar perspective, Yasser Arafat is reported to have said,  
 
The Palestinian woman who bears yet another Palestinian every ten 
months…is a biological time bomb threatening to blow up Israel from within” 
(Portuguese, 1996, p. 311).   
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As women have been constructed as „biological reproducers‟ and „cultural 
transmitters‟ of the nation in nationalist discourse, at various times both Palestinian 
and Israeli women have been restricted in their life choices, such as being confined to 
heterosexual marriage and compulsory child-rearing (Yuval-Davis, 1997).  Moreover, 
this has limited their goals and aspirations for the future.   
 
As mentioned above, the relationship between gender and nation is not always a 
comfortable one.  In nationalist discourse, “differences between nations are often 
highlighted which tend to suppress differences within them” (Allen, 1994, p. 96).  
Thus, the discourse of national unity often obscures the nation‟s inner workings, 
especially in relation to gender (Anderson, 1991).  Although gender equality is 
assumed to be an automatic by-product of nationalist projects, national 
democratization does not necessarily entail a democratization of power relations 
between men and women (Miller, 1997).  Moreover, there is no „given‟ or automatic 
relationship between women‟s interests and national interests.  This is because 
women are situated differently than men, and each other, in relation to divisions of 
power, violence, labour and resources.  Therefore, what benefits men, or other 
women, will not necessarily benefit them.  It is from this perspective that theorists 
such as Halliday (1988) warn that the struggle for self-determination can, in fact, 
often be detrimental to the interests of women because it is premised, over and above 
all else, on a primary commitment to the welfare of a community of men.  He argues 
that,  
 
Nationalist movements subordinate women in a particular definition of their 
role and place in society, and enforce conformity to values that are often male-
defined (Halliday, 1988, p. 419).   
 
For example, in the Palestinian context, the struggle for civil rights and national 
liberation has typically stressed the particular experiences of Palestinian men over 
feminist concerns.  Moreover, Charlesworth argues that the oppression of women 
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within groups claiming the right to self-determination has never been considered 
relevant.  Rather, she asserts that, 
 
The right to self-determination attaches to „peoples‟, entities defined 
ethnically or culturally, even if half the persons constituting the people have 
little or no power in that community…In this sense, the right is only relevant 
in the most public of contexts: male political life (Charlesworth, 1994, p. 75).   
 
In this way, nationalist sentiments often provide a perfect pretext for the continuing 
oppression of patriarchy, because it is women who are required to sacrifice and 
postpone their needs and rights for the greater cause of nationalism.  As Enloe argues,  
 
Women who have called for more genuine equality between the sexes…have 
been told that now is not the time, the nation is too fragile…they must be 
patient; they must wait until the nationalist goal is achieved; then relations 
between women and men can be addressed. „Not now, later‟ is the advice that 
rings in the ears of many nationalist women (Enloe, 1989, p. 62).   
 
Moreover, Pettman notes the occurrence of an “uneven but very widespread pattern 
of regression in terms of women‟s claims and participation after the state is won” 
(Pettman, 1996, pp. 136-7).  Men, she observes, often suffer a collective and 
convenient memory loss about the contribution made by women to national liberation 
struggles:   
 
Forgetting…appears to be a frequent effect of reconsolidating centralized 
control of authority…it is part of the process of legitimizing privilege, 
including gender privilege (Pettman, 1996, p. 138).   
 
Furthermore, in societies affected by colonialism or Western imperialism, such as 
Palestine, calls for female emancipation are often dismissed as „Western influence‟.  
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This has only served to strengthen the position of men who are opposed to changes in 
the traditional sex hierarchy (Richter-Devroe, 2005).  
 
This discussion has, so far, taken for granted that the modern world is, and should be, 
divided into discrete nations (imagined communities) that correspond with specific 
and „fixed‟ territories and political structures (nation-states).  Moreover, it has also 
assumed that individuals automatically develop deep and long-lasting feelings of 
„home‟ for these spaces.  However, Palestinians‟ experiences of exile and 
statelessness within the context of globalization and transnationalism mean that these 
assumptions have to be challenged.  This will be done in the next section. 
 
3.3  Home 
 
Although nationalist narratives often assume the possibility of a physical space, a 
national territory, which is „fixed‟, „pure‟, and „uncontaminated‟ by movement or 
desire, in the 21
st
 century, the processes of globalization mean that there is increased 
population mobility across international borders.  For many families, it is 
commonplace to have members living, working or studying in other countries.  
Moreover, modern conflict and warfare have meant that within the last century, 
thousands of people have been displaced both within and across national borders.  
Transmigration has also affected individuals who have never left their place of birth.  
Open markets and global media mean that cultural absorption and influence affect 
everyone around the world through the exchange of goods and ideas.  Moreover, the 
use of telecommunications technology means that bonds no longer have to be 
cemented through physical proximity.  As Cohen argues,  
 
In the age of cyberspace, a diaspora can, to some degree, be held together or 
recreated through the mind, through cultural artifacts and through a shared 
imagination (Cohen, 1996, p. 516).   
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In all of these ways, there is a growing disjuncture between territory and 
„subjectivity‟.  Transnationalism has changed people‟s relations to space by creating 
social fields that connect and position actors in more than one country.  Moreover, 
through transnationalism, individuals are forming „hybrid‟ cultural understandings 
and identities (Bhaba, 1994).  At the same time, transnationalism is enabling the 
creation of new forms of solidarity and identity where face-to-face contact is not 
paramount (Vertovec, 1999).  For example, „nations without states‟, such as Palestine, 
can develop constructions of the nation-state that encompass all refugees and their 
descendents wherever they may have settled and whatever legal citizenship they may 
have acquired.  In this way, Palestine has been discursively constructed as a 
„borderless state‟ that exists within the legal boundaries of many existing nation-
states.  In a similar way, the twentieth century Muslim „community of believers‟ 
(Islamic Umma) transcends any territorially bound notion of nationhood.  Therefore, 
rather than being understood as a singular, linear and „fixed‟ narrative attached to the 
nation or a particular territory, „home‟ can be theorized across different registers:  
where one lives, where one‟s family lives, one‟s native country and one‟s „spiritual 
country‟.  In this sense, migration has become a process of transition, a movement 
from one register of „home‟ to others (Ahmed, 1999).   
 
Just as transnationalism challenges the essentialist discourses of nation and „home‟ 
and the binary divisions of „detachment/attachment‟, it also problematizes the binary 
opposition between „here‟ and „there‟ and the assumption that transnational migration 
can ever be completed.  Rather, as Chambers argues,  
 
Migrancy…involves a movement in which neither the points of departure nor 
those of arrival are immutable or certain.  It calls for a dwelling in language, 
in histories, in identities that are constantly subject to mutation.  Always in 
transit, the process of home-coming-completing the story, domesticating the 
detour-becomes an impossibility (Chambers, 1994, p. 5).   
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In this sense, „home‟ is not simply an already constituted space, from which one can 
simply depart and remain the same.  Rather, as Ahmed argues, locality intrudes into 
the senses, and „the subject‟ and the space come to inhabit one another.  In other 
words, the boundary between „self‟ and „home‟ becomes permeable, and the process 
of migration works to construct new subjectivities (Chambers, 1994). 
 
However, despite the formidable challenges to the modern nation-state, national 
identity and „home‟ that I have just discussed, these concepts are far from irrelevant 
in the contemporary world and are here to stay.  Although human mobility, 
telecommunications, media and the internet have significantly contributed to the 
creation of „translocal‟ understandings and identities, these are all anchored in 
physical spaces with a variety of legal, political and cultural ramifications.   For 
example, the attachment to a nation and the acquisition of a national identity provides 
individuals with certain rights and privileges, such as access to resources, 
information, opportunity and power.  Moreover, it gives individuals an important 
sense of centeredness, rootedness and solidarity around which they can construct 
collective „memories‟, „traditions‟ and „home‟.  Furthermore, although globalization 
and nationalism appear to be parallel forces in conflict, in practice, they are bound 
through processes of „intersectionality‟.  Thus, while globalization challenges the 
power of the state, the nation-state continues to be the major mechanism through 
which globalization processes are accomplished.  In this way, the tensions and 
contradictions between nationalism and globalization continue to shape and regulate 
identities as individuals and nation-states negotiate their way between the global and 
the local, the powerful and the marginal and „tradition‟ and „modernity‟ (Chambers, 
1994).  For all of these reasons, the nation and the state are very relevant concepts for 
Palestinians and important units of analysis in this study of Palestinian identities in 
Lebanon. 
 
As discussed above, the tension between the national and the transnational affects all 
individuals.  However, while we all experience the transnational in the modern world, 
issues of identity, belonging and „home‟ are particularly complex for exiles, whose 
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relocation and interaction with another culture have been forced upon them.  For 
refugees, migration has been undertaken without them having complete security or 
the right to participate as full members of the new „host‟ society.  Thus, as Said 
argues, exile is an „unhealable rift‟, a „discontinuous state of being‟, a splitting of 
„home‟ as the place of origin and „home‟ as the sensory world of everyday experience 
(Said, 1999).   
 
For many Palestinian refugees exiled in Lebanon, particularly those who experienced 
Al Nakba (the loss of their homeland) directly, their lives have been lived largely in 
the „liminal‟, awaiting the return to their „homeland‟.  These Palestinians find 
themselves perpetually in a state of dislocation as „transmigrants‟ whose daily lives 
depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and 
whose public identities are configured in relation to more than one nation-state 
(Ahmed, 1999).  As discussed in Chapter 2 (Context), as refugees in Lebanon, 
Palestinians are not incorporated into the Lebanese economy, political institutions or 
patterns of daily life.  Yet, they also cannot maintain connections, build institutions, 
conduct transactions and influence national events in their „homeland‟ (Mason, 2007).  
However, in trying to make the best of their lives in exile, they have established some 
level of „roots‟ and attachment to the country in which they reside. This has made 
concepts such as identity, home and belonging difficult to reconcile for these 
refugees.  It is here that Bhaba‟s concept of the „hybrid third space‟ is useful in 
attempting to understand how Palestinians make sense of, and negotiate, the interplay 
between various elements of their identities and concepts of „home‟ (Bhaba, 1994).  
Said‟s metaphor of music is also helpful in understanding the „contrapuntal‟ nature of 
Palestinian identity that exile creates.  For Palestinians in the diaspora, identity is like 
“a series of notes flowing over, around and through one another, where two or more 
voices or notes can be heard simultaneously” (Mason, 2007, p. 274).  In other words, 
the „home‟ of the „homeland‟ and the „home‟ of lived reality are lived concurrently by 
Palestinian exiles in Lebanon and are central to their feelings of belonging and 
notions of identity.  
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For younger Palestinian generations in exile, the situation is even more complex.  As 
Al Nakba took place 60 years ago, most Palestinians in Lebanon have been born in 
exile.  This means that for these generations, their connections to, and understandings 
of, the „homeland‟ have been passed down to them through „acts of remembering‟, 
and the experiences of their parents and elders, rather than personal lived experience.  
As Mureed Al-Barghouti notes,  
 
The (Israeli) occupation (of Palestine) has created generations of Palestinians 
who are strangers to Palestine, generations who are familiar with every 
alleyway of their places of exile, but who are ignorant of their homeland […] 
These generations are condemned to love an unseen lover, a distant, difficult 
lover separated from them by guards and fences and sleek terror. The [Israeli] 
occupation has transformed us from the sons of Palestine into the sons of the 
idea of Palestine (Al-Barghouti, 1998, pp.60-61).   
 
It is in this context of exile that the processes of „homemaking‟ become particularly 
important survival mechanisms for Palestinians as they aim to recreate the exilic 
community as well as foster a sense of „home‟ in the „host‟ country.  As discussed 
earlier, this often involves the production and reproduction of the nation as well as 
discourses and shared cultures of „Palestinian-ness‟.    
The ways in which the nation and notions of „Palestinian-ness‟ are constructed 
through the appropriation and articulation of discursive resources and performances 
both within and through social institutions in the camps in Lebanon will be discussed 
below. 
 
3.4  Discursive resources  
 
As I have previously discussed, there is nothing natural or „given‟ about nations or 
national identity.  Rather, nations are „imagined communities‟ that are constructed 
around notions of difference.  As all nations are comprised of diverse individuals, 
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these individuals must be „made‟ to feel an intense bond of solidarity to the nation 
and to other members of their nation.  Therefore, nation-building must take place 
through the construction of a symbolic image of the community and the creation of 
symbols and rituals designed to emphasize its unique character and difference from 
other nations.  As all symbols are arbitrary and there are no natural flags, crests or 
other national symbols, these symbols are made to embody the norms and values of 
the community through their reification within nationalist discourse.  Moreover, since 
there are no inherent qualities in any symbol that link it emotionally or cognitively to 
the entity which it symbolizes, this linkage has to be learnt (Eriksen, 1993) (see 
Chapter 6, Institutions).   
 
Learning the nation is often accomplished through large-scale social processes, such 
as formal schooling, and schools are often key sites for the reproduction of „tradition‟, 
a shared vision of the past, the dominant language, religion, culture and social 
hierarchies in society.  Moreover, nationalist discourse can be found in virtually all 
curricula systems, often through school subjects such as Civics, Social Studies and 
Religious Education.  As Zambeta argues,  
 
Dominant discourses on the cultural supremacy of the nation, underlining the 
distinctiveness, continuity, nobility, originality and purity of its legacy to the 
world, constitute common features of school curricula (Zambeta, 2005, p 79).   
 
In addition to disseminating „knowledge‟ about a particular nation, nationalized 
school curricula are also used as a political project in the context of shifting socio-
political discourses and changing geo-political realities.  For example, in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, standardized education has been used as a political 
tool to support the goals and practice of Israeli military occupation through curricular 
censorship of textbooks mentioning Palestine and the prohibition of supplementary 
learning materials (Nicolai, 2007).  
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Although the school continues to be, perhaps, the most effective mechanism for 
constructing and regulating the nation and disseminating „knowledge‟ to young 
people, its‟ influence on shaping young people‟s national identities is being 
diminished through the increasing influence of media and popular culture.  As Billig 
argues, the nation is being produced through everyday practices:  
 
Small words rather than grand memorable phrases make up the stuff of 
national belonging for a great many people: coins, stamps, turns of phrase, 
televised weather reports; in brief, the banal nationalism continuously 
strengthens and weakens people‟s sense of national belonging (Eriksen, 1993, 
p. 101).   
 
In other words, it is not through acts of government, but through a „daily plebiscite‟ 
that the nation is constructed.  As Renan argues, members of the nation, by their daily 
participation in the life of the nation, show their consent to its existence and to their 
own continued membership (Renan, 1990).  As citizens construct stories of the 
nation, they are in turn constructed by these available cultural narratives.  In this way, 
knowledge is not simply handed down.  Rather, members of the nation are co-
producers in the construction of meaning and in construction of the nation 
(Dimitriadis and Kamberelis, 2006).   
 
Moreover, institutions do not produce and reproduce meanings on their own.  Rather, 
meanings are accumulated “across a variety of texts and mediality, inter-textually” 
(Hall, 1997, p. 232).  In other words, both formal and non-formal institutions in 
society, such as the school, the family, religious institutions, political organizations 
and the media, all function as sites of identity production and performance.  
Moreover, the „knowledge‟ that is socially produced in and through these sites is 
legitimated and made to appear factual, stable, neutral and natural through culture.  In 
this way, institutional regimes, networks and processes regulate and discipline 
identities in formal and informal life (Foucault, 1977).  This „intertextuality‟ becomes 
even more meaningful in the context of Palestinians in Lebanon, as they must 
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construct their identities in the absence of a state and its institutions and in reference 
to another place.   
 
One way that nations are produced and reproduced in everyday life in and through 
institutions is through the construction of „typical‟ ethnic symbols, which stimulate 
reflection on one‟s own cultural „distinctiveness‟.  For example, in Palestinian society 
in Lebanon, a dish called bisara has been reified as a symbol of „Palestinian-ness‟, 
and Palestinians reproduce the nation whenever they eat it.  However, many so-called 
„traditions‟ are not „traditional‟ at all.  Rather, they are invented by national elites to 
justify the existence and importance of their respective nation-states (Hobsbawm, 
1990).  For example, folk costumes, cross-stitch, traditional music and peasant food 
have all become Palestinian national symbols even to people who were not raised 
with these customs.  In other words, certain aspects of rural peasant culture have been 
reinterpreted and placed into an urban diasporic political context as evidence that 
Palestinian culture is distinctive, that Palestinians are „a people‟ and that they, 
therefore, ought to have their own state (Eriksen, 1993).  Moreover, in the 
construction of „typical‟ ethnic symbols in the context of diaspora, there is often a 
reference/deference to places and artifacts back in the „homeland‟.  In this way, 
Palestinian symbols, such as Al Aqsa mosque, help to construct links between 
subjects and specific territory.          
 
However, despite the fact that symbols are used to construct „cultural distinctiveness‟, 
many of these symbols are neither „ancient‟ nor „typical‟ at all (Khalidi, 1997).  
Moreover, these symbols are often contested by different groups.  One example of 
this involves the politics of food in the Levant.  The origin of „traditional‟ foods has 
recently become a hot point of contention between Israelis, Palestinians, Lebanese 
and their neighbours in their quest to construct an „authentic‟ cultural identity and to 
demarcate boundaries between themselves and „Others‟.  For example, foods 
indigenous and common to the whole region, such as falafel, are being marketed 
internationally as „Israeli‟, even though the State of Israel is only 60 years old and the 
majority of Israelis are Ashkenazi Jews who originally hailed from Europe, where 
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they did not eat such foods.  In other words, the construction of falafel as a 
„traditional‟ Israeli food not only problematizes the „East/West‟ nation-state 
distinction, it also helps to construct historical continuity and connect Israel with its 
„ancient‟ Israelite past in the region.  However, in the battle over cultural 
distinctiveness, and therefore national „legitimacy‟, the Lebanese Industrialists‟ 
Association has recently begun pushing back against what they see as Israel's 
appropriation of „their‟ cuisine.  At the time of writing this thesis, the Lebanese 
Industrialists‟ Association was advocating to have 25 „traditional‟ food dishes, such 
as falafel and hummus, officially designated as Lebanese and given „Protected 
Designated Origin status‟ under EU law, meaning that these foods can only be 
marketed under their names if they are made in Lebanon (Macleod, 2008).  This 
move is situated very much within the „historical origin of nations‟ discourse 
discussed earlier, through which „history‟ is used to validate the „legitimacy‟ of 
modern nation-states.  By designating these foods as officially Lebanese (Arab), 
Israel is being discursively „inauthenticated‟ as a „legitimate‟ nation, while Lebanese 
culture is being validated as „ancient‟, even though the State of Lebanon has also only 
been in existence for 66 years.  In this way, national territory is not only geographic.  
It also relates to many aspects, symbols and artifacts of cultural history. 
 
In addition to the creation and adoption of symbols, the nation is also reproduced 
culturally, socially and symbolically through the „performativity‟ of its members 
through culture and ritual.  Bhaba theorizes that, 
 
The people are the „subjects‟ of a process by which national life is redeemed 
and signified as a repeating and reproductive process.  The scraps, patches, 
and rags of daily life must be repeatedly turned into the signs of a national 
culture, while the very act of the narrative performance interpellates a growing 
circle of national subjects (Bhaba, 1990, p. 296).  
 
Moreover, Billig speaks of the everyday forms of nationalism, which shape the minds 
of a nation's inhabitants on a day-to-day basis.  Through regular, repetitive exercises 
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of solidarity, signifiers of nationality become accepted by members of the nation as 
„natural‟, and national consciousness is kept alive (Billig, 1995).  In this way, the 
performance of everyday ritual, like wearing „Palestinian colours‟ or singing the 
„Palestinian national anthem‟, works to produce and reproduce the nation. 
 
One important way in which „performativity‟ constructs the identity of the nation is 
through „the body‟.  Foucault argues that the body is constructed, shaped and 
reshaped through the intersection of disciplinary discursive practices.  In this way, the 
body functions as a sort of surface on which different regimes of power/knowledge 
are inscribed and where difference is defined (Foucault, 1977).  In nationalist 
discourse, the body is often an important boundary marker for the nation.  As Mayer 
argues, through the body:  
 
the mythical unity of national „imagined communities‟ is maintained and 
ideologically reproduced by a whole system of symbolic „border guards‟ 
(Mayer, 2000, p. 18).   
 
These „border guards‟ serve to identify people as members or non-members of a 
specific collectivity through cultural codes of style of dress and behaviour, as well as 
through customs, religion, language, and the construction of specific „masculinities‟ 
and „femininities‟ (Armstrong, 1982).  For example, the hijab (head covering worn by 
Muslim women) acts as a symbolic border guard to demarcate the difference between 
Muslim women and „Other‟ women, as well as the difference between women and 
men.   
 
As the previous example shows, embodiment of the nation is gendered, and women 
often bear the burden of representation for the collective identity.  In this way, women 
are often made to embody such ideals as „tradition‟, „culture‟ and „honour‟ for the 
nation (Yuval-Davis, 1997).  Women‟s movements and bodies are, therefore, 
„policed‟ in terms of their sexuality, fertility and relations with „Other‟ men (Pettman, 
2001).  In the Middle Eastern context, where the nation is often reproduced in 
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resistance to Western imperialism, tradition and women‟s modesty and purity become 
keys signifiers of the collectivity.  One way to ensure this type of reproduction is by 
employing coercive means to control women‟s sexuality.  This may take the form of 
policing women‟s dress, restricting their movements and regulating their access to sex 
through arranged marriages (Yuval-Davis, 1997).   
 
Moreover, in situations where conflict is linked with questions of identity and 
ethnicity, there is often increasing societal control over women‟s mobility and control 
over their bodies (Ricoeur, 1988).  For example, Palestinian women, in their role as 
„defenders of culture and national values‟, are often called upon to exhibit 
conservative dress and behaviour to embody the line which signifies the collectivity‟s 
boundaries between „them‟ and „Others‟.  Penalties for transgression across these 
boundaries are severe and have included so-called „honour killing‟ by male relatives 
for perceived „shame‟ brought on their families and community (Yuval-Davis, 1997).  
While women are expected to uphold these traditions without question, men often 
have the choice of being unbound and unregulated by the values and belief systems of 
their culture.  For example, Palestinian Muslim men are free to marry „foreign‟ 
women who are not Muslim.  On the other hand, Palestinian women are socially 
required to marry both within their ethnic group and within their religious sect.  In 
this way, women are expected to „perform‟ the nation through the preservation of the 
„sanctity‟ and „purity‟ of their bodies (Yuval-Davis, 1997).   
 
As I have discussed above, identity is constructed through the appropriation and 
articulation of discursive resources in society.  However, as identity is constituted 
through culture, it is not an already accomplished „fact‟.  Rather, it is a „production‟ 
which is never complete.  When economic, social or political conditions change over 
time, identities become contested and new „hybrid‟ subject positions emerge (Bhaba, 
1990).  In this way, identities are unstable positions that are always in the process of 
shifting, transforming and „becoming‟ in relation to changing circumstances (Hall, 
1996).  The production of „new identities‟ will be discussed in the next section. 
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3.5  New identities 
 
As I have already discussed, there are no „authentic‟ or „inauthentic‟ representations 
of a seemingly monolithic community.  Rather, popular culture is a site where new 
and emergent forms of identity proliferate and are open to contestation (Hall, 2000).  
The dominant culture dictates, or tries to dictate, what can be thought and what can be 
done.  However, it does not stand uncontested.  Rather, residual culture in the form of 
old values and meanings is often still active in the present.  Moreover, emergent 
culture in the form of newly emerging values, meanings and practices puts pressure 
on the existing dominant culture while guiding its future directions.  In this way, 
culture is dynamic and always in a state of flux.  Moreover, it is the ground through 
which identity is constituted and where struggles over dominance and resistance to 
hegemony are waged (Dimitriadis and Kamberelis, 2006).   
  
In the construction of identities, there is also the important issue of „agency‟.  As 
discussed earlier, identity is not a single linear narrative.  Rather, as Hall argues, 
identity is:  
 
increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed 
across different, often intersecting and antagonistic discourses, practices and 
positions (Hall, 2000, p. 17).   
 
In other words, all individuals bear ethnicity, race, gender and sexuality as collective 
as well as individual identities.  Thus, Sen notes that he is simultaneously:  
 
an Asian, an Indian citizen, a Bengali with Bangladeshi ancestry, an American 
or British resident, an economist, a dabbler in philosophy, an author, a 
Sanskritist, a strong believer in secularism and democracy, a man, a feminist, 
a heterosexual, a defender of gay and lesbian rights, with a nonreligious 
lifestyle, from a Hindu background, a non-Brahmin, and a nonbeliever in an 
afterlife (Sen, 2006, p. 19).   
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Moreover, he bears all of these identities at the same time.   
 
However, although all individuals bear multiple identities, within different historical 
and geographical contexts, they choose to give prominence to one identity over 
another.  For example, complex internal cultural segmentation cuts through 
Palestinian identity, and at any given time, locality, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, 
class or generation can serve as the locus for identity, or for identity politics 
(Alexander, 2002).  In other words, identity is strategic and positional, and 
individuals form temporary attachments to specific subject positions based on 
positions of advantage (Bhaba, 1990).  Therefore, although we may be constituted 
within a social-symbolic order, we are not determined by it. Rather, there is always 
the possibility of agency, of acting out within the system in ways that are subversive 
and transformative.  As identities are always in the process of becoming, changing 
and transforming through the processes of resistance, negotiation and accommodation 
(Hall, 1996), “the human subject is made only temporally specific, highly context-
dependent and unfinalizable” (Dimitriadis and Kamberelis, 2006, p.51).  In this way, 
Palestinian identities continue to shift and change throughout time and space (see 
Chapter 7, New Identities).   
 
Although there is a multiplicity of identities that are available to each one of us, these 
identities are not on equal footing.  Rather, they are ranked hegemonically and 
regulated through culture (Mayer, 2000).  For example, in Palestinian society, 
multiple „masculinities‟ and „femininities‟ are available for young people to take up.  
However, displaying sensitive behaviours, such as emotional vulnerability, can often 
expose young males to teasing and bullying.  On the other hand, an overt display of 
„sexual confidence‟ by young females can result in social sanctioning and their 
inability to marry.  In other words, gender identities, as well as others, are disciplined 
through the enactment upon them of both symbolic and physical violence (Ghoussoub 
and Sinclair-Webb, 2006).            
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There is also the extent to which individuals are capable of exercising agency.  Sen 
makes an important point when he argues that, although we all exercise „choice‟ in 
our take up and performance of identities, the existence of choice does not indicate 
that there are no constraints restricting that choice (Sen, 2006).  Rather, choice is 
exercised within the limitations set by any particular field.  For example, Sen notes 
that during the apartheid era in South Africa, a non-white person might have chosen 
to be a „citizen‟ of the country; although, he or she would not have been regarded by 
the state as such.  Similarly, on November 15, 1988, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) unilaterally proclaimed the establishment of the „State of 
Palestine‟, and this day has been commemorated by Palestinians throughout the 
diaspora as „Palestinian Independence Day‟ ever since.  However, this is despite the 
fact that at the time „independence‟ was declared, the PLO had no control over any 
territory. Moreover, no de facto independent Palestinian state has come into existence 
since.  Thus, the unilateral declaration of „Palestinian statehood‟ in the absence of 
official international recognition is a clear example of how:  
 
our freedom to assert our personal identities can sometimes be extraordinarily 
limited in the eyes of others, no matter how we see ourselves (Sen, 2006, p. 
6).     
 
Moreover, Sen makes the distinction between „well-being‟ and „agency‟ and argues 
that a person may have various goals and objectives other than personal well-being 
(Sen, 1990).  For example, in many contexts, it may be entirely rationale for a woman 
to try and get the best possible position available to her within the confines of her 
particular socio-economic and cultural context, even if it threatens her personal well-
being (Sen, 1990).  In this way, women‟s attachment to and stake in certain forms of 
patriarchal structures may neither derive from „false consciousness‟ nor from 
deliberateness but from an actual stake in certain positions of power available to them 
(Kandiyoti, 1998).  For example, Kandiyoti (1998) argues that in Islamic 
fundamentalist communities in the Middle East, there are few options available to 
women other than to embrace Qu‟ranic values and beliefs.  Indeed, any attempt to 
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oppose or subvert its tenets courts danger.  In this context, women‟s decision to wear 
the hijab (Islamic head covering) may be construed not as an act of induced 
submission but as a pragmatic response among women.  From this perspective, 
wearing the hijab represents a “bargain with patriarchy” enabling women to move 
freely in public spaces, hidden from the „male gaze‟, while reassuring their menfolk 
that they continue to be “worthy of protection” (Kandiyoti, 1998, p. 283).  In this 
way, women‟s wilful subjection of their bodies to Islamic discourse may not 
necessarily promote personal well-being, however it may help them to achieve other 
goals, such as freedom of movement. 
 
People‟s actions must also be seen in light of their attempts to subvert and resist 
colonialism (Spivak, 1988).  In any cultural setting, there are dominant groups that 
establish what can and cannot be said and done by others on the basis of the 
discursive knowledge they impose on others.  The historical reality of colonialism 
and continued Western imperialism in the Middle East makes issues of representation 
particularly relevant to a study on Palestinian identity.  As Said argues, „the Orient‟ 
has been constructed through discourse within the framework of Western hegemony 
(Said, 1978, p. 8).  In this way, „the West‟ was able to manage and even produce „the 
Orient‟ politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and 
imaginatively through the discourse of „Orientalism‟.  As an object of study, 
„Orientalism‟ created „the Orient‟ by: 
 
making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching 
it, settling it, ruling over it (Said, 1978, p.3).   
 
In this context, the strategic use of „positivist ethnic essentialism‟ might be seen as a 
necessary strategy to question and disrupt the hegemonic power of colonial discourse 
(Spivak, 1988).  For example, in the Arab World, the issue of Western hegemony has 
made the task of preserving ethnic pride and a positive identity a formidable task 
(Moghadam, 1993).  Therefore, as a backlash to perceived Western imperialism, 
many Arab women have begun the search for an „authentic‟ identity 
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„uncontaminated‟ by Westernization or modernity through cultural identification with 
fundamentalist movements such as radical Islam (Afshar, 1989).  For many women, 
this has involved taking up the hijab and voluntarily subjecting their bodies to the 
strict regulation of Islamic discourse (Afshar, 1989).  Moreover, the search for an 
„authentic‟ identity has convinced many Arab women to unite with Arab men in 
solidarity against „Westernisation‟, even though they are aware that Arab men have 
been implicated in constructing „woman‟ as the „Other‟ (Shukri, 1996).  Therefore, as 
Western feminist discourse has often been complicit in constructing Arab women as 
„sub-altern‟ subjects and subverting their attempts to speak for themselves, many 
Arab women have consciously chosen to reject modernization and female 
„emancipation‟ as defined by the West (Spivak, 1988).   
 
The discussion above highlights how individuals construct their identities through the 
erection of physical and symbolic boundaries of difference between themselves and 
„Others‟.  These boundaries are constructed through the appropriation and articulation 
of the discursive resources of identity through everyday practices through institutions 
in society. However, as culture is constantly shifting and transforming, individuals 
strategically take up specific subject positions in order to gain positions of advantage 
in any given context.   
 
All of this raises important questions about how social life is created, experienced and 
given meaning by Palestinian young people in refugee camps in south Lebanon in the 
absence of state structures and apparatus.  This brings me to the research questions 
that I seek to explore in this study. 
 
3.6  Research Questions 
 
In this overview of the academic literature and current theoretical debates around the 
broad concept of identity, specific themes have emerged that have particular 
relevance for this study of Palestinian identity in Lebanon.   
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First, the literature has discussed the ways in which notions of sameness and 
difference are played out through the organizing concepts of nation and „home‟ and 
implicated in the construction of specific aspects of identity, such as kinship, culture, 
ethnicity, religion and gender (see 3.2 Nation; 3.3 Home).  This raises important 
questions about how people construct their identities and erect boundaries between 
themselves and „Others‟ in the context of forced migration and exile.  Therefore, my 
first research question for this study is as follows: 
 
1. How do Palestinian youth (male and female) understand and perform their 
identities vis-à-vis nationality, gender and religion in camps and gatherings in 
south Lebanon? 
 
This question will be addressed in Chapter 5, Boundaries. 
 
Secondly, the literature provides a theoretical overview of how identity is constructed 
through the appropriation and articulation of discursive resources and performances 
both within and through social institutions (see 3.4 Discursive Resources).  This 
raises important questions about how identities are constructed in the absence of a 
state and its institutions.  This leads to my second research question, which is as 
follows: 
 
2.  How are the discursive resources of Palestinian identity appropriated and 
articulated in everyday life within the camps? 
 
This question will be addressed in Chapter 6, Institutions. 
 
Finally, the literature acknowledges that identities are not „fixed‟ but, rather, shift 
across space and time (see 3.5 New Identities).  As the processes of forced migration 
have dramatically and brutally repositioned Palestinians within the world and called 
upon them to interact with it in new ways, this raises important questions about how 
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Palestinian identities in Lebanon have shifted and transformed over time.  This brings 
me to my third research question, which is as follows: 
 
3.  How have Palestinian identities in Lebanon shifted across exilic generations?  
 
This question will be addressed in Chapter 7, New Identities. 
 
3.7 Overview 
 
Located within a theoretical framework of post-structuralism, post-colonialism and 
feminism, this study is about the instability of social categories and the need for 
critical reflexivity in research.  The literature reviewed in this chapter specifically 
focuses on how nations are discursively constructed through the production and 
reproduction of symbolic systems in and through institutional sites.  The 
intersectionality of „nation‟ with other social categories, such as „gender‟ and 
„religion‟, produces multiple identities that are in a constant state of flux and 
transformation across time and space.  Moreover, these categories themselves are 
fluid, as they have been arbitrarily constructed through history and language.  In other 
words, this thesis is about the instability and transience of Palestinian identiti(es) in 
Lebanon.  Rather than being a singular, linear narrative, „Palestinian-ness‟ is 
continually being constructed and reconstructed through processes of 
intersectionality, resistance, negotiation and accommodation.  This instability makes 
the writing of this thesis extremely challenging, particularly given the limitations of 
the linguistic resources available to us.    
 
In the next chapter, I provide a rationale for the methodology used in this study and a 
detailed description of the research design. 
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Chapter 4 – Methodology 
 
 
4.1  Introduction  
 
Located within a post-structuralist, post-colonial and feminist theoretical framework 
of identity production and regulation, this study explores how Palestinian youth in 
Lebanon understand and perform their identities vis-à-vis nationality, gender and 
religion, how the discursive resources of identity are appropriated and articulated in 
everyday life within the camps and how Palestinian identities in Lebanon have shifted 
across exilic generations.   
 
In this chapter, I provide a detailed description of the research design for this case 
study.  I then go on to provide a rationale for my decision to undertake interpretivist 
research.  Following this, I present methodological reflections which explore how my 
researcher identities, and the ways in which they were strategically exercised, 
impacted the study.  I conclude the chapter with a discussion on ethical issues that 
arose during the research and the ways in which they were negotiated. 
 
4.2  Research Design  
 
This research was a qualitative, interpretivist case study using interviews as the 
primary research method.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Context), I conducted research in three official UNRWA 
refugee camps close to the south Lebanese port city of Tyre (Sur in Arabic): 
Rashidieh, Burj A-Shemali and Al Bas.  Fieldwork was conducted between June, 
2007 and December, 2008.  Due to the chronic political instability in the region, and 
owing to my legal status as a „foreigner‟, I was required to get official permission to 
enter the camps from the Lebanese army base in the south Lebanese city of Sidon 
(Saida in Arabic).  This permission had to be renewed on a 1-3 month basis, which 
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meant that I was always in a somewhat precarious position in terms of gaining re-
entry to the camps.  Thankfully, I was always able to secure the official permission I 
needed to enter the camps and did not experience any unanticipated breaks in my 
interview schedule.  I also had to obtain permission from the Palestinian Authorities 
in each of the camps in order to interview the youth.  In all cases, this permission was 
granted without difficulty.  Moreover, in the case of Burj A-Shemali and Rashidieh 
camps, the Palestinian Authorities specifically helped me access the youth and 
provided a meeting place for the interviews.  
 
Although I sought official permission from UNRWA Headquarters in Beirut to 
conduct interviews with young people in UNRWA schools within the camps, my 
request got lost in bureaucratic „red tape‟, and this permission was never granted 
(although it was also not denied).  Therefore, I was only able to interview some 
teachers „off the record‟ at UNRWA schools.  Instead, I conducted interviews with 
youth in community centres within the camps.  In Burj A-Shemali camp, I conducted 
interviews at the Fatah-affiliated Al Kurami Centre, at Al Bas camp, I conducted 
interviews at the UNRWA Vocational Training Centre (VTC), and at Rashidieh 
camp, I conducted interviews at the Fatah-affiliated Al Kadoumi Library.  A 
limitation of this study is that the community centres where I interviewed youth in 
Burj A-Shemali and Rashidieh camps were politically affiliated.  Therefore, the 
people I was able to interview and the data I was able to collect in these environments 
were skewed in favour of the Fatah (PLO) political organization.   
In addition to conducting interviews in the 3 official UNRWA camps, I also 
conducted some interviews in two „unofficial camps‟ or Palestinian gatherings close 
to Tyre:  Al Mashuq and Al Qasmieh.  While these gatherings are located outside the 
official camps, UNRWA still maintains some institutions there, such as schools, and 
provides some limited services to the community.  In Al Mashuq and Al Qasmieh 
gatherings, I conducted interviews with the youth in family homes.  With the adults, I 
conducted interviews in work places or private homes within the camps or at the 
UNRWA regional office in Tyre.   
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I chose to conduct research in these specific communities because of their proximity 
to one another, their shared history and questions of access, that is the presence of 
„gatekeepers‟ known to me. 
 
The following section provides a rationale for the framing of this research as a case 
study and includes a detailed description of participant demographics, research 
methods (semi-structured interviews, focus groups and RRA/PLA approaches) and 
data analysis used in this study. 
 
Case Study 
In order to conduct an in-depth study of the Palestinian community in south Lebanon, 
and to capture and reconstruct the complexity and richness of this unique 
environment in the text, I chose to do a case study.  As a bounded dynamic system, a 
case study allowed me to holistically portray what it is like to live in a Palestinian 
camp in south Lebanon through the experiences, thoughts and feelings of young 
people (Geertz, 1973).  Empirical data was gathered in their naturalistic setting 
without intervention or manipulation so that I could capture the context in which 
actions, behaviours and processes occurred.  Rather than me explicitly interpreting, 
evaluating or judging events and situations, they were accepted at face value.  
However, due to my privileged status as both a researcher and an educated and 
„affluent‟ Westerner, my very presence in the camps no doubt influenced the research 
environment as well as what I „saw‟ there.  
 
I found doing a case study to be useful for a number of purposes.  First, a case study 
allowed me to recognize the complexity and embeddedness of social truths and 
alternative interpretations, and it helped me to capture unique features that may 
otherwise have been lost in large-scale data collection.  For example, a case study 
enabled me to uncover hidden voices and perspectives from marginalized populations 
in the community, such as „youth‟ and „women‟, that would not have otherwise been 
heard.  Secondly, a case study allowed me to present research data in a more publicly 
accessible and intelligible form than would have been possible with other kinds of 
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research report.  As a case study contains elements of the „everyday‟ that people can 
connect with, this has helped to enhance the accessibility of and interest in the text for 
a wider audience who may not be familiar with the Palestinian refugee situation in 
Lebanon (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000).   
 
Despite its advantages, a limitation of doing a case study in this context was that it 
resulted in too much information and provided more variables than data points (Yin, 
1994).  For example, I went in to the research specifically looking at how gender, 
religion and nation influenced the construction of identity for Palestinian young 
people only to discover that other variables, such as class, generation and 
urbanization, were, perhaps, equally significant factors.  However, I was only able to 
touch on some of these issues in the text.  In other words, the complexity of the 
situation on the ground made a truly in-depth study very difficult to achieve and the 
resulting comprehensive text very challenging to write.  Therefore, I acknowledge 
that the claims I make in this thesis are clearly biased towards the categories of 
analysis that I had pre-determined before undertaking the study and that further 
research is needed in order to enrich and nuance the account I have provided here.  
On the other hand, focusing on a few selected dimensions of identity (gender, religion 
and nation) has allowed me to achieve intensity in the text that would not have been 
possible with a broader focus.  
 
As with other case studies, another limitation is that this study provides little basis for 
generalization in other contexts (Stake, 1995).  In this case, as south Lebanon has 
been shaped by unique social, political and historical factors, Palestinian communities 
have developed unique ways of reproducing themselves.  Therefore, the claims I 
make in this thesis do not necessarily extend beyond the bounded environment of 
Rashidieh, Burj A-Shemali and Al Bas camps and Al Mashuq and Al Qasmieh 
Palestinian gatherings in south Lebanon.  However, as Yin notes, generalization of 
results from a case study can be made to theory rather than to populations (Yin, 
1994).  Thus, while the findings of this research are not necessarily generalizable to 
other refugee populations, or even other Palestinian communities in Lebanon, I have 
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been able to advance theoretical knowledge of identity in refugee/diasporic contexts 
through this case study.   
 
The following section includes a detailed description of participant demographics, the 
research methods (semi-structured interviews, focus groups and RRA/PLA 
approaches) and data analysis used in this study. 
 
Participant demographics  
In total, I interviewed 50 Palestinian youth, aged 15-24 (in traditional Arabic culture, 
individuals, and particularly females, become „adults‟ after they marry and move out 
of their parents‟ home).  I identified research participants through a number of 
processes which included: using my own personal contacts within the communities, 
establishing links with key individuals and UNRWA officials within each locality and 
„snowballing‟.  My research sample was purposive, and I chose participants based on 
the criteria of camp/non-camp residence, age, gender, religious affiliation and 
political affiliation.     
 
In order to explore the relationship between camp/non-camp residence and identity 
construction, I interviewed respondents from each of the three official UNRWA 
camps in south Lebanon as well as respondents from two Palestinian gatherings close 
to the city of Tyre.  As in the camps most interviews took place within institutions, it 
was easier to get a larger sample of respondents than in the gatherings, where 
interviews took place within private homes (see Table 4.2.1). 
 
Table 4.2.1  Youth participants by camp/gathering 
Rashidieh Burj A-
Shemali 
Al Bas Al Mashuq Al Qasmieh Total  
21 6 14 4 5 50 
 
As youth do not exist outside of the larger society, I also interviewed 26 adults (aged 
30+) in order to provide a more contextualized picture of Palestinian youth identity 
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and to provide reference points for how Palestinian identity has changed, and 
continues to change, throughout exilic generations.  The adults I interviewed included 
UNRWA school administrators and teachers, local NGO staff, political leaders, 
religious leaders and parents (see Table 4.2.2).   
 
Table 4.2.2  Adult participants by role 
Parents Teachers Community leaders Total  
10 12 4 26 
 
In order to represent as broad a spectrum of experience as possible, and recognizing 
that males and females often experience life in very different ways, I attempted to 
interview an equal number of male and female respondents.  Although I achieved 
parity in terms of the number of male and female youth interviewed, the number of 
adults interviewed was skewed in favour of male respondents (see Table 4.2.3).  This 
is because in Palestinian society males work outside of the home and dominate 
leadership positions.  Therefore, I was able to access and interview male respondents 
in public environments, such as offices.  On the other hand, I mostly had to access 
and interview female respondents in their homes.    
 
Table 4.2.3  Participants by gender  
Youth Adults 
Males Females Total Males Females Total  
23 27 50 17 9 26 
 
As the Palestinian community is religiously segmented, and south Lebanon has a long 
history of sectarian conflict and violence, I attempted to interview members of all 
major religious sects.  The fact that the majority of Palestinians are Sunni is reflected 
in the large number of Sunni respondents interviewed (see Table 4.2.4). 
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Table 4.2.4  Participants by religious affiliation   
Sunni Muslim Shi’ite Muslim Christian Total  
51 13 12 76 
 
As the Palestinian community is also politically segmented and situated within the 
complex political landscape of south Lebanon, I attempted to interview members of 
all major political parties.  Although Palestinians in Lebanon have multiple and 
complex political identities, Fatah (PLO) controls the three camps in south Lebanon 
and they helped me to gain access to youth participants within the camps.  Therefore, 
the number of participants I interviewed is heavily skewed in favour of the Fatah 
political organization (see Table 4.2.5). 
 
Table 4.2.5  Participants by political affiliation   
Fatah 
(secular) 
Hamas 
(Sunni) 
Islamic 
Jihad 
(Sunni) 
Hezbollah 
(Shi’ite) 
Independ
ent  
Unknown  Total  
47 5 3 11 3 7 76 
 
Research Methods 
Acknowledging the centrality of human interaction for knowledge production (Kvale, 
1996), and to be inclusive of as many voices as possible (Connell, 2007), I chose to 
adopt interviews as the primary research method in this study.  These consisted of 
semi-structured interviews and focus groups using Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) and 
Participatory Learning and Action (PLA) approaches, such as taxonomies, sorting and 
ranking techniques, Venn diagrams, art and role-play.  These interviews were 
conducted either individually or in single-sex groupings, depending on time and space 
constraints and the preferences of the participants.  Depending on the nature of the 
exercise, some data were recorded on paper by the participants, and all interviews and 
follow-up discussions to group activities were recorded on tape.  Observational notes 
were taken during each activity and later added to my researcher diary (Dunne, Pryor 
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and Yates, 2005).  I interviewed both youth and adults until saturation of the data had 
been achieved and responses had become predictable.       
 
I informed all participants in the study of the purposes of the research and the ways in 
which the findings would be disseminated (thesis, written reports, academic papers 
and conference presentations).  Verbal consent was granted by all interviewees to 
participate in the study.  However, due to the sensitive nature of the environment, the 
history of political and sectarian conflict in the region and the fear expressed by 
marginalized segments of the Palestinian community (particularly the youth, females, 
religious and political minorities and UNRWA staff fearful for their jobs), I did not 
seek written consent in an effort to relieve anxiety and preserve the anonymity of 
participants. 
As the language of instruction in UNRWA schools is English/Arabic, all Palestinian 
youth in Lebanon have a working knowledge of English.  Therefore, interviews were 
conducted in English, with a translator from the Palestinian community always 
present.  When required, I used my knowledge of Arabic for clarification purposes 
during interviews and activities.  I found my occasional use of Arabic to be useful in 
terms of „connecting‟ with the participants, creating an environment of comfort and 
equalizing linguistic advantage. 
 
The following section is an in-depth discussion of each research method used in this 
study (semi-structured interviews, focus groups and RRA/PLA approaches).   
 
Semi-structured Interviews 
Among the research methods I used in this study were semi-structured interviews (see 
Appendices 1-5).  From a post-colonialist and feminist perspective, I chose interviews 
as a research method because they offered the potential for participants to discuss 
their interpretations of the world around them and to express how they regarded 
situations from their own point of view.  As such, interviews yielded rich insights into 
Palestinian biographies, experiences, opinions, values, aspirations, attitudes and 
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feelings (May, 2001).  Moreover, my direct interaction with the participants through 
the interview allowed for greater depth than would have been possible with other 
methods of data collection, such as questionnaires, because I could probe, encourage 
people to expand on their answers and cross-check information (Kane, 1995).  
Additionally, the social nature of the interview meant that respondents became 
involved in the research process and, hence, more motivated to participate.   
I specifically chose to undertake semi-structured interviews for the purposes of this 
research study, as they allowed local, individual and marginalized viewpoints to 
emerge more readily than would have been possible with structured interviews (Kane, 
1995) (see Appendix 1).  Respondents were the ones who decided what was 
important, and they created the categories for the interview.  For example, youth often 
directed the conversation towards issues of interest or concern to them even if these 
issues were not specifically addressed through my interview questions, such as their 
concerns relating to factional violence within the Palestinian community.  Moreover, 
my use of open-ended questions allowed the meanings that respondents attributed to 
events and relationships to be understood on their own terms (May, 2001).  Semi-
structured interviews also gave me the flexibility to modify the sequence of questions, 
change the wording, explain them or add to them.  By probing, I could seek both 
clarification and elaboration beyond the answers, and thus enter into a dialogue with 
the interviewee.  Moreover, the open-ended nature of the questions encouraged the 
development of cooperation and rapport between me and the participants.  It also 
challenged my preconceptions through the emergence of unexpected or unanticipated 
answers which suggested unthought-of relationships or hypotheses.  For example, 
although I did not theorize the importance of generational shifts in Palestinian identity 
before I undertook the research, through interviews with the youth, I found it to be of 
major significance in contemporary Palestinian society and proceeded to follow up on 
this theme.  In this way, I entered the research situation and responded to what 
emerged (May, 2001).   
A limitation of semi-structured interviews in this research context was that the open-
ended nature of the questions sacrificed standardization of the data.  This made 
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comparison between different groups and different contexts problematic.  For 
example, the youth in Burj A-Shemali camp were interested in talking about changes 
they wanted to make to the UNRWA education system and, therefore, they directed 
the conversation towards this end.  However, the youth in the other two camps did not 
mention this issue.  Therefore, I cannot make any generalized claims about this 
„knowledge‟, as I do not know if the views and opinions of young people in Burj A-
Shemali are representative of Palestinian youth in general or they are localized to the 
context of that particular camp.     
I also struggled with the open-ended nature of semi-structured interviews.  Going in 
to the interview session, I often had a personal agenda and specific information that I 
wanted to find out in order to broaden my understanding of a particular aspect of 
Palestinian identity.  Therefore, it was challenging for me not to purposefully „hijack‟ 
the conversation and guide it towards my own ends but, rather, allow the participants 
to direct the conversation as they wished.  However, in all honesty, I was not always 
successful in my attempt to relinquish control during these interviews, and my agenda 
sometimes dominated.        
 
Focus groups 
In order to recognize the existence of multiple perspectives, I also chose to conduct 
group interviews through focus groups.  I found focus groups to be useful because 
participants interacted with each other, rather than only me, which provided space for 
the participants‟ agenda to dominate.  Moreover, it was often through the interaction 
of the group that the data emerged (Chambers, 1997).  Focus groups provided me 
with valuable insight into both social relations and the processes of social dynamics 
within the camps and amongst the youth, in particular (May, 2001).  For example, I 
could clearly witness the gender divide in Palestinian society through male and 
female youth refusing to sit next to one another in interview sessions.  I could also 
witness gender dynamics at work with girls often deferring their „air time‟ and their 
opinions to those of boys.    
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Within this research context, I found focus group interviews to have a number of 
advantages.  First, focus groups were a useful orientation for me to life in the refugee 
camps from the perspectives of the youth.  In this way, focus group interviews helped 
me to develop themes, topics and schedules for subsequent interviews and to develop 
tentative hypotheses (Kane, 1995).  Second, focus groups enabled me to acquire 
shared cultural knowledge.  Group members had an overlapping spread of knowledge 
which covered a wider field than that of any single individual.  Moreover, group 
dynamics meant that dominant discourses rose to the surface.  In this way, focus 
groups allowed me to acquire understanding of normative social organization and 
cultural behaviour in Palestinian society.  Third, focus groups were less intimidating 
than individual interviews for participants.  For example, I noticed how the youth, 
both male and female, sometimes became shy and uncomfortable once their 
classmates left the room.  Moreover, the movement from individuals to group shifted 
the balance of power creating a lower ratio of „outsiders‟ to „insiders‟.   This 
encouraged participants to discuss sensitive topics more freely in groups than they 
would have alone with a stranger (Chambers, 1997).   
 
A limitation of group interviews in this context was that the nature of group dynamics 
inhibited full participation by all members.  For example, some girls hesitated to 
participate fully or reply truthfully in a group situation if boys were present due to the 
hegemonic nature of gender relations in Palestinian society.  Moreover, participants 
who were older or who were from dominant political and sectarian groups were often 
more vocal and tended to dominate group discussions, which restricted the 
participation of others.  Being an „outsider‟ to the community, I was not always 
sensitive to the hegemonic nature of these social relations, particularly at the 
beginning of the fieldwork.  However, once I became aware of these group dynamics, 
whenever possible, I tried to ensure that an equal number of boys and girls were 
present and that religious sects and political organizations were as equally represented 
as possible in interview sessions.     
 
96 
 
Focus groups also posed a challenge for me in terms of group facilitation.  Not being 
used to this form of semi-structured group interaction, the young people often all 
spoke at once, interrupted each other or giggled on the side while another speaker 
„held the floor‟.  This meant that taped interviews were sometimes rendered inaudible 
or difficult to decipher afterwards.  Moreover, as interview sessions were held over a 
number of meetings, not all of the young people could attend all of the sessions.  This 
meant that there was a lot of „coming and going‟ in and between interview sessions 
which was often quite disruptive.  Moreover, the lack of continuity in participant 
attendance affected the nature and quality of data that I was able to collect.  In 
retrospect, I should have introduced the participants to this form of semi-structured 
group interaction slowly and discussed „speaker/audience etiquette‟ with them at the 
outset.    
 
Although focus groups yielded rich data, it was difficult to know how to record, 
transcribe and attach meaning to the data.  This is because it was not just what the 
participants said but also how they interacted with each other and with me that was of 
significance.  In other words, it was the spaces between the lines of the text that were 
also important in constructing meaning (Dunne, Pryor and Yates, 2005).  Therefore, 
making observational notes during the interview proceedings and keeping a 
researcher diary greatly helped me to enrich and nuance verbal data.  
 
RRA/PLA approaches 
In order to recognize the existence of multiple perspectives, I also chose to adopt 
Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) and Participatory Learning and Action (PLA) 
approaches, which aim to empower local people to analyze their own lives and enable 
them to contribute to the planning and management of research projects.  The RRA 
and PLA activities that I used in this study included taxonomies, sorting and ranking 
techniques, Venn diagrams, art and role-play (see Appendix 6).   
 
RRA and PLA activities helped me to move: 
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from closed and preset to participatory and open, from etic to emic, from 
measuring to comparing, from individual to group, from verbal to visual, from 
higher to lower, from reserve to rapport and from frustration to fun 
(Chambers, 1997, p.130).   
 
Moreover, RRA and PLA approaches were flexible and allowed me to mix and match 
methods to tailor the interview to the local situation and the aims of the session.  
Through the use of mapping techniques, taxonomies, sorting and ranking techniques, 
Venn diagrams, calendars, maps, art and role-play, I was able to gather a picture of 
the lives, attitudes and beliefs of Palestinian youth in camps in Lebanon.  As I 
collected and fed information back into the system, the direction and context of the 
research was changed and refined as necessary in an iterative approach (Chambers, 
1997).   
 
Some of the RRA/PLA approaches that I used in this study produced rich visual data.  
For example, in order to „get a feel for‟ how the youth understood „Palestine‟, I asked 
them to draw a picture to show what Palestine meant for them (see Figure 4.2.6).  I 
then analyzed the pictures to see what themes emerged (e.g.: Islam, suffering, etc.).  
From this activity, I was able to gain insight into how the youth understood their 
identities and constructed boundaries between groups (see Chapter 5, „Difference‟). 
 
Figure 4.2.6 
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On another occasion, I asked the youth to map their community specifically 
indicating the places and institutions though which males, females and youth learned 
about Palestine (see Figure 4.2.7).  I used this activity to understand how male, 
female and youth spaces are constructed in Palestinian society (e.g.: the mosque, the 
internet café, the coffee shop and the sports field = „male‟ space) and what 
institutions are considered by the youth to be important in their construction of 
identity (e.g.: the family, political organizations, religious institutions, etc.)  (See 
Chapter 6, „Institutions‟).    
 
Figure 4.2.7 
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I also had the youth construct a type of Venn Diagram to choose and rank the most 
influential institutions in the camps for learning about Palestine.  Larger circles 
indicated the most important institutions (e.g.: the family, political organizations), and 
smaller circles indicated the least significant institutions for learning about Palestine 
from the youths‟ perspective (e.g.: the school).  Through the youths‟ placement of the 
circles in various degrees of proximity to one another, I was also able to learn about 
the level of institutional cooperation in Palestinian society through the eyes of the 
youth (see Figure 4.2.8).   
 
Figure 4.2.8 
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All of the activities producing visual data were followed up by a feedback session in 
which the youth had a chance to explain what they had produced, and other youth had 
the opportunity to comment on it.  These conversations were recorded and later 
transcribed.  Moreover, observational notes were taken during these activities and 
entered into my researcher diary. 
 
I also used other RRA/PLA activities which yielded different types of data.  For 
example, I had the youth roleplay the „difference‟ between Palestinians and „Others‟, 
including Palestinians and other Arabs (Lebanese), Palestinians in Lebanon and 
Palestinians in other countries (Syria), Palestinian men and men in other countries, 
Palestinian women and women in other countries, Palestinian Muslims and Muslims 
in other countries, Palestinian men and Palestinian women and Palestinian Muslims 
and Palestinian Christians.  This activity helped me to understand how Palestinian 
youth define and construct boundaries between their community and „Others‟ (i.e., 
through „suffering‟) (See Chapter 5, „Difference‟).  Another type of RRA/PLA 
activity that I used was the „Sociogram‟.  In this exercise, the youth were asked to 
decide if they agreed or disagreed with a prepared statement on the „responsibilities‟ 
of males and females in different institutional contexts within Palestinian society and 
respond to it by standing in a particular corner of the room (see Appendix 7).  
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Through this activity, I was able to learn about how Palestinian youth understood 
(and contested) gender performance in their society (See Chapter 7, „Shifting 
Identities‟).  Again, these activities were followed up by a feedback session in which 
the youth had the chance to justify their positions and discuss different points of view.  
In these exercises, the discussions were recorded and I took notes on the social 
interactions taking place.  These notes were later entered into my researcher diary.    
 
I found RRA and PLA approaches to be advantageous for a number of reasons.  First, 
from a postcolonial perspective, these approaches helped me to address power 
reversals and allowed me to work with Palestinians as „partners‟, rather than as 
„subjects‟.  It was the participants who expressed, owned and shared the information 
gleaned from RRA and PLA activities.  Second, the visual nature of representation in 
RRA and PLA allowed different people in the group to add details and verify and 
amend information.  It also enabled marginalized groups, such as girls or those from 
political and sectarian minorities, to express their preferences and priorities in a 
physical form which did not entail personal confrontation with those normally 
dominant (Chambers, 1997).  Furthermore, RRA and PLA proved to be particularly 
effective research methods to interview young learners.  RRA/PLA approaches 
helped to establish trust and rapport in a very short space of time in a way that 
reduced young people‟s inhibitions and allowed them to speak freely.  RRA and PLA 
activities were also very enjoyable for young people and took on the appearance of 
drawing, acting or „a game‟ (Mulhall and Taylor, 1998).   
 
One challenge of using RRA and PLA approaches was that they required me to „let 
go‟ and turn over facilitation responsibilities to the young people.  In semi-structured 
interviews and focus groups, the young people were all focused on one task with me 
as facilitator.  However, in RRA and PLA activities, the large group split up and each 
small group of young people went off to work on different tasks.  In this way, 
facilitation became a lot more challenging, and I was not always successful at it.  
Moreover, the unstructured nature of RRA and PLA activities also made it very 
difficult for me to listen to important conversations the youth were simultaneously 
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having in different parts of the room.  In this way, I was unable to capture valuable 
data on the processes involved in the youths‟ thinking in relation to the issues they 
were discussing and the tasks they were working on.  
 
Another challenge of using RRA and PLA approaches was that they required 
consistent group attendance and participation.  As exercises often conceptually built 
upon one another, or revisited issues discussed in previous meetings, RRA/PLA 
activities required youth to attend interview sessions consistently.  However, due to 
family, work and school commitments, this was not always possible for all youth.  
Moreover, some youth lost interest in the activities after one or two sessions and 
stopped attending.  Therefore, although I conducted Focus Group interviews using 
RRA/PLA activities over several meetings with youth at Burj A-Shemali and Al Bas 
camps, due to the difficulty of consistently assembling the youth at Rashidieh camp 
during the school term, I conducted in-depth individual interviews with the youth in 
that camp.  Although individual interviews were valuable as they produced a different 
kind of data, the data that I was able to collect in Rashidieh camp differed markedly 
from that collected in the other two camps.  This made comparisons between the 
youth and between the different camps problematic.  
 
Another challenge of using RRA and PLA approaches was that both qualitative and 
quantitative data were produced.  For example, drawing and mapping activities 
produced visual data, whereas ranking and Sociogram activities produced quantitative 
data.  This required me to find effective ways of integrating and interpreting the 
different data sets.  Moreover, the visual nature of much of the data that emerged 
through RRA and PLA activities challenged me to find effective methods of 
transcription and translation of the data into textual form. 
 
From a practical perspective, RRA and PLA activities also created transport as well 
as data storage and retrieval challenges.  First, chart paper, coloured markers, 
coloured paper, scissors, tape and glue had to be transported to and from each 
interview site.  Next, as masses of charts and posters were produced through these 
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activities, data storage and retrieval became difficult.  Therefore, when leaving the 
field site, I systematically captured all the images in a digital form so that they could 
be saved and transported electronically.    
 
Data Analysis 
As the study was interpretive, data analysis involved a “reflexive, reactive interaction 
between [myself] and the decontextualized data” (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 
2000, p. 285).  I analyzed the data through a constructivist, thematic coding of 
transcripts.  The first stage of data analysis was to read and re-read interview 
transcripts, unstructured notes and personal texts in my researcher diary to get „close 
to the data‟, to get a feel for what was being said and to identify the key themes and 
issues being discussed by the participants.  These themes included boundaries of 
identity (i.e., religion, suffering), the use of discursive resources to construct identity 
through institutions and the processes of resistance, negotiation and accommodation 
in the construction of new identities.  Of course, I was not a „blank slate‟ in this 
process, and key concepts and ideas from the literature I had read, as well as my own 
personal experiences and discursive positionings influenced the construction of these 
themes.  Moreover, the research questions I had entered the research with were also 
pivotal in the thematic structuring of the text.   
 
After I identified units of meaning, I clustered, categorized and ordered them through 
thematic coding (Gibbs, 2002). This enabled me to juxtapose and compare the data to 
identify relationships between different themes.  By noting patterns and counting the 
frequency of occurrence, I made interpretations and linkages and developed tentative 
theories, relating the findings to previous literature and research.  From this, I wrote a 
general narrative description of the lived experiences of Palestinian youth from the 
perspectives of the research participants.  Of course, this text was filtered through my 
own discursive locations and theoretical positionings (see Methodology section, 
below). 
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In response to the particular discursive positionings of Palestinians in Lebanon, I used 
post-structuralist, post-colonialist and feminist theory as a framework for the 
interrogation of the data (see Literature Review, chapter 3).   
 
4.3  Methodology 
 
The design of this research study emerged from my epistemological and ontological 
positioning in relation to the nature of „the social‟ and the production of „knowledge‟.  
In the following section, I discuss the theoretical underpinnings which informed the 
research decisions made in this study.  In particular, I provide a rationale for my 
decision to design this research as an interpretivist study. 
 
The nature of „the social‟ and the production of „knowledge‟  
An ongoing question related to the research process is, what is the nature of the social 
world, and how can we have knowledge of it?  How we answer this question and 
where we locate ourselves ontologically and epistemologically conditions the way we 
envision, plan and conduct our research.  For example, do we see participants in our 
research study as „collaborators‟ with us in the research process or as „subjects‟ to be 
researched?  Do we see ourselves as „miners‟ who go in to „extract‟ external, 
objective and pre-existing information, or are we „travellers‟ who are constantly in 
negotiation with research participants in the process of social construction? (Kvale, 
1996).  Our assumptions in these matters largely determine what methodological 
position we adopt, what research methods we implore and how we analyze the data 
(Dunne, Pryor and Yates, 2005).   
 
My ontological and epistemological position is that the social world cannot be viewed 
in the same way as natural phenomena within a traditional scientific methodology.  
There is no objective „knowledge‟ of the social that can be extracted and recorded in 
a neutral fashion by an unbiased and disengaged researcher.  Rather, “human science 
is constitutively value-engaged in a way natural science is not” (Walsh, 1999, p. 51), 
and I, as the researcher, am always implicated in knowledge production.  This is 
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because I am located discursively, which means that I am constructed and regulated 
by the specific discursive spaces that I inhabit.  Therefore, these discourses constitute, 
to some extent, what I can „know‟.  Moreover, I am constituted by „technologies‟, 
such as sexual, political, legal, educational and religious patterns of behaviour, of 
which I am often unaware (Foucault, 1977).  As such, I may take as „neutral‟, 
„natural‟ and „given‟ specific discursive formations in my own society, and thereby 
make judgments about „Other‟ populations based on my own normative assumptions 
(Said, 1978).  This combined with the power differentials inherent between 
researcher/researched and West/East clearly has implications for any „knowledge‟ I 
may construct about Palestinians in Lebanon through the research process and how I 
may represent them. 
 
However, despite the power differentials inherent in research, meaning does not just 
belong to me alone.  Rather, it is constructed in the dialogue between me and the 
research participants in a space where our semantic histories collide or intersect 
(Bakhtin, 1986).  In other words,  
 
The specific contexts in which utterances are produced, distributed and 
consumed are influenced by at least four levels of intentionality: a) the 
intentionality of the historical moment, b) the intentionality of the social and 
cultural frames at work, c) the intentionality of the culture in which the 
utterance is produced, and d) the intentionality of the individual speakers 
(Dimitriadis and Kamberelis, 2006, p. 52).   
 
In this way, each social encounter I have had with Palestinians in Lebanon has 
constructed new „knowledge‟ both through the discursive practices which contained 
us and through the personal agency which we exercised within a specific context.  As 
we collected new “vocabularies” and ideologies from each social encounter and 
integrated them in new ways, we became:  
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laminates (or mosaics) of these discursive practices and became partially 
responsible for [our] own uniqueness (Dimitriadis and Kamberelis, 2006, p. 
53). 
 
Acknowledging that Palestinian young men and women are meaningful actors in their 
own right, I initially chose to undertake interpretivist research within the 
phenomenological tradition in order to answer questions about how social life is 
created, experienced and given meaning by Palestinian young people in Lebanon.  
Adopting a broad definition of phenomenology, my initial intention was to study 
Palestinian youth‟s experiences and perceptions from their consciousness of them in 
order to privilege personal perspective and interpretation in knowledge production.  I 
intended to do this with the understanding that the youth make these constructions 
within a socio-cultural and historical framework and through the sites of institutions 
(Foucault, 1977; Flick, 1998).  Moreover, as identity is process, the youth continually 
test and modify these constructions in light of new experiences (Schwandt, 1998).   
 
However, as I engaged in the research process, contradictions began to emerge for me 
around the issue of researcher identities.  Pure phenomenological research seeks to 
start from a perspective free from hypotheses or preconceptions by the researcher 
„bracketing‟ her experiences and preconceptions (Husserl, 1970).  However, exposure 
to feminist and postcolonial literature and my fieldwork experiences (see 4.4 
Researcher Identities, below) left me questioning, and ultimately refuting, the 
possibility of a researcher starting without any preconceptions or biases.  Rather, I 
came to see that social research is not under the control of an “autonomous, 
disengaged, disembodied subject, knower, or ideal epistemic agent” (Schwandt, 1998, 
p. 199).  Rather, the researcher is always socially, culturally and historically situated, 
and the researcher frames the research and constructs „knowledge‟ from the position 
of her own personal location in the world and her biography of experiences and 
background assumptions.  This means that my account of life in Palestinian camps is 
inherently ideological, political and permeated with my own values and assumptions 
and my own discursive positionings (Rouse, 1996).  Therefore, I have needed to 
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become visible in the „frame‟ of the research as an interested and subjective actor 
rather than as a detached and impartial observer and make clear how unequal power 
relations between myself (a Canadian researcher studying at a UK university) and the 
researched (young, stateless Palestinian refugees) have impacted interpretations and 
meanings (Stanley and Wise, 1993).  As Said argues,  
No production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever ignore or 
disclaim its author‟s involvement as a human subject in (her) own 
circumstances (Said, 1978, p.11).   
Moreover, this realisation has meant that I have had to shift my initial 
phenomenological framing of the research to a more broadly based constructivist 
analysis.   
 
4.4  Researcher Identities 
 
As discussed above, the researcher is always socially, culturally and historically 
situated and constructs „knowledge‟ from her own personal location in the world.  
Therefore, from post-colonialist and feminist perspectives, it has been imperative for 
me to interrogate my multiple identities, and the ways in which they were 
strategically exercised in this study.  The following section will examine the ways in 
which my identities regulated my access to participants, the quality of data that I was 
able to collect, how I interpreted the data and how I constructed „knowledge‟ from it. 
 
Access to participants 
My different group identities situated me both as an „insider‟ and an „outsider‟ in 
Palestinian society.  As a Canadian, non-Arab and non-Muslim, I was clearly an 
„outsider‟ to the Palestinian community I was living in.  However, being married to a 
Palestinian meant that I was also an „insider‟ in some respects, as I was formally 
attached to a „tribe‟.  Moreover, I was considered to be an „insider‟ to certain 
segments of the population, specifically „women‟ and „Christians‟.  In other words, 
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the „insider/outsider‟ binary collapsed as I was reconstituted along this sliding scale in 
different contexts and according to different criteria. 
Being an „insider‟ and an „outsider‟ to the community proved to be both 
advantageous and disadvantageous in different situations and at different times in 
terms of gaining access to participants.  For example, being an „insider‟ to females 
meant that I had unfettered access to Palestinian girls and women in their homes, 
where most female life takes place.  A male researcher would not have had this access 
or been privy to the type of information that this environment yielded.    
However, being an „insider‟ in terms of gender also meant that I was expected to take 
up and perform local female subject positions and participate within the „honour and 
shame‟ paradigm, whereby women become responsible for the „honour‟ of the family 
and community through the regulation of their bodies (Yuval-Davis, 1997) (see 
Literature Review, Chapter 3).  This meant that I had to follow a certain „dress code‟ 
and refrain from venturing out into „male space‟, talking to men unsupervised, 
travelling by myself, going out in the evening alone or staying out late at night.  For 
example, on one occasion as I was returning home around 10:00 p.m. from the local 
internet café, I was met by an inquisitive male neighbour at the entrance to the 
apartment building where I was staying.  Upon seeing me, he commented, “Returning 
home so late?  Well, your husband is in charge of you”.  At this remark, I realized 
that I had committed two cultural „faux pas‟, the first had been venturing into the 
„male space‟ of the internet café without a male „chaperone‟, and the second was 
returning home after dark.  However, what is of significance in this exchange was my 
status as an „insider‟.  Whereas a „foreign‟ woman is understood to participate within 
a different (and „inferior‟) cultural paradigm of „morality‟, a Palestinian woman is 
always expected to conduct herself with utmost propriety and never comprise her 
„honour‟ or the honour of her (extended) family.  As the „wife of a Palestinian‟, and 
therefore an „insider‟, I was expected to adhere to these cultural and moral norms.  
Consequently, I was placed under the constant „surveillance‟ and „gaze‟ of the 
community.  Moreover, I was expected to „police‟ myself to avoid perceived moral 
indiscretions (Foucault, 1977).  As a researcher, these restrictions on my movements 
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proved tremendously challenging in terms of data collection, as they determined 
where I could go, who I could talk to and under what conditions. 
Identifying participants through the process of „snowballing‟ was also affected both 
by my identities and those of the participants referring me to others.  For example, my 
data sample is admittedly heavily biased towards members of the Fatah political 
organization.  In part, this reflects the inequitable demographic balance of political 
membership in the camps in south Lebanon in favour of Fatah.  However, it is also 
indicative of the fact that interviewees tended to recommend associates, colleagues 
and friends for interview who held the same political affiliation as themselves.  For 
example, staff at the Al Kurami Centre (Fatah Office) in Burj A-Shemali camp 
referred me to the Fatah (Al Kadoumi) Library in Rashidieh camp.  In a similar way, 
Sunnis referred me to other Sunnis, Shi‟ites to other Shi‟ites and Christians to other 
Christians.   This meant that I had to make a conscious effort to seek out members of 
other political parties and religious sects in order to gain a more balanced 
understanding of Palestinian identity (see Participant Demographics).   
 
Nature and quality of data collected 
In addition to impacting my access to participants, my identities also impacted the 
nature and quality of data that I was able to collect.  In the interview process, there is 
a constant symbolic exchange between the researcher and the participants which 
largely determines what questions can be asked and what information will be given.  
One example of this is how my status as an „insider‟ in terms of gender allowed me to 
ask questions and receive information about female sexuality within the Palestinian 
community.  On one afternoon, as I was sitting with three young Palestinian teachers, 
two male and one female, I approached the subject of sexuality within Palestinian 
society.  Although I normally would not have approached this subject in mixed 
company, I did so because my assessment of the female teacher present was that she 
was something of a „rebel‟ in the sense that she did not wear the hijab, she rode a 
motorcycle and she was engaged to a European Christian.  Believing the female 
teacher to be quite „liberal‟, I assumed that she would be willing to speak about this 
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subject with the other teachers.  However, although the male teachers were happy to 
speak openly about (hetero)sexuality, the female teacher suddenly fell silent.  Instead 
of articulating her views, she asked if she could write her responses down in my 
notebook because she didn‟t want to discuss this topic in the company of men.  At 
this point, I realized that it was my „insider‟ status as a „female‟ that had gained me 
access to this important data.  A male researcher, whether an „insider‟ or an „outsider‟ 
to the Palestinian community, would never have been privy to this type of 
information.  However, it was also the assumptions I had made as an „outsider‟ that 
had led me to make this cultural error in the first place.  Moreover, it was the power I 
held as a Westerner and as the researcher that allowed me to impose Western 
meanings onto the situation. 
 
Although being an „insider‟ sometimes worked to my advantage in terms of gaining 
access to participants and specific types of data, being an „outsider‟ was also 
advantageous in certain circumstances.  For example, the fact that I was a „foreigner‟, 
and therefore an „outsider‟, meant that I was seen to exist outside local and regional 
political and sectarian conflicts.  In other words, I was perceived to be somehow 
„neutral‟ and non-partisan.  In this way, minority populations, such as Shi‟ites and 
Christians felt comfortable in providing me with their perspectives on Palestinian 
issues and life in the camps.  In the same way, I was able to gain access and conduct 
interviews with members of all political factions.  In terms of my national identity, 
being Canadian definitely worked to my advantage as a researcher in this 
environment, as Canada is perceived to be a “peaceful” and “good” country by most 
Palestinians.  On the other hand, Americans are widely disliked for their overt support 
of Israel, and the British are distrusted for their historical role in the drafting of the 
1917 Balfour Declaration, which laid the foundation for the 1948 Palestinian Al 
Nakba.  Moreover, many Palestinians hold both Americans and Britons responsible 
for the events currently unfolding in (Arab) Iraq, and the Middle East more generally.   
 
In some instances, my multiple identities intersected to create new „hybrid‟ identities 
which sometimes worked to my advantage.  For example, my „insider‟ status as the 
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„wife of a Palestinian‟, and my status as a woman, intersected with my „outsider‟ 
status as a Canadian to give me unique access to sensitive information.  On one 
occasion, a young Palestinian woman disclosed to me that she had been the victim of 
a sexual assault.  Believing she could talk freely to me about the incident „woman to 
woman‟, and believing that, as a foreigner, I would not pass judgment on her 
according to local cultural and religious traditions, she felt safe in sharing this 
information with me.  This was despite the fact that she had never spoken about this 
incident with even her closest family members out of fear of reprisals.  In other 
words, it was who I was in relation to who she was that allowed this exchange to take 
place.  Moreover, our exchange of personal information and empathy directly 
challenged dominant „masculine‟ research methodologies calling for „emotional 
detachment‟ in the interview process and “the manipulation of interviewees as objects 
of study/sources of data” (Oakley, 2002, p.33). 
 
The symbolic exchange between myself and the participants was further complicated 
through the presence of an interpreter at interview sessions.  Although the interpreters 
I used were always Palestinian, and every effort was made to ensure that they were of 
the same age and sex as the participants, they were not necessarily members of the 
same religious sect or political organization as the respondents.  For example, in Burj 
A-Shemali camp, two Sunni female youth participants approached me after a group 
interview session to say that they did not feel comfortable speaking in front of a 
female Shi‟ite interpreter because they felt that her religious sect made her more 
sympathetic to the “Lebanese perspective” (most Lebanese in south Lebanon are 
Shi‟ite).  In other words, for these youth, the interpreter‟s religious affiliation 
challenged her „authenticity‟ as a Palestinian and transformed her into an „outsider‟ in 
their eyes.  Just as the interpreter being „too different‟ from the participants 
sometimes affected the interpretation process, being „too close‟ also presented 
specific challenges.  For example, in Rashidieh camp, one participant expressed 
hesitation to speak in front of the interpreter because she was his neighbour in the 
camp, and he did not want her to know his „business‟.  However, the same youth was 
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more than willing to speak with me alone, as he considered me to be an „outsider‟ to 
the community and, therefore, a „non-threat‟.       
 
Interrogation of data and creation of „knowledge‟ 
Beyond access to participants and information, my identities also determined what I 
saw in the field, how I interpreted it and what „knowledge‟ I created out of it.  For 
example, my identity as a woman meant that I was particularly interested in listening 
to and giving articulation to female perspectives within the community.  Moreover, as 
a non-Muslim conducting research in an increasingly Islamicized society, I was eager 
to interview non-Muslims and religious minorities and give them an opportunity to 
express their views on life in the camps and changes in Palestinian society. 
 
One of the benefits of being an „outsider‟ in the Palestinian community was that it 
enabled me to view things through „fresh eyes‟ and question the „normal‟.  However, 
as an „outsider‟, I had to work hard to try to understand life from the perspective of 
the participants.  For example, I had to try and resist the temptation to interpret and 
judge local gender relations according to my Western feminist perspectives.   
As an „outsider‟, it was also very easy to view participants as a monolithic whole, as 
Palestinians, Arabs or Muslims, rather than as individuals with complex identities.  
On one hand, this meant that there was a tendency to want to „Orientalise‟ the 
population and to „teach‟ or „correct‟ them (Said, 1978).  On the other hand, it was 
tempting to want to portray the community as „innocent victims‟ of Western 
imperialist policies and Israeli aggression, as people who need to be „pitied‟ and 
„helped‟.  However, this would have merely served to deny Palestinians any form of 
agency or control over their lives.  Moreover, it would have ignored the realities „on 
the ground‟ of community participation and complicity in gender inequality and the 
symbolic use of violence to politicize and militarize children from an early age. 
 
Contestation, negotiation and accommodation of identities  
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Conducting fieldwork in such a challenging environment meant that my own 
identities were constantly being contested.  This required me to engage in the 
processes of identity negotiation and accommodation.  For example, I knew that 
espousing a Western feminist dogma would merely serve to alienate me from the 
community and preclude me from collecting the data that I needed.  However, I also 
knew that unconditionally taking up local female subject positions would be an 
unacceptable compromise to me on a personal level.  Therefore, I had to reach a place 
of accommodation by implementing some key strategies.  First, I took up what I 
could of local subject positions, such as adopting a negotiated version of the female 
„dress code‟.  For example, rather than swimming in the sea fully-clothed and with 
my hair covered, as the other Palestinian women did, I opted to enter the water in a 
baggy T-shirt and knee-length shorts.  In this way, I could show that at least I was 
making some attempt to respect cultural norms and protect my „modesty‟, while at the 
same time still managing to enjoy the experience of swimming.   
Being both female and „the wife of a Palestinian‟, I knew I could not escape from 
participating within the „honour and shame‟ paradigm.  On the other hand, as a 
researcher, I knew that I needed freedom of movement to complete my data 
collection.  Therefore, in order to achieve both objectives, I chose to strike a „bargain 
with patriarchy‟ (Kandiyoti, 1998).  One way I did this was by using my mother‟s 
visit to my field site as an opportunity to comply with cultural norms while 
conducting fieldwork in the company of men.  I capitalized on my mother‟s identity 
as an older female, and therefore as a kind of „chaperone‟, to enable me to move 
freely within public space and openly interact with males in her presence.  Being 
accompanied by my mother during interviews not only gave me access to male 
participants and „male spaces‟, it served to humanize me and soften my „foreignness‟ 
in the eyes of the participants, as they highly value and respect close family 
relationships.  Another strategy that I employed was to ask my London-based 
Palestinian husband to phone his family, certain influential officials and key members 
of the community to let them know that I had his „permission‟ to enter „male space‟ 
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and interview men.  Therefore, I could culturally comply with accepted norms and 
still carry out my fieldwork.  
 
My attachment to certain subject positions and the performance of my identities in 
different contexts also raised several ethical issues during my fieldwork.  For 
example, on my part, there was a definite desire to want to „play up‟ certain identities 
in order to gain positions of advantage in the interview process.  For example, when I 
was interviewing minority Palestinian Shi‟ites, I often used my relationship with my 
husband‟s family in order to gain the trust of the participants.  However, when I was 
interviewing Palestinian Christians, I often didn‟t mention that my husband‟s family 
was Muslim due to the long history of sectarian conflict in the region.  Moreover, my 
own identity as a Christian meant that Christian Palestinians already felt safe and 
comfortable in discussing with me their marginalized status within the Palestinian 
community.  Was it ethical for me to use my identities strategically to gain positions 
of advantage in the interview process, or is this what we all naturally do in any given 
social interaction?     
 
Sometimes I was asked about specific aspects of my identities, such as whether or not 
I had ever eaten pork, drank alcohol or been to Israel.  Although I knew what answers 
participants wanted to hear, I came to the decision that, for better or for worse, I was 
going to represent myself accurately and honestly to the community.  Was this a wise 
thing for me to do in terms of forwarding my research goals?  For me, it was a 
compromise that I felt I could live with on a moral level.    
In all of these ways, my researcher identities and my discursive positioning(s) largely 
influenced the research process and what I could claim to „know‟ about Palestinians 
in Lebanon.  
 
4.5  Ethical Issues  
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As discussed earlier, social research is concerned with knowledge production and is 
inherently bound up in relations of power.  Therefore, the moral and ethical 
dimensions of the research must be assessed through a critical analysis of power 
relations between researcher and researched.  In this way, it has been crucial for me to 
acknowledge the power differentials that existed in this study between „researcher‟ 
and „subject‟, to recognize the vulnerability of the participants and to hold myself 
accountable.  The following section will discuss ethical issues in this study relating to 
researcher relations, issues of consent, privacy and representation and the 
dissemination of findings. 
 
Researcher relations (researching the vulnerable) 
Working from within the interpretivist tradition, I was attempting to describe the 
lived experiences of the participants through their eyes and then reconstruct an 
account for the reader.  In other words, I was involved in the creation and 
representation of „knowledge‟ about Palestinians in Lebanon.  However, knowledge 
is inextricably bound with power and possesses the power to harm as well as to 
benefit (Foucault, 1977).  Therefore, from a post-colonial perspective, I have had to 
acknowledge my position of power as a Western, educated researcher conducting 
social research with a vulnerable population, such as Palestinian refugee youth in 
Lebanon.   
 
As a stateless people group and a minority ethnic population, Palestinians experience 
systematic political, social and economic marginalization in Lebanon (see Chapter 2, 
Context).  Moreover, their historical experiences have been, and continue to be, 
framed by Western imperialism and colonialism (see Chapter 3, Literature Review).  
In this way, Palestinians are particularly vulnerable to the hegemonic „gaze‟ of the 
researcher and the power of research to construct them as „Other‟ through 
representation (Said, 1978).  Despite this vulnerability, ethnographic research, in 
particular, has been historically linked with colonialism and imperialism where white, 
Western, bourgeois males have created and legitimated „knowledge‟ of colonized 
peoples through the social sciences (Akeroyd, 1984).  Moreover, research has often 
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been conducted in an oppressive manner through a one-way process of extraction of 
information without regard for the impact on the researched (Scheyvens and Storey, 
2006).  As hooks argues,   
 
There is no need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you 
can speak about yourself.  No need to hear your voice.  Only tell me about 
your pain.  I want to know your story.  And then I will tell it back to you in a 
new way.  Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own.  
Re-writing you, I write myself anew.  I am still author, authority.  I am still 
the colonizer, the speak-subject, and you are now at the centre of my talk 
(hooks, 1990, p.151-152).   
 
Considering the socio-political context in which Palestinians have had to live their 
lives in Lebanon, it was particularly imperative for me to make a conscious effort to 
avoid reproducing neo-colonial research postures and practices that would only serve 
to enhance their experiences of oppression and domination by „the West‟/Israel.   
 
The Palestinian community, like all communities, is internally segmented, and 
specific groups within Palestinian society often experience particular forms of 
marginalization and vulnerability.  In the Palestinian context, young people are 
among the most vulnerable.  While sharing with adults the pain and hardship of living 
their lives as refugees in exile, Palestinian young people lack even the most basic 
decision-making power and access to resources that adults in their community enjoy, 
however limited.  Despite this, the trend in research has often been to consider young 
people only indirectly, if at all.  As Bowden argues, “[the young] is a category taken 
for granted – seen but not heard, acted upon but not with” (Bowden, 1998, p. 282).  In 
other words, parents, teachers and other adults in the community are often called 
upon to speak „on behalf‟ of young people, effectively silencing them and rendering 
them invisible in the narrative, or worse yet, misrepresenting them.  Even if young 
people are included in the research, it often takes the form of: 
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a „raid‟, whereby the investigator moves in, plunders the results, swiftly 
moves out and in this process, [the youth] are denigrated to little more than 
tokens (Matthews, Limb and Taylor, 1998, p. 316).   
 
Within this context, it was particularly important for me, as the researcher, to treat the 
youth as equal partners in the research process and empower them as much as 
possible to express and own the data through the adoption of an interpretivist 
methodology and participatory research methods.  
 
In addition to the young, girls and women are also among the most vulnerable in 
Palestinian society.  Patriarchal structures mean that Palestinian females often face 
specific forms of oppression in their daily lives. For example, women are rarely given 
leadership roles or appointed as official spokespersons for their community.  
Moreover, women‟s lack of freedom of movement in the public sphere often results 
in their inability to attend meetings, express themselves or ask questions.  These 
social realities mean that it is often difficult for a researcher to gain access to women 
in public spaces.  Moreover, it is often impractical or culturally inappropriate for the 
researcher to visit women in their homes.  In this way, research can easily come to 
ignore or misrepresent Palestinian girls and women and become centred around men.  
Additionally, the ideas, opinions and experiences of male respondents can be 
mistakenly taken to represent those of the entire community, rather than just the 
dominant group (Scheyvens and Storey, 2006).  As gender intersects with other social 
categories, such as race, ethnicity and age, this constructs additional forms of 
marginality (Hill Collins, 1991).  Therefore, I had to take special care to ensure that 
females had equal chance to freely express their views in an environment that was 
empowering, respectful and safe.      
In this context, it was also particularly important for me, as the researcher, to question 
the assumed „neutrality‟ and „objectivity‟ of social research and to reflect on the 
power dynamics inherent in the research process.  This meant that I had to assess the 
effects of my presence in the camps and my research techniques on the nature and 
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extent of the data collected (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).  Moreover, I had to 
acknowledge that there was interpretation and conjecture on my part in deciding what 
topics to explore, what data to select and how to express and order this data.  In this 
way, I had to acknowledge that I had the power to misrepresent, distort or delete 
findings which were provided in good faith by the research participants in order to 
serve my own ends.   
Consent 
A practical research issue related to power is that of participant consent.  Social 
research involves the collection of data about and from human beings.  Therefore, 
before research participants consent to participating in the research, it is imperative 
that they be informed about the methods and aims of the study, its anticipated 
consequences and the potential benefits, risks and disadvantages their participation 
may bring to themselves and their community (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000).  
However, the acquisition of participant consent in social research is far from 
straightforward.  For example, from whom is consent to be obtained and in relation to 
whom?  What matters, events and data does the consent pertain to?  Is obtaining 
consent a simple one-off process or is it a negotiated, lengthy, repeated process?  If 
consent is withdrawn, what implications are there for the field data relating to that 
person?  Is covert research acceptable when it is the only way to ensure that 
participants behave naturally or to obtain information about illegal or disapproved 
activities?  Does full disclosure need to be balanced against scientific interests? 
(Akeroyd, 1984)  In addition to the moral dilemmas I encountered around the issue of 
consent, pragmatically, the need for informed consent presented me with acute 
challenges in relation to politically sensitive settings.  It was difficult, impractical or 
simply impossible for me to obtain written consent from everyone in the field setting 
(Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000).  This was particularly true in relation to the 
youth, women, religious and political minorities and UNRWA staff members who 
feared for their jobs.  Instead, I sought to gain knowledgeable and voluntary verbal 
consent from each participant.  The ethical boundaries were further blurred as 
participants often provided me with rich information during informal „chit chat‟ 
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sessions at the end of interviews once the microphone had been turned off.  As this 
information was provided outside the context of the formal interview setting, was it to 
be considered „off the record‟, or could it still be considered legitimate data?  At the 
very least, this informal exchange invariably coloured how I interpreted the 
„legitimate‟ data afterwards. 
 
Privacy  
Related to the issue of informed consent was the right of participants to privacy, 
confidentiality and anonymity in the research process.  I had to establish a good level 
of rapport and trust with participants in order to gain depth of information, 
particularly where the issues being investigated were of a sensitive nature (Dunne, 
Pryor and Yates, 2005).  However, I was aware that those whose lives were being 
portrayed risked exposure, embarrassment, a potential loss of standing in the 
community or even physical reprisal for information they were sharing with me.  
Again, this vulnerability was particularly acute for the youth, females, political and 
religious minorities and UNRWA staff, who all had good reason to fear being 
identified.  In this way, it was critical for me not to inappropriately exploit the rapport 
I established with the participants, to use deception or to probe sensitive issues that 
may have further enhanced participants‟ vulnerability (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).  
Moreover, I needed to think through my methods and procedures for recording, 
transcribing, processing, storing and accessing data in order to ensure that the 
confidentiality of research participants was protected (Akeroyd, 1984).  For example, 
it was important for me to make sure that the inclusion of direct quotes and vignettes 
of individual cases or participants did not compromise confidentiality.  However, the 
practice of maintaining participant confidentiality and anonymity was also not 
without moral ambiguity.  For example, during fieldwork, I sometimes learned of 
behaviour or planned acts which threatened my moral values or posed harm to others.  
Therefore, I was faced with the dilemma of whether or not to report these situations 
or to keep them in confidence.  Then there was the issue of whom these situations 
could be reported to.  This last point is particularly problematic in a society that lacks 
formal state institutions.  Therefore, in order to minimize the risk of these situations 
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arising in the first place, at the start of each interview, I had to make clear to 
informants that matters of this nature could not be kept confidential for their personal 
well-being and for the well-being of the community.   
 
Representation  
An ethical dilemma which I faced during the writing-up phase of the research process 
was one of representation.  In my „insider‟ status as the „wife of a Palestinian‟, I knew 
that I was expected to view the „Palestinian struggle‟ with sympathy and represent the 
Palestinian community as „innocent victims of Zionist aggression‟.  Moreover, I 
strongly suspect that some participants agreed to participate in this study with the 
hopes that I would tell the international community about the injustices suffered by 
the Palestinians at the hands of the Israelis.  Although I was clear and honest with all 
participants about the aims and objectives of the research study from the outset, was it 
ethical to take participants‟ comments, made with the objective of political posturing, 
and apply them in a different context?  I decided that I did not have control over the 
political agendas of the participants, yet in clearly and honestly explaining the aims 
and goals of the research and in gaining their expressed consent to participate in the 
study, I had gained the „right‟ to use their data for analysis.  This is not to say, 
however, that I have never felt a sense of guilt or disloyalty to the participants by not 
necessarily representing them as they would wish, particularly because of their status 
as a marginalized and vulnerable population and because of my husband‟s 
relationship to the community.  Instead, this experience has highlighted for me the 
power of the researcher to manipulate the data, take quotes out of context and elevate 
or diminish certain perspectives in order to support a particular thesis.  In other 
words, the „knowledge‟ that is created through the research process is inherently 
ideological, political and permeated with my values, assumptions and agendas as the 
researcher. 
 
Dissemination of findings 
Many of the ethical issues that arose during the research process occurred during the 
reporting and publication of data.  Questions that arose during this stage included: 
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What is legitimate private and public knowledge?  Who will have access to this data?  
Who will own it?  Should participants be allowed to respond to or alter matters of 
interpretation and judgment that I have made? (Akeroyd, 1984)  For example, should 
members of the Palestinian community have veto powers over portions of the thesis 
where I have exposed gender inequality in Palestinian society?  I decided that a 
balance had to be struck between my commitment to the interests of the informants 
and to the public dissemination of findings.  As the researcher, I had to think through 
how participants would be given feedback on the results, to what extent they would 
own the data and if/how they would have a say in its publication.  In turn, these issues 
had to be tempered by practicalities such as distance, language issues, elapsed time 
and participants‟ level of interest.  In this sense, I have had to continually negotiate 
the relationship between my moral position and a professional code of ethics. 
 
4.6  Overview  
 
Located within a theoretical framework of identity production and regulation, this 
study explores how Palestinian youth in Lebanon understand and perform their 
identities vis-à-vis nationality, gender and religion, how the discursive resources of 
identity are appropriated and articulated in everyday life within the camps and how 
Palestinian identities in Lebanon have shifted across exilic generations.  The study 
has been interpretivist and framed as a case study.  In this light, empirical data were 
collected through semi-structured interviews, focus groups and Rapid Rural Appraisal 
(RRA)/Participatory Learning and Action (PLA) approaches in three official 
UNRWA refugee camps and two Palestinian „gatherings‟ in south Lebanon.  Data 
analysis was interpretive and framed through post-structural, post-colonial and 
feminist theory (see Literature Review, Chapter 3).   
 
In the next chapter, I turn my attention to the research questions and, using empirical 
data, begin to analyze how the concept of „difference‟ plays itself out in identity 
construction in Palestinian camps in Lebanon.  
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Chapter 5 – Boundaries 
 
In this chapter, I use empirical data to analyze how Palestinian youth (male and 
female) understand and perform their identities in refugee camps in south Lebanon 
(research question 1).  I do this through a macro-level analysis of how identity is 
constructed through „difference‟ in Palestinian society (see Chapter 3, Literature 
Review).  First, I examine how difference is constructed between Palestinians and 
external „Others‟ through the construction of physical, structural and symbolic 
boundaries in Palestinian society.  Next, I look at how Palestinians construct 
difference through shared cultures and discourses of „Palestinian-ness‟.  Finally, I 
explore how Palestinians themselves contest these discourses and construct internal 
„Others‟.  I argue that although identity is constructed through the erection of 
boundaries between groups, the construction of these boundaries is ultimately 
problematic.  On one hand, the assertion of difference attempts to erase similarities 
between groups, such as between Palestinians and Lebanese.  On the other hand, 
Palestinian identities are not unified, and there are contradictions within them which 
have to be negotiated.   
 
5.1  Palestinians and external ‘Others’ 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (Literature Review), in the context of exile, Palestinians in 
Lebanon have been constructed as a separate people group both from neighbouring 
Israelis and from their Lebanese „hosts‟.  This section will discuss the ways in which 
physical, structural and symbolic boundaries have been erected and used to construct 
difference between Palestinians and „Others‟ in Lebanon. 
 
The construction of physical boundaries between groups is one means of preserving 
the „purity‟ of „imagined communities‟ and keeping out those perceived to be 
„foreigners‟, „intruders‟ and „aliens‟ (Kristeva, 1982).  As refugees, the vast majority 
of Palestinians in south Lebanon live in enclosed, gated camps which are guarded by 
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the Lebanese army (see Chapter 2, Context).  This physical boundary of separation 
between the Palestinian and Lebanese communities serves two purposes.  First, the 
enclosures, gates and guards produce a landscape that spatially encodes ethnic 
segregation between the two communities.  For example, when asked to explain the 
difference between Lebanese and Palestinians, one male Palestinian youth from Burj 
A-Shemali camp replied, “Lebanese live in their homeland, and we live in camps.” 
 
Secondly, the physical boundaries between the Lebanese and Palestinian communities 
not only demarcate territory, they also help to symbolically produce and reproduce 
narratives of the „dangerous‟ and „licentious‟ Palestinian „Other‟ who is to be 
distrusted and avoided.  Camp boundaries separating the two communities serve both 
to construct and regulate Lebanese fears of Palestinian „violence‟ and „crime‟.  This 
fear is reflected in the fact that few Lebanese dare to enter the Palestinian camps, as 
they are considered to be bastions of „corruption‟, „danger‟ and „lawlessness‟.  As a 
young Lebanese woman who was accompanying me on a visit to Burj A-Shemali 
camp teasingly asked a Lebanese soldier at the gate, “If they try to kill me in there, 
will you come and save me?”   
 
The narrative on the Palestinian side is similarly one of mistrust and fear of the 
„Other‟.  For example, in my discussions with Palestinian youth, they frequently 
expressed their concerns about being physically or verbally attacked by Lebanese 
youth outside the camp boundaries, “for no reason…because we are Palestinian 
only”.  This fear of ethnic violence is so strong among Palestinian youth that it has 
largely curtailed their movements outside the camps.  On the other hand, as the 
Lebanese army has jurisdiction outside the camps while the Palestinian security 
forces keep order within the camps, the boundaries of the camp symbolically signify 
for Palestinian youth the space in which they may exercise their freedom from 
Lebanese authority.  Moreover, all of the Palestinian young people remarked how 
they felt much safer remaining within the camp enclosure among their “own people”.       
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As discussed above, the shared Palestinian/Lebanese narratives of racialized fear and 
security have resulted in the creation of a „garrisoned‟ Palestinian community.  Yet 
the camp offers a kind of incomplete boundedness, as residents have to leave the 
camp in order to work and to shop in the Lebanese city of Tyre.  Moreover, as there is 
only one high school for Palestinian students in all of south Lebanon, which is located 
in Rashidieh camp, young people from the other camps and gatherings must traverse 
Lebanese territory to reach it.  When Palestinians do leave the camps through 
checkpoints at camp gates, Lebanese soldiers assess the „acceptability‟ of Palestinian 
identity documents, car passengers and contents.  If an inspection does not meet the 
satisfaction of the soldiers, residents and goods are denied exit or re-entry into the 
camp.  Not only does this practice result in the creation of lengthy cues at camp gates, 
it also reinforces Lebanese hegemony over Palestinian residents.  By tightly 
regulating and controlling who and what goes in and out of the camps, the Lebanese 
army enacts a form of „surveillance‟ over the Palestinian community.  Those 
Palestinians who manage to successfully navigate these checkpoints are still subjected 
to the random „stop and search‟ tactics employed by the Lebanese army over the 
Palestinian population in south Lebanon.  In this way, the „gaze‟ of the Lebanese 
army on all aspects of camp and non-camp life works to create „docile‟ Palestinian 
bodies who know their place in the socio-political order (Foucault, 1977). 
 
In addition to the construction of physical boundaries between groups, „Othering‟ 
between Lebanese and Palestinians is both marked and maintained through unequal 
social and material conditions.  In the context of Lebanon, the social and material 
disadvantage of the Palestinian „Other‟ is both produced and reproduced through 
official discourses of „citizenship‟.  Discourses of citizenship classify people either as 
„insiders‟, who are protected by the state, or „outsiders‟, for whom the state bears no 
responsibility.  As refugees and stateless persons living in Lebanon, Palestinians are 
constructed as „burdens‟ to the Lebanese state (see Chapter 2, Context).  
Consequently, structural, institutional and legal boundaries are erected to produce and 
maintain segregation between the Palestinian and Lebanese communities.  As „non-
citizens‟ of Lebanon, Palestinians have no legally enshrined political, economic or 
125 
 
social rights within the country.  For example, all Palestinians are forbidden from 
participating in government, attending government schools, working in more than 70 
professions, accessing health and unemployment benefits, building and owning their 
own homes, travelling freely within Lebanon and obtaining a passport (see Chapter 2, 
Context).  As one male Palestinian youth from Rashidieh camp explained,  
 
The difference between Palestinian and Lebanese people is they (Lebanese) 
study just for work, but I study to service the Palestinian people and because 
of my family‟s economical status. And the difference is that they will get 
work easily, because they are Lebanese people, but me, as Palestinian, I 
couldn‟t find work easily.  And the difference is they live at home, and we 
live in the camp where all houses are near each other, and the water is leaking 
from the roof and we can‟t build anything.   
 
As mentioned above, in the context of south Lebanon, segregation between 
Palestinians and Lebanese has largely been imposed on the two communities through 
the construction of physical and structural boundaries by the Lebanese government.  
However, Palestinians have also used their circumstances to symbolically construct 
boundaries between themselves and the Lebanese „Other‟.  Although Palestinians are 
largely restricted to living in camps, camp life, itself, has become a marker of national 
identification for young Palestinians.  For example, when asked to define what the 
difference was between Palestinians and „Other‟ people, one male youth from 
Rashidieh camp responded, 
 
Other people live in their homes, and we live in a camp.  We are in Lebanon 
now, but we are still Palestinians living together.  Because of this, we say that 
we are Palestinian.   
 
For camp residents, the „boundedness‟ of their community has permitted them to 
construct a unified „Palestinian‟ culture and national identity in correspondence with 
a specific territory.  In an attempt to build community within the camp, Palestinians 
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have imprinted themselves physically on the landscape through the erection of 
symbolic boundaries between themselves and „outsiders‟.  When visitors enter 
through the camp gate, they are immediately bombarded with a plethora of signs that 
clearly indicate that Lebanon has been left behind, and they have entered Palestinian 
territory.  Banners, posters and graffiti depicting specifically Palestinian figures, 
monuments and landscapes work to erase history and create the illusion of an 
unbroken, continuous Palestinian identity attached to a specific territory (see Chapter 
6, Institutions).  This is despite the fact that camp residents have been refugees in 
Lebanon for more than 60 years.  Moreover, on the air waves, Palestinian satellite and 
local TV stations, such as Al Quds, Filastine, Al Aqsa and Al Barak, create a virtual 
reality where physical and temporal distance is collapsed between residents and their 
„homeland‟ in Palestine.  The call to prayer from the mosques inside the camps also 
works to erect sacred boundaries between the predominantly Sunni Palestinian camp 
residents and the largely Shi‟ite south Lebanese population.  As if to purposefully 
distance themselves from the „Other‟, Sunni mosques inside the camps broadcast their 
call to prayer a few minutes earlier than the call to prayer heard from the Lebanese 
Shi‟ite mosques outside. 
 
Moreover, „hardship‟ in the camps, itself, has become reified by many Palestinians as 
a boundary marker between „their‟ community and „Others‟.  Many young 
Palestinians have taken up their suffering as a kind of „badge of honour‟ that 
differentiates themselves from the Lebanese.  As one young woman from Rashidieh 
camp put it, 
 
We are the people who suffer.  I am proud because the Palestinians are the 
strong people, and if we are not strong, we would not be outside our 
homeland.  When you face problems, you will become stronger.  When people 
were in Palestine, they didn‟t ask about identity, but now they do.  
 
In other words, „suffering‟ has become appropriated as an identity marker and a 
symbolic boundary between Palestinians and „Others‟.  For this young woman, 
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Palestinians suffer precisely because they possess some unique and exceptional 
strength which „Others‟ lack.  Hence, by taking up their suffering, Palestinians 
reinforce the essence of their „Palestinian-ness‟ and mark the difference between 
themselves and „Others‟.  In this way, Palestinian identity is unified and strengthened 
through adversity.    
 
This brings me to a discussion of how Palestinian youth exercise agency and work to 
construct difference between themselves and „Others‟ through the construction of 
shared cultures and discourses of „Palestinian-ness‟. 
 
5.2  Shared cultures and discourses of ‘Palestinian-ness’ 
 
Although physical and structural boundaries between Palestinians and „Others‟ have 
largely been constructed and imposed by the Lebanese government, UNRWA and 
other foreign powers, Palestinians themselves work to construct the nation through 
shared cultures of „Palestinian-ness‟.  They do this discursively through the 
construction and performance of narratives of shared history, kinship, religion and the 
cross-cutting theme of gender (see Chapter 3, Literature Review).  Through these 
narratives, Palestinians simultaneously emphasize their sameness with other members 
of „their‟ collectivity as well as underline their difference from „Others‟, as discussed 
below.  
 
Shared history 
As discussed in the Literature Review (Chapter 3), shared history is often used as a 
basis for the construction of the nation.  As refugees, one experience which unifies all 
Palestinians is the displacement and forced exile they suffered as a community as the 
result of the creation of the „State of Israel‟ in 1948 (see Chapter 2, Context).  The 
uniqueness of this history has been reified by Palestinians as a boundary marker of 
the nation.  For Palestinian youth, the very borders of Palestine have been 
discursively constructed through the shared suffering of the collective, and 
Palestinian territory is considered to be those villages and lands which were „lost‟ at 
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the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.  Within this narrative, Palestinians are all 
the people who suffered that loss.  For example, when asked what differentiated 
Palestinians from other people, one male youth from Rashidieh responded,  
 
They are homeless.  All people have a home, but Palestinians live in their 
homes only in their hearts. We have only one goal which is to liberate our 
homeland and return back to it.  
 
There are a couple of interesting points to note from the comment above.  First, this 
youth, like all the others, was born in a refugee camp in Lebanon and has never been 
to or experienced Palestine as a physical or political reality.  For this youth, Palestine 
is a narrative, a myth of an idyllic land with “many rivers, mountains, lakes and trees, 
vegetables and fruits”.  Through the narratives of his parents and grandparents, this 
youth‟s „memories‟ of Palestine have been discursively constructed (see Chapter 6, 
Institutions).  Moreover, the village in Galilee that his grandparents fled from in 1948 
has symbolically become Palestine in his imagination.  This has important political 
implications for the Middle East Peace Process and how the borders of a new 
Palestinian state might be „imagined‟.  For example, in the „two state solution‟ to the 
„Palestinian/Israeli conflict‟ proposed by the American government and others, 
„Israel‟ would continue to exist as a state, although somewhat reduced in territory, 
while „the West Bank‟ and „Gaza‟ would collectively become part of a new 
Palestinian state.  However, for Palestinian young people in Lebanon who envision 
Palestine as the village from where their grandparents were exiled in Galilee, this 
solution would never be acceptable, as it requires them to „return‟ to a „foreign‟ 
culture and way of life in the „foreign‟ land of the West Bank/Gaza Strip. 
 
The second point worthy of note from the comment above is this youth‟s genuine 
desire to „return back‟ to his „homeland‟ and „restore‟ a „historical‟ past where 
Palestinians enjoyed full „nationhood‟ and „self-determination‟.  In reality, Palestine 
was never a bounded or autonomous territory under Ottoman rule, and it was not a 
self-governing nation under the British Mandate.  Rather, Palestine is a geopolitical 
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„casualty‟ of history, forever caught between the decline of empire and the rise of the 
nation state (see Chapter 2, Context; Chapter 7 New Identities).  In this way, the 
„history‟ of Palestine as an „occupied state‟ has been discursively constructed through 
institutions in Palestinian society (see Chapter 6, Institutions).  In a similar way, the 
„State of Israel‟ has been discursively constructed through the Jewish historical myth 
of “a land without a people for a people without land”.  Moreover, this myth has been 
used as a pretext for the occupation of territory and forced removal of indigenous 
Palestinian inhabitants.   
 
Interestingly, for many Palestinian youth, the creation of the „State of Israel‟, or Al 
Nakba, provides a historical boundary against which they can construct their 
identities.  As one male youth from Burj A-Shemali camp put it, 
 
Palestinians are people who lived in Palestine, and Israel occupied their 
homeland, and now they are scattered around Arabic countries. 
 
When the youth were asked to draw a timeline of events they considered to be 
important in Palestinian history, all of the youth „began‟ time in 1916.  This is 
significant, as although Palestinians as a people group have been in existence for 
more than 3000 years, for the youth, „Palestinian‟ history began in 1916 with the 
British-French negotiated Sykes-Picot agreement, which laid the foundation for the 
creation of the „State of Israel‟ in 1948 (see Chapter 2, Context).  In other words, it 
was the creation of the „Israeli Other‟ which constructed them as „Palestinians‟.  
Ironically, it is this very historical event which many Palestinians refuse to 
acknowledge or would like to reverse.  For example, when asked to cite the most 
important historical event affecting the Palestinian people, one male youth from Burj 
A-Shemali camp said, 
 
Until now, it didn‟t come.  When they put „Palestine‟ in the place of „Israel‟ in 
international maps.  
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The shared historical experience of forced migration has not only helped to construct 
boundaries between Palestinians and „Others‟, it has also helped to shape notions of 
„Palestinian-ness‟.  For many young Palestinians, the experiences of displacement and 
suffering mark a kind of „moral‟ boundary between themselves and the Israelis.  As 
one male youth from Al Bas camp explained, “Israel kills many women and 
children.”  For this youth, Israel‟s attacks on „helpless‟ Palestinian women and 
children render it „immoral‟ and „barbarian‟.  On the other hand, Palestinians, as the 
Israeli „Other‟, become simultaneously constructed in binary opposition: „moral‟ and 
„civilized‟.  In this way, Palestinians develop a positive, shared notion of „Palestinian-
ness‟ through the construction of their identities as different from the Israeli 
„occupiers‟.  Moreover, as Israel is constructed as „immoral‟, Palestinians therefore 
have the „ethical duty‟ to fight „Israeli evil‟ through armed struggle.  In a similar way, 
Israeli discourse has worked to construct Palestinians as the „terrorist Other‟.  In other 
words, the binary oppositions of „good vs. evil‟, „moral vs. immoral‟ and „civilized 
vs. savage‟ have been used by both communities to mark difference and to justify 
aggression. 
 
Biology and shared kinship 
In addition to shared history, Palestinian youth also construct difference between 
themselves and „Others‟ through discourses of biology and shared kinship.  Within 
this essentialist narrative, metaphors of „blood‟ and „roots‟ are frequently 
appropriated by the youth to describe what makes them different from „Other‟ people.  
When asked what it meant to be Palestinian, many male and female youth in all the 
camps responded, “it‟s in my blood”, or “my blood is Palestinian”.  For example, one 
young man in Rashidieh camp put it this way,  
 
I may be born in Palestine or in a foreign country, but the blood gives me my 
personality.   
 
All Palestinians in Lebanon are living in exile.  However, many Palestinians in 
Lebanon find they have no choice but to seek employment in other foreign countries 
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(see Context, Chapter 2).  This phenomena of emigration, particularly to the Arabian 
Gulf States and Europe, has had a huge impact on Palestinian society.  Moreover, it 
has destabilized identities and worked to construct new ones (see Chapter 7, New 
Identities).  However, when asked if it were possible to „shed‟ or „lose‟ „Palestinian‟ 
identity and acquire a new one through the process of emigration, one male youth 
from Rashidieh camp responded,  
 
The son of my uncle was born in Sweden.  He is not talking any word in 
Arabic, only in Swedish and Danish and English.  But he is Arabic because 
his blood is Arabic.  His father is Arabic.  He has the nationality of Sweden 
but he is an Arabic people from the root…from the root.  He has the 
Palestinian blood, but Swedish is only a nationality.  
 
This comment is illuminating from three different perspectives.  First, it clearly 
indicates that, for this youth, national identity is based on essentialist notions of 
biological determinism.  Nationality may be bestowed on individuals by 
governments, but there is an „authentic‟ „Palestinian-ness‟ that is only derived 
through genealogy and shared bloodlines.  This is important in light of Palestinians‟ 
experience of exile and statelessness.  As Joseph Massad (1995) notes, before „Al 
Nakba‟ took place in 1948, one was considered to be Palestinian if he/she was born 
and resident in the territory of Palestine.  However, after the loss of „Palestinian‟ land 
in 1948, „Palestinian-ness‟ became reconstituted to involve direct kinship ties with an 
ancestor who lived in Palestine.  This reveals how constructions of „Palestinian-ness‟ 
have shifted over time in response to changing social, economic and political 
conditions (see Chapter 7, New Identities).   
 
The second interesting point to note about the youth‟s comment above is that the 
narrative of biological determinism also constructs a particularly exclusive form of 
„Palestinian-ness‟ that cannot be acquired by „foreigners‟.  When asked if I could 
become Palestinian through birth or naturalization in Palestine, the youth responded 
negatively and clarified that I didn‟t have „Palestinian blood‟.  The youth‟s 
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association of nationality with biological inheritance means that there is only one way 
to acquire „Palestinian citizenship‟, and that is to be born into it.  In other words, it is 
through biological reproduction that boundaries are constructed between „insiders‟ 
and „outsiders‟, and the „purity‟ of the Palestinian community is maintained.   
 
The third point to note from the youth‟s comment above is that the narrative of 
biology has specific implications for the lives of women.  As the nation is reproduced 
biologically, women are encouraged to have children to reproduce the nation (see 
Chapter 3, Literature Review).  Moreover, this discourse has been internalized by 
Palestinian youth.  For example, when asked what women do to show they are „good 
Palestinians‟, many young people responded that they “have children for Palestine”.  
As one young woman from Burj A-Shemali camp put it,  
 
All women should give birth to more than 5 children to continue Palestinian 
generations.  A good Palestinian woman will have many children to liberate 
Palestine. 
 
As child bearing is perceived to be a „cornerstone‟ of female Palestinian „citizenship‟, 
women are called upon to bear as many children as possible for the nation, perhaps at 
the expense of their health or the achievement of other personal, educational or 
professional goals.  In this way, Palestinian women are forced into compulsory 
heterosexuality and marriage, regardless of sexual desire.   As a female Palestinian 
teacher from Burj A-Shemali camp explained, 
 
If a woman doesn‟t marry by a certain age, she should marry whoever.  Her 
life will be almost destroyed if she is not married.   
 
In addition to having direct and specific implications for the lives of women, the 
narrative of biological determinism also has very serious political implications and is, 
indeed, at the very heart of the Palestinian nationalist struggle.  If nations are 
biologically-based, then Palestine, with its „pure‟ bloodlines is validated as a 
133 
 
„legitimate‟ nation.  Conversely, „Israel‟, as a settler country, whose citizenry has 
immigrated there from all parts of the world without direct biological ties, becomes 
„illegitimate‟.  As one male youth from Rashidieh camp put it,  
 
Israel is not a real country.  They bring Iraqi and Russian Jews to make Israel.   
 
In this way, „blood‟ has been constructed as a symbolic boundary to mark the 
difference between „legitimate‟ and „illegitimate‟ nations and Palestinians and 
Israelis.  Moreover, as „Israel‟ is not a legitimate nation, according to this narrative, it 
can and should be dismantled and destroyed.      
 
As Palestine is reproduced biologically, biological reproduction is also used as a 
demographic weapon in the Palestinian nationalist struggle.  As one female youth 
from Burj A-Shemali camp explained, 
 
All women bring children, but Palestinian women bring heroes.  Israel kills 
one child and we bring 5.  If we don‟t bring children, Palestine will be lost. 
 
As Palestinian „citizenship‟ is obtained exclusively through biological inheritance, the 
only way to increase the size of the Palestinian resistance army is through biological 
reproduction.  In this way, every birth to a Palestinian woman becomes a birth for the 
whole nation.  Similarly, every death experienced by a Palestinian family is grieved 
as a loss to the whole nation.      
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (Literature Review), nations are gendered constructions, 
and biological discourses of „Palestinian-ness‟ are also intersected with gender.  This 
has specific implications for who can and who cannot be considered a Palestinian.  As 
one male youth from Rashidieh camp explained,  
 
You can‟t be Palestinian because you don‟t have a father and all the things 
that make you a Palestinian.  You don‟t have this.  Feelings are not enough. 
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The youth‟s contention that I cannot be Palestinian because I do not have a 
Palestinian father indicates that Palestinian identity has been „imagined‟ as „male‟.  
As another female youth from Rashidieh camp elaborated,  
 
If your mother is Lebanese and your father is Palestinian, you are Palestinian, 
but if your mother is Palestinian and your father is Lebanese you are 
Lebanese.   
 
This youth‟s comment may be partially a reflection of the fact that in Lebanon, and 
indeed in Arabic culture(s) more generally, a child legally acquires the citizenship of 
his/her father.  However, patrilineal inheritance practices both reflect and reproduce 
narratives of „sexual purity‟ for women.  If national identity is derived through the 
male, then it becomes imperative to secure paternity and the „purity‟ of bloodlines 
through the control and regulation of female sexuality.  In this way, Palestinian 
females become the symbolic „gatekeepers of the nation‟ by being called upon to 
erect boundaries between „their‟ community and „Others‟ through the sanctity of their 
bodies.  Therefore, in Palestinian culture, disciplinary regimes of „surveillance‟ and 
narratives of „honour and shame‟ (where the „honour‟ of the family rests on the 
women‟s propriety) ensure that Palestinian females are „policed‟ into compliance.  As 
one female Palestinian teacher from Burj A-Shemali camp explained, 
 
Women should always be a virgin.  It is catastrophic when she is not.  It is a 
sign of a good woman.  The husband can make a scandal if he discovers she is 
not a virgin.  More than 98% will ask her to leave the house.  We have no 
open-minded man in this society.  The man can do whatever he wants because 
he is a man.  They think it is something related to honour.  But a man‟s 
mistake is little compared to a woman‟s.  Even a girl who is raped wants to 
have surgery to get back her virginity.  They show the bed sheet to the family 
of the man to prove she is a good woman.  If a woman is not a virgin, maybe 
she can‟t get married…A man will marry one but then have a mistress.  A 
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woman can‟t do this.  He doesn‟t want to marry more than one because of 
financial obligations, although the Qu‟ran says he can have four.   
 
This narrative of biological „purity‟ has been internalized by Palestinian young 
people.  For example, when asked how they show they are „good Palestinians‟, girls 
in all camps remarked that they endeavour to maintain a „good moral reputation‟ by 
“not going out at night, by not talking to boys and by not going to the coffee shop”, in 
other words, by marking the boundaries of „Palestinian-ness‟ through the „purity‟ of 
their bodies.  For boys, however, the maintenance of „sexual purity‟ and „a good 
reputation‟ were not mentioned as criteria for Palestinian „citizenship‟.  By contrast, 
boys indicated that they were not subject to the same disciplinary regimes as girls in 
relation to sexuality.  As one Palestinian boy from Burj A-Shemali camp explained, 
 
As a boy, how I dress, my behaviour and the places I go reflect my own 
personality.  I am free in Palestinian society as a boy, but girls are controlled. 
 
The construction of national boundaries through patrilineal/matrilineal inheritance is 
also extremely significant in the context of the „Arab/Israeli conflict‟.  Although both 
Palestinian and Lebanese cultures practice patrilineal inheritance, in Israeli culture, 
inheritance is matrilineal.  In Jewish narrative, Jews and Arabs are both „sons of 
Abraham‟.  However, Jews are descended from Sarah, Abraham‟s rightful wife, 
whereas Arabs are descended from Hagar, his slave girl (Genesis, Chapter 16).  To 
Arabs, this difference is not relevant, as both „peoples‟ share the same „father‟.  On 
the other hand, to Jews, this difference is extremely significant as, through matrilineal 
inheritance, they are made the „legitimate‟ heirs of Abraham and, therefore, the land 
of Palestine.  Moreover, through this narrative, they are positioned hegemonically 
above the Arab „Other‟.  
 
Shared culture and religion 
In addition to constructing „Palestinian-ness‟ through narratives of shared history and 
kinship, Palestinians also emphasize their sameness as „a people‟ as well as underline 
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their difference from „Others‟ through narratives of shared culture and religion.  For 
example, when asked what differentiated Palestinians from „Others‟, one male youth 
from Rashidieh camp responded,   
 
Palestinians are an Arabic people who are Muslim.  The history of Palestine is 
Muslim. It has an Islamic history.  The Turks left Palestine in 1945. It was the 
best period for the Palestinians when the Turks occupied Palestine.  They 
were Muslims.   
 
This comment is important because the speaker uses the terms „Palestinian‟ and 
„Arabic‟ interchangeably (see Chapter 7, New Identities).  As discussed in Chapter 3 
(Literature Review), the term „Arab‟ is a highly contested one that has to be unpacked 
within the larger socio-political context of Lebanese society.  In Lebanon, the 
„historical origin‟ debate has been at the very centre of identity politics among 
Christian and Muslim Lebanese, who „imagine‟ themselves to be descendents of the 
ancient Phoenicians and Arabian conquerors of the Levant, respectively.  Therefore, 
in this context, the interchangeability of „Palestinian‟ with „Arab‟ in popular 
discourse serves to construct a very exclusive imagining of „Palestinian‟ as „Muslim‟.   
 
As a result of the increasing „Islamicization‟ of „Palestinian‟ society, the majority of 
young male and female Palestinians in the camps in south Lebanon indicated that, for 
them, Muslim identity takes precedence over attachments to other subject positions.  
As one male youth from Rashidieh camp put it, 
 
Before I am Palestinian, I am Muslim and Arabic.  I don‟t say I am Palestinian 
because the British divided Palestine into Jordan, Syria and many countries. 
 
Moreover, another female Palestinian youth from the same camp added, 
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Being Muslim is more important because we are born Muslim and will die 
Muslim.  Being Muslim is more important because Islam is wider than 
belonging to a country.  With Islam, we enter paradise. 
 
These comments are interesting for a couple of reasons.  First, they indicate that 
„Muslim‟ has been constructed as a subject position which is „innate‟ and „fixed‟.  In 
other words, adherence to Islam is not a choice to be taken or an idea to be 
negotiated, and conversion to another faith is not possible (see Chapter 3, Literature 
Review).  Moreover, Muslim identity differs from national identity in that it does not 
require land, it cannot be bestowed on individuals by governments, and it cannot be 
taken away through military force.  Thus, Muslim identity is more attractive for many 
Palestinian youth because it is not as „fragile‟ as national identity and does not rely on 
external validation for its realization.  In this way, Muslim identity offers Palestinian 
youth a kind of agency and control over their own lives. 
 
The second interesting point to note about the comments above is that they illustrate 
how young Palestinians value Muslim identity because it unites them with the global 
Muslim community and gives them a sense of religious and cultural solidarity with 
others.  Moreover, being part of a global Muslim community is also politically 
advantageous for Palestinians, as it offers them „strength in numbers‟ in the context of 
a nationalist struggle.  As one male youth from Al Bas camp explained, 
 
Being Muslim is more important because all Muslims aim to liberate 
Palestine, but Palestinians are alone.  It is the duty for all Muslims to fight for 
Palestine because of Al Aqsa mosque. 
 
In the Palestinian context, Muslim identity is gendered, and it is the women who are 
called upon to embody Islamic values and traditions (see Chapter 3, Literature 
Review).  For example, when asked how they showed they were „good Palestinians‟, 
many girls said, “from our traditions, our clothes and the hijab” (Islamic head 
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covering worn by females).  As one female Palestinian teacher from Burj A-Shemali 
camp explained,  
 
Most women in society like to cover (wear the hijab), but some people don‟t 
follow this. There are more hijabs in the Palestinian society than the Lebanese 
society.  Palestinian society is more conservative than Lebanese society, 
especially in the camps.   
 
This comment reveals how women‟s bodies are used to construct the boundaries 
between Palestinians and „Others‟ through the adoption of Islamic dress.  Moreover, 
not only are boundaries demarcated between Muslims and „Others‟, difference is 
constructed through female clothing between Sunni Muslims, who are predominantly 
Palestinian, and Shi‟ite Muslims, who are predominantly Lebanese.  Although it is 
not immediately obvious if a man is Muslim or Christian or Sunni or Shi‟ite from his 
appearance, traditional Muslim women can be instantly recognized by the wearing of 
the hijab.  Similarly, traditional Shi‟ite women can be instantly recognised by the 
distinctive style, colour and shape of their chadour (black robe).   
     
As discussed here, Palestinian youth are working to construct their identities through 
shared cultures and discourses of „Palestinian-ness‟.  However, the hegemonic nature 
of identities means that these identities are often being constructed in essentialist 
terms.  Moreover, some identities are being positioned above others (see Chapter 3, 
Literature Review).  In this way, discourses of „Palestinian-ness‟ are also working to 
produce contestations and internal „Others‟ in Palestinian society.  This will be 
discussed in the next section.   
 
5.3  Contestations and internal ‘Others’  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (Literature Review), everyone has multiple identities which 
are constructed across different, intersecting and often antagonistic discourses (Hall, 
2000).  However, when these identities are constructed in essentialist terms, 
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individuals are forced to choose between membership in different groups.  Moreover, 
as identities are hegemonically ranked, membership in some groups is more 
advantageous than others.  As group membership regulates people‟s access to 
resources, information, opportunities and power, membership in particular groups has 
important implications for the lives of individuals (see Chapter 1, Introduction).   
 
In the Palestinian context, discourses of shared culture and religion have actually 
worked to produce contestations and internal „Others‟.  In Palestinian society, 
practically speaking, everyone is forced to choose a religious affiliation.  Moreover, 
this identity position is constructed in binary terms.  For example, it is not possible to 
be both a Muslim and a Christian.  In this way, the construction of Palestine as 
Muslim unifies, yet it also excludes.  Moreover, it also problematizes notions of 
„Palestinian-ness‟.  For example, Turks, Pakistanis and Iranians are Muslims, but they 
are not Palestinians or even Arabs. On the other hand, Palestinians may be either 
Muslim or Christian in faith, among others (see Chapter 3, Literature Review).   
 
As discussed in the previous section, in the camps in Lebanon, Palestine has been 
„imagined‟ as Muslim.  However, Palestine has been constructed as Muslim to such 
an extent that when asked to name „good Palestinian Christians‟, many Muslim 
Palestinian youth could not think of any.  In some cases, they assumed that key 
Christian Palestinian figures, like Hanan Ashrawi and Edward Said (political activists 
and scholars) were Muslim.  Moreover, many Muslim Palestinian youth were even 
unaware that there were any Christian Palestinians living in their camp.  This is partly 
because the notion of Palestine as Muslim is reinforced in the camps through spatial 
segregation between communities and the construction of symbolic enclaves (see 
Chapter 6, Institutions).  For example, sacred communities in the camps are spatially 
bounded through the presence or absence of religious iconography and imagery.  As 
Muslim identity is dominant in Palestinian society, one can easily ascertain when one 
is in a Muslim neighbourhood through the overwhelming presence of images of 
Muslim figures, monuments and landscapes.  On the other hand, in Christian 
neighborhoods, „silences‟ become significant.  As Christians are the minority, there is 
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not a strong presence of Christian iconography in Christian areas.  However, there is a 
telling absence of Muslim symbolism in those areas.  In addition to spatial distancing, 
„Othering‟ based on religion is also enacted in the camps through social 
disengagement, with each religious community turning inward on itself.      
 
The physical and symbolic separation of religious communities in the camps in 
Lebanon has helped to produce narratives of ignorance about the internal „Other‟ as 
well as mistrust.  As one Muslim male youth from Al Bas camp said,  
 
I have no idea about Palestinian Christians.  I love the Christian religion, but I 
don‟t hear about them.  It is like Islam.  They help us fight Israel. 
 
The comment made by this youth illustrates a couple of points.  First, it signifies that 
there is little, if any, engagement and interaction between the Muslim and Christian 
Palestinian communities.  Moreover, Christian Palestinians do not have a prominent 
position in Palestinian social and political life within the camps.  Secondly, there is an 
attempt by the Muslim Palestinian youth to collapse all boundaries of difference 
between the two communities by suggesting that Christianity is “like Islam”, as „the 
Other‟ is merely a reflection of „the Subject‟.  Moreover, the youth makes an explicit 
assumption that Muslim and Christian Palestinians have the same goal, which is to 
fight Israel and „liberate‟ Palestine.  As another youth from the same camp went on to 
elaborate,  
 
Good Christians are those who unite with Muslims against the Israeli 
occupation.   
 
In contrast to this, the Christian Palestinians that I interviewed were acutely aware of 
their status as the „internal Other‟.  As the minority religious community, they 
expressed a strong fear that Palestine was being „imagined‟ as Muslim.  Moreover, 
they were concerned that this „imagining‟ of the nation was essentially excluding 
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them from Palestinian „citizenship‟.  One Palestinian male Christian resident in the 
Lebanese city of Tyre put it this way,  
 
Christianity is a part of my nationality.  I don‟t imagine myself as a citizen 
without the freedom and rights to be a Christian.  The conflict has become 
bigger than the one between the Jews and Arabs.  The conflict between 
Christians and Muslims influences us to think about ourselves.  It is a conflict 
between lifestyles, thinking and living. It‟s not enough to have a place in 
Palestine without freedom to hope and dream and play music.  Palestine with 
restrictions can stay away from me. 
 
This comment illustrates how boundaries of viewpoint and lifestyle have been erected 
to mark internal difference between the Christian and Muslim Palestinian 
communities.   Moreover, once again, it is the women who have been called upon to 
mark difference and the boundaries of identity between communities through their 
bodies and behaviour.  As a Christian Palestinian man explained,  
 
Christians are different.  We don‟t expect women to stay segregated from men 
or stay home at night like the Muslims.   
 
As Palestinian identity is not perceived to be inclusive of them, many Christian 
Palestinians see emigration to Europe or assimilation into Lebanese society as their 
only viable options.  One Palestinian Christian woman from Al Bas camp explained it 
like this, 
 
If I have the chance to go to Palestine, I wouldn‟t go because it will be a 
Muslim society.  I would rather stay here or go abroad to avoid conflict. 
 
By refusing to return to Palestine if she had the opportunity, this woman is contesting 
the dominant discourse of Palestine as Muslim.  At the same time, she is working to 
reposition the boundaries between Palestinians and „Others‟.      
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In addition to constructing difference between Christians and Muslims in Palestinian 
society, difference is also constructed between Muslims based on religious sect.  For 
example, in Palestinian society, boundaries are constructed between „authentic‟ 
Palestinian Sunnis and Palestinian Shi‟ite „Others‟.  Palestinian refugees from what is 
known as the „seven villages‟ in northern Galilee are overwhelmingly Shi‟ite, in 
contrast to the predominately Sunni refugees from other villages in Palestine (see 
Chapter 2, Context).  This has led to an interesting phenomenon, whereby the 
„authenticity‟ of „Palestinian-ness‟ in Lebanon is increasingly being constructed on 
the basis of sect, with Sunnis being hegemonically ranked above Shi‟ite „Others‟.  As 
one man from Al Mashuq Palestinian gathering put it, 
 
I was raised in Rashidieh camp, and I went to school in a camp and I suffered 
as a Palestinian; so, I am Palestinian.  But, I am not fully accepted in the 
Palestinian community because I am Shi‟ite.  I am also not fully accepted in 
the Lebanese community because I have a Palestinian accent. 
 
Although this man‟s family came from Palestine, he is „inauthenticated‟ as a „real‟ 
Palestinian by others in the camp community because of his Shi‟ite religious 
affiliation.  On the other hand, his „Palestinian‟ accent gives him away as being not 
Lebanese.  In other words, the construction of „Palestinian-ness‟ as Sunni in binary 
terms has left him excluded by both Palestinian Sunni as well as Lebanese Shi‟ite 
communities.  Therefore, as if to defend his identity as a „true‟ „Palestinian‟, he 
reverts to offering his shared suffering with other Palestinians in the camp as proof of 
his „authentic Palestinian-ness‟.  
 
Ironically, it is this suffering which has produced contestations around notions of 
„Palestinian-ness‟ for some young Palestinians.  As one young woman from 
Rashidieh camp explains, 
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I don‟t like being Palestinian.  I sometimes wonder why I have to live as a 
Palestinian.  Life is not easy.  I say that I am Palestinian, but these are only 
words.  I don‟t feel it.  I have never been there.  It is only in my imagination.  
Why do I have to suffer for a country I don‟t know.  Most of the young people 
feel this.  I shouldn‟t say this, but it is true.   
 
While many older Palestinians hold on to their suffering as a boundary marker 
between Palestinians and „Others‟, many younger Palestinians are eager to „blur‟ 
these boundaries in order to facilitate their integration into Lebanese society.  In the 
Palestinian context, „being Lebanese‟ is desirable for youth because it is a pragmatic 
way to achieve their human rights.  For example, when asked if she would like to 
retain Palestinian „citizenship‟ or obtain Lebanese citizenship if it were offered to her, 
another young woman from Al Mashuq gathering said this, 
 
My father feels he is Palestinian but I feel that I am Lebanese.  I don‟t care 
about Palestine.  It‟s not my life.  I didn‟t see Palestine.  I would take 
Lebanese citizenship to become free and to get my rights.   
 
As these comments illustrate, Palestinian identity is unstable, and the boundaries of 
„Palestinian-ness‟ are continually being repositioned in relation to various points of 
reference.  Moreover, these identities are in the constant process of being negotiated 
and accommodated by Palestinian youth (Hall, 1996).  This will be discussed in 
further detail in Chapter 7, New Identities. 
 
5.4  Overview 
 
This discussion of Palestinian youth has highlighted the ways in which Palestinian 
identity is symbolically and socially marked by difference.  In some ways, difference 
is constructed between Palestinians and external „Others‟ through the erection of 
physical and structural boundaries between communities.  At other times, Palestinians 
themselves work to construct difference through shared discourses of „Palestinian-
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ness‟.  However, these discourses have also produced contestations and worked to 
construct internal „Others‟. 
 
I have argued that although identity is marked by difference, the construction of 
boundaries between groups is ultimately problematic.  On one hand, the assertion of 
difference attempts to erase similarities between groups.  For example, in Palestinian 
narrative, all Lebanese are constructed as „Other‟ under the umbrella of national 
identity.  However, this negates the numerous cultural similarities that Palestinians 
and Lebanese share as the product of shared history and lived experience in south 
Lebanon.  On the other hand, identities are not unified, and there are contradictions 
within them which have to be negotiated.  For example, the construction of Palestine 
as Muslim has produced a „Christian Other‟ in Palestinian society.  Moreover, the 
specific construction of „Palestinian-ness‟ as Sunni has produced contestations among 
Palestinian Shi‟ites.  In addition to this, there are generational differences in the 
degree to which, and how, Palestinian identity is taken up and performed in 
Palestinian society. 
In the next chapter, I narrow the focus and use empirical data to analyze how 
Palestinians appropriate and articulate the discursive resources of identity in everyday 
life within the camps through both formal and non-formal institutions in Palestinian 
society. 
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Chapter 6 – Institutions 
 
 
In the previous chapter (Chapter 5, Boundaries), I used empirical data to undertake a 
macro-level analysis of how Palestinian youth (male and female) understand and 
perform their identities in refugee camps in Lebanon.  In this chapter, I narrow the 
focus and use empirical data to undertake a micro-level analysis of how the discursive 
resources of Palestinian identity are appropriated and articulated in everyday life 
within the camps in the context of statelessness (research question 2).  I do this 
through an examination of how institutions such as the school, the family, political 
organizations, the media, and religious institutions all function as sites of Palestinian 
identity production and performance.  Within this discussion, I highlight the ways in 
which Palestine and Palestinian identities are culturally, socially and symbolically 
produced and regulated in Palestinian society through the use of symbolic systems, 
the performance of ritual and embodiment (see Chapter 3, Literature Review).  I then 
examine how these processes are also implicated in the production of internal 
„Others‟.  I argue that there are vast challenges and complexities entailed in the 
process of trying to represent the diversity of the Palestinian experience through a 
single, hegemonic identity.  In other words, the concept of „authenticity‟ is highly 
problematic in the Palestinian context, and it challenges the very essence of 
Palestinian nationalist „imagining‟.   
 
6.1  Discourses of ‘Palestinian-ness’ through institutions 
 
As was discussed in the Literature Review (Chapter 3), nations are not pre-formed, 
„natural‟ entities.  Rather, they are produced and reproduced culturally, socially and 
symbolically through institutions.  The „knowledge‟ that is produced in and through 
these institutions is made to look stable, neutral and natural through culture.  In this 
way, institutional regimes, networks and processes regulate and discipline identities 
in formal and informal life (Foucault, 1977).   
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In most countries, it is state institutions that are mandated with constructing and 
reproducing the nation (see Chapter 3, Literature Review).  However, as a stateless 
population living in exile in Lebanon, Palestinians lack state institutions.  Rather, as 
discussed in Chapter 2 (Context), UNRWA is the primary social service provider for 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.  Although the mandate of UNRWA is to provide 
services for Palestinian refugees, the organization itself is not a Palestinian one.  
Rather, it is governed and run by the United Nations.  Therefore, in order for 
Palestinians to construct Palestine and a distinct Palestinian identity, they must 
exercise agency and appropriate and articulate the discursive resources of identity in 
everyday life within the camps.  They do this through both formal and non-formal 
institutions in Palestinian society (see Chapter 3, Literature Review).   
 
One of the first PLA interview activities I conducted with the youth in each camp was 
to ask them to map their community and indicate which places they went to learn 
about Palestine (see Chapter 4, Methodology).  In the next section, I discuss the 
institutions in the camps that the young people identified as important learning sites 
about the nation, namely the school, the family, political organizations, the media and 
religious institutions.  I then analyze how institutional processes and practices work to 
produce shared cultures and discourses of „Palestinian-ness‟ in the context of refugee 
camps in south Lebanon.   
 
Acknowledging that institutions do not act alone in constructing meaning, and that 
symbols accumulate meanings inter-textually across a wide variety of institutions 
(Hall, 1996), I separate out institutions here merely as an organizing structure for this 
chapter. 
 
The school 
As was discussed in the Literature Review (Chapter 3), in modern nation-states, 
schools are charged with the production and reproduction of the nation.  However, in 
the Palestinian case, UNRWA is the primary education provider and the only 
unifying institution for Palestinian refugees.  UNRWA‟s stated objective is to give 
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Palestine refugees a basic education comparable to that provided in host government 
schools, so that they are on an equal footing in terms of gaining access to educational 
and employment opportunities (UNRWA, 2005). Consequently, under agreements 
made with the „host‟ authorities, UNRWA has to use the curricula and textbooks of 
the countries/territories where it operates, and students sit for national exams at each 
stage of the education cycle.  As a result of this agreement, Palestinians in Lebanon 
follow the Lebanese curriculum in UNRWA schools and are assessed through 
Lebanese national exams (UNRWA, 2007) (see Chapter 2, Context). 
 
In practice, this means that Palestinians in Lebanon, as in all „host‟ countries, have no 
input into what they learn or how they are assessed.  Moreover, they are invisible in 
the curriculum.  As schools are a primary institutional site for identity construction 
and regulation among young people, this has profound consequences for the 
production and maintenance of a distinct Palestinian national identity.  As one 
UNRWA Head Teacher from Al Bas camp put it, 
 
There is no Palestinian content in the curriculum.  UNRWA doesn‟t care 
about teaching Palestinian children about their identity.  In the Civics class, 
Palestinians learn how to be Lebanese. 
 
From the perspective of many UNRWA teachers, the omission of Palestine and 
Palestinians from the national curriculum is a form of „cultural genocide‟ and a 
deliberate attempt to get rid of the “Palestinian problem”.  One Deputy Head Teacher 
from Burj A-Shemali camp explained it this way,  
 
UNRWA‟s policy was to remove the book about Palestine.  I feel sad about it.  
This is an intentional policy to get rid of the „Palestinian problem‟ by using 
local curriculum in the different host countries.  Palestinians cannot be given 
jobs in Lebanon except through UNRWA, so it doesn‟t make sense that 
UNRWA uses the local curriculum to facilitate integration into Lebanese 
society.  This is a deliberate attempt by other Arab governments, the US, the 
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Israelis and the UN, which is run by the Americans, to get rid of the 
„Palestinian problem‟ to make Palestinian students forget their identity and 
assimilate into host countries.    
 
Although there is no official curriculum on Palestine in UNRWA schools, and there is 
no official communication or cooperation with the Palestinian Authority on 
Education, motivated UNRWA teachers can still theoretically take it upon themselves 
to teach their students about Palestine and being Palestinian in an unofficial capacity.  
However, there are several barriers to the achievement of this goal.  As one UNRWA 
teacher from Al Qasmieh gathering explained,  
 
We must sign an official document with UNRWA saying we will not talk 
about Palestine in the class.  If we do not sign this document, we are fired.  
 
An UNRWA school inspector added that it was also not possible to introduce 
Palestine into class lessons because of a lack of training and scheduling constraints: 
 
There is no special teacher training on Palestinian issues.  Not all teachers can 
be depended upon to introduce these subjects or convey accurate information.  
This requires a very skilled and creative teacher.  Teachers don‟t have time to 
teach something extra that is not examinable.   
 
In spite of these challenges, many motivated teachers creatively integrate Palestine 
and Palestinian themes into their lessons and daily activities.  Often, this takes the 
form of the performance of rituals, such as the commemoration of special „national‟ 
days and the singing of the „national anthem‟ (see Chapter 3, Literature Review).  As 
one male youth from Burj A-Shemali camp explained,  
 
Every morning we say the Palestinian national anthem, and in the last year, 
there was special periods for the history of Palestine, and we make a memorial 
for Palestinian National Day.  The UNRWA curriculum doesn‟t include 
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anything about Palestine, but most teachers care about Palestine because they 
are Palestinian. 
 
For Palestinian young people, performance of these rituals constructs and reinforces 
their distinctive „Palestinian-ness‟. For example, through regular and repeated 
performance of the „Palestinian national anthem‟, Palestinian young people learn that 
suffering, steadfastness and resistance are signifiers of Palestinian identity.  In a 
similar way, the annual commemoration of „Palestinian Independence Day‟ on 
November 15 reinforces for Palestinian youth their „Palestinian-ness‟ and the 
„naturalness‟ of Palestinian „nationhood‟.  Moreover, the performance of rituals also 
works to construct boundaries between Palestinians and „Others‟ (see Chapter 5, 
Boundaries).  For example, through the annual commemoration of Al Nakba on the 
anniversary of „Israeli Independence Day‟, difference is emphasized between 
Palestinians and Israelis.   
 
In addition to the performance of rituals, a sense of shared „Palestinian-ness‟ is 
produced and reproduced in schools through the construction of „Palestinian‟ 
symbols.  These symbols can be found in all classrooms in UNRWA schools, often 
through posters distributed by political organizations.  Moreover, these symbols are 
also displayed on the walls of school courtyards, officially in the form of murals, and 
unofficially in the form of graffiti.  In the next section, I discuss the symbols of 
shared „Palestinian-ness‟ that I repeatedly observed in UNRWA schools.  Moreover, 
these symbols were consistently and repeatedly reproduced by the young people in 
PLA activities in response to requests to draw „Palestine‟ (see Chapter 4, 
Methodology).  
 
One important symbol which appears frequently in schools and is used to unite 
Palestinian young people in a shared „imagining‟ of the nation is the „national flag‟.  
The „Palestinian flag‟ is an adaptation of the flag designed for the Arab revolt against 
the Ottoman Empire in 1916.  On November 15, 1988, the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) adopted the current flag as the „national flag‟ of the „State of 
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Palestine‟ (Abdul-Hadi, 1986).  For Palestinians, the colors of the flag have been 
made to symbolically embody the nation.  As one female youth from Burj A-Shemali 
camp explained,  
 
The red colour represents the colour of blood, the black colour represents the 
agony the Palestinian people suffered, the white colour represents the purity 
and the green colour represents paradise.  After our life on earth, we can go to 
paradise.    
 
In other words, the Palestinian flag represents the essence of „imagined‟ „Palestinian-
ness‟: suffering, blamelessness, sacrifice and Islam.  As the Palestinian flag has been 
adopted as a „national‟ symbol in the absence of a true state, it has become a symbolic 
means of constructing the nation of Palestine in public consciousness. Moreover, the 
flag has become a text through which Palestinian national identity is shaped and kept 
alive in the imagination of young people who have never seen Palestine.  As it is 
consistently and repeatedly displayed across UNRWA public institutions, such as 
schools, libraries and hospitals to mark Palestinian „territory‟, the existence of 
Palestine as a nation-state is validated and naturalized in the popular imagination.   
 
Another symbol which is frequently used to produce shared cultures and discourses of 
„Palestinian-ness‟ in the camps, and particularly through schools, is the „map of 
Palestine‟.  However, „the map of Palestine‟ works to construct a very specific 
„imagining‟ of the nation.  For example, when asked to draw „Palestine‟, without 
exception, all the young people in all the camps drew the map of present-day „Israel‟, 
as opposed to the UN designated „Occupied Palestinian Territories‟ (the West Bank 
and Gaza).  As one male Palestinian youth from Rashidieh camp said,   
 
In international maps, there is no name for our country.  They write, „Israel‟.   
 
The youth‟s construction of the land of Palestine as present-day Israel is most likely 
because virtually all of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon originally hail from the 
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northern Galilee region of Palestine (see Chapter 2, Context).  Therefore, the 
„reduced‟ map of Palestine showing only the West Bank and Gaza, which is often 
found in Western political discourse, is not inclusive of their „homelands‟.  This 
mergence of national politics with space is significant as the map of Palestine drawn 
by the youth discursively constructs Palestinians as „all people who lost homes and 
landholdings to the „Israelis‟ in Al Nakba and afterward‟ (Christie, 1998).  This is in 
contrast to Israeli narratives which construct Palestinians as only those individuals 
resident in the West Bank or Gaza (Palestinians resident in „Israel proper‟ have been 
granted „Israeli citizenship‟ and are legally and socially considered to be „Israeli 
Arabs‟).  In this way, the map of Palestine drawn by the youth symbolizes the „loss‟ 
that all Palestinians experienced during Al Nakba.  At the same time, it unifies 
individuals of diverse religions and political affiliations into one Palestinian nation. 
   
Within the map of Palestine, other specific symbols of Palestinian collective „loss‟ are 
reproduced in schools and other institutions in Palestinian society.  For example, 
„keys to homes in Palestine‟ act as a powerful symbolic reminder of the Palestinian 
people‟s experience of exile.  As many Palestinians left their homes in a state of 
haste, believing they would soon return, they took their house keys with them.  This 
symbol is also reinforced in the home, as many Palestinian elders still keep the keys 
to their homes in Palestine, even though these homes have been destroyed or are now 
occupied by someone else.  In this way, these keys have come to symbolically 
represent Palestinians‟ continued connection with the land of Palestine and their right 
to return to it.   
 
Another important symbol of Palestine frequently reproduced in schools is that of 
„blood‟.  The images displayed in and around schools often contain graphic 
depictions of violence against Palestinians and Palestinian suffering, which involves 
the shedding of Palestinian blood.  Moreover, these symbols are often reproduced by 
the young people themselves.  For example, when asked to draw what Palestine 
meant to them, many youth drew the map of present-day Israel with a dagger piercing 
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its heart and blood pouring out from the soil.  As one male youth from Burj A-
Shemali camp explained of his drawing,  
 
This represents the heart of Palestine.  By our suffering, we protect our heart.  
Palestine will come back to her lover.   
 
This comment is interesting because this youth has reproduced the metaphor of the 
land of Palestine as a female body which is being „raped‟ by the Israeli occupiers (see 
Chapter 3, Literature Review).  As the „violation‟ of a woman‟s body becomes “a 
violation of national boundaries, a violation of national autonomy and national 
sovereignty”, the Palestinian patriot (lover) must shed his blood to „liberate‟ Palestine 
and restore life to the nation (Mayer, 2000, p. 18).  In this way, this metaphor 
encourages young Palestinian men to become appropriately gendered as „masculine‟ 
through their performance as „protectors‟ and „defenders‟ of women/the nation.  
Moreover, it encourages young Palestinian girls to be „worthy‟ of protection by 
maintaining the „sanctity‟ and „purity‟ of their bodies (see Chapter 3, Literature 
Review).     
 
The symbols of Palestine and „Palestinian-ness‟ discussed here are not just passively 
displayed on school buildings and other institutions in the camps. Rather, they are 
actively performed by Palestinian young people.  For example, young people are 
invited to carry the Palestinian flag in their hands when they participate in school 
assemblies, parades and flag-hoisting ceremonies.  Moreover, they are encouraged to 
reproduce it through school activities, such as art, drama, music and poetry.  The 
Palestinian flag is also inscribed on young Palestinian bodies through the 
performance of fashion.  Although Palestinian students are required to wear an 
official school uniform in UNRWA schools, they are allowed, and in some cases even 
encouraged, to embellish and accessorize it with jewellery, trinkets and fabrics 
embossed with „Palestinian colours‟.  In this way, young Palestinian bodies are 
symbolically marked with the Palestinian „national‟ flag.  This works both to mark 
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sameness with members of „their‟ collectivity as well as to construct boundaries 
between themselves and „Others‟.   
 
In addition to visual symbols, language is also used in UNRWA schools as a 
symbolic mechanism to produce and regulate shared consciousness of „Palestinian-
ness‟.  For example, UNRWA schools in the camps in south Lebanon bear the names 
of Palestinian villages where massacres against Palestinians occurred, such as Deir 
Yassine (Boy‟s elementary school in Al Bas camp), AShajarah (Boy‟s middle school 
in Al Bas camp), Bab Alwad (Girls‟ elementary school in Burj A-Shemali camp) and 
Al Quds (High School in Rashidieh camp).  Through the naming of schools in this 
way, „wounds‟ against the Palestinian community are kept open and fresh, and 
Palestinian „memories‟ of collective suffering are inscribed in the consciousness of 
young people.  Moreover, through this practice, Palestinian youth are ever reminded 
of their „origins‟ in Palestine.   
 
It is also within schools that the repeated usage of certain language by school 
administrators, teachers and students works to construct shared notions of Palestinian 
„history‟.  For example, the regular use of the term Al Nakba to describe the „birth‟ of 
Israel in classrooms and school grounds reconstructs the seemingly happy event into 
an occasion for Palestinian „national‟ mourning.  Similarly, the replacement of the 
name „Israel‟ with „Occupied Palestine‟ in classroom discourse, learning materials 
and maps negates the existence of the State of Israel for both the speaker and the 
listener and inscribes the injustice inflicted on the Palestinian people in students‟ 
consciousness.  The use of language also offers the Palestinian „subaltern‟ an 
opportunity to „fight back‟ and challenge dominant discourses or construct new ones 
(Spivak, 1995).  For example, the regular use of terms such as „martyr‟, „resistance 
fighter‟ and „liberation movement‟ in school discourse to describe the conflict with 
Israel challenges the dominance of American/Israeli discourse on „terrorism‟. 
 
In addition to the school, Palestinians also exercise agency and work to produce 
shared notions of „Palestinian-ness‟ through other non-formal institutions in 
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Palestinian society.  The section below will discuss how shared Palestinian cultures 
and discourses are constructed through the family, political organisations, the media 
and religious institutions in Palestinian society.  
 
The Family 
In interviews and PLA activities, Palestinian youth in all camps identified „the 
family‟ as the most important institution for learning about Palestine and being 
Palestinian in their society.  The family was identified as a particularly important site 
of learning for Palestinian girls as, culturally, they are not permitted to move freely in 
public places constructed as „male‟, such as the street, the coffee shop, the internet 
café, the sports field and the mosque (see Chapter 2, Context).  Moreover, the 
Palestinian cultural association of females with the „private sphere‟, and the largely 
female practice of visiting the homes of relatives and neighbours, means that the 
home becomes the most significant site for identity construction amongst girls and 
women.  As one female youth from Burj A-Shemali camp explained, 
 
Girls go to school and stay at home and the Student Office and community 
clubs.  There is no place that girls can go.  The internet café is for boys.  There 
is no mosque for girls.  Girls don‟t go on the street.  Boys go to school, home, 
the internet, the Student Office, the mosque, community clubs, Kurami club.  
They have more choices.   
 
Within the institutional site of the family, Palestinian women become the key actors 
in the ideological reproduction and transmission of the community‟s culture and 
values. Under patriarchal relations, women are the main socialisers of children, and in 
their roles as „mothers‟, women are largely responsible for inculcating beliefs, 
behaviours and loyalties in their children.  In the Palestinian context, this cultural 
transmission includes teaching children the nation‟s symbols, rituals, and myths 
(Yuval-Davis, 1997).  As one male youth from Rashidieh camp put it, 
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Mothers should teach Palestinian culture, because in our tradition, the mother 
is nearer to her children than the father, and she spends most of her time in the 
house, and so the children stay with her…From when I drank milk from my 
mother, I learned I was Palestinian. 
 
In the family, Palestinian young people learn about „typical‟ Palestinian ethnic 
symbols and Palestinian cultural distinctiveness (Eriksen, 1993).  One example of this 
is how the „traditional‟ „Palestinian‟ dance called debke is learned by all Palestinian  
young people in the home and is regularly performed at family gatherings, such as 
weddings.  Debke is considered to be the „national‟ dance of Palestine and is fraught 
with symbolic nationalist meaning.  As debke dancers link arms in solidarity, they 
rhythmically stomp their feet, emphasizing their connection to the land.  However, as 
debke is actually a shared custom amongst other countries of the Levant, Palestinian 
parents and older relatives emphasize slight variations in dance steps to differentiate 
Palestinian debke from Lebanese debke and to assure its „authenticity‟ as a 
distinctively Palestinian cultural artifact.   
 
In a similar way, as Palestinian parents teach their children the Arabic language in the 
home, they emphasize minor variations in accent to differentiate Palestinian Arabic 
from Lebanese Arabic.  For example, older Palestinians often tell the story of how 
Lebanese soldiers used the different pronunciation of „tomato‟ („banadora‟ in 
Palestinian dialect, and „banadura‟ in Lebanese dialect) to differentiate between the 
two „peoples‟.  I also encountered the importance of this linguistic difference in my 
interactions with Palestinians/Lebanese inside and outside of the camps.  For 
example, when I spoke Arabic with Palestinians in the camps, residents frequently 
commented that my accent or choice of vocabulary was “Shi‟ite” (Shi‟ite Lebanese).  
Moreover, some Palestinians even went so far as to „correct‟ my Lebanese 
pronunciation or choice of expressions by teaching me to speak „Palestinian‟.  On the 
other hand, when speaking to individuals in the Lebanese city of Tyre, I was 
frequently told that my Arabic was “too Palestinian”.  In other words, while Lebanese 
and Palestinian Arabic are interchangeable for me as an „outsider‟, for the two 
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communities, language is an important boundary marker for the nation (Rassool, 
2007).        
 
It is also in the home that Palestinian national distinctiveness is constructed through 
local cuisine.  As discussed in Chapter 3 (Literature Review), in the Palestinian 
camps in Lebanon, a dish called bisara has been reified as a symbol of „Palestinian-
ness‟, and Palestinians reproduce the nation whenever they prepare and eat it.  
Moreover, small differences in food preparation between the Palestinian and 
Lebanese communities are accentuated and given meaning.  For example, when asked 
what differentiated Palestinians from Lebanese, one Palestinian youth responded, 
“We have better falafel”.  Again, as an „outsider‟, the difference between the two 
„national‟ dishes was not evident to me, although this difference was ascribed 
important meaning by the two communities.      
 
It is also within the family that males and females learn to perform shared gendered 
„scripts‟ of Palestinian identity.  As one Palestinian male youth from Al Bas camp 
observed,  
 
A Palestinian man should work to get a good income, to get married and have 
a family, to find a beautiful young wife to have beautiful babies.  A 
Palestinian woman should cook, take care of the house, raise kids to have 
secondary education and to teach the kids.  Women have limited expectations 
to get a man to support them as a father, not as a lover.  They are interested in 
someone who will support the kids.  The wife should be much younger, able 
to deliver babies, very beautiful and to be always under her husband‟s control.   
 
By observing the different expectations and privileges that are accorded to males and 
females in the family, Palestinian young people learn to perform gendered 
representations of „Palestinian-ness‟ from an early age.  For example, in the home, 
Palestinian girls learn that they bear the burden of representation for the collective 
identity and are called upon to embody such ideals as „tradition‟, „culture‟ and 
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„honour‟ (Yuval-Davis, 1997) (see Chapter 3, Literature Review).  In practical terms, 
this means that Palestinian women‟s bodies are highly regulated by family members 
(both male and female), and their movements and behaviours are subject to public 
surveillance and control.  As one Palestinian boy in Rashidieh camp explained, 
 
If her husband is dead, a good Palestinian woman doesn‟t marry again.  She 
should just hug her children. 
 
In addition, it is in the home that Palestinian females are made to symbolize the future 
of Palestine through the biological reproductive capabilities of their bodies.  From an 
early age, Palestinian girls learn that they are expected to have many children for 
Palestine.  As one female youth from Burj A-Shemali camp explained,  
A good Palestinian woman has children for Palestine.  In my opinion, it is 
necessary to have children, so the children will grow up and fight for 
Palestine.  If there are no children, Palestine ends.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 5 (Boundaries), the prominence placed on childbearing 
within the nationalist discourse means that women are confined to the realm of 
„heteronormativity‟, through which marriage becomes compulsory.  In the family, 
Palestinian young people learn the boundaries of gender relations in specific contexts 
and the boundaries of „Palestinian sexualities‟ through the enactment upon them of 
both symbolic and physical violence.  In this way, „Other‟ configurations of gender 
and sexuality are regulated and ostracized, and inequality between males and females 
is made to appear „natural‟ and „stable‟ (Butler, 1990).   
 
Political Organizations 
Outside the family, the youth identified political organizations and their institutions as 
the most important sites of identity construction for Palestinian young people, 
especially for males.  As one female youth from Burj A-Shemali camp explained, 
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The Student Office is the most important source of information about 
Palestine.  It is part of the political organization.  It is for Fatah.  Hamas also 
have an office and Al Jihad Al Islami (Islamic Jihad) also.  All the 
organizations have an office.  At the Student Office, we learn many things.  
First of all, we learn about the history, and about our rights, and how to 
behave as Palestinian people and live beside the Lebanese people.  We have 
formal sessions, posters and meetings. 
 
As this comment illustrates, Palestinian political organizations mimic the formal 
structures and functions of the state.  Each political organization constructs a 
symbolic system to represent itself and its vision of Palestine and Palestinian identity.  
These symbols of Palestine are then produced and reproduced through the 
performance of „nationalist‟ rites and ceremonies through institutions in Palestinian 
society.  For instance, in Burj A-Shemali camp, I attended a Fatah (PLO) youth 
meeting in a community centre where, at its outset, all the youth were instructed to 
stand up, uniformly raise their arms in salute and pledge eternal allegiance to the flags 
of both Palestine and the Fatah political organization.  This mimics the way that 
„citizens‟ are called upon to pledge allegiance to the state through the performance of 
nationalized ritual.  Moreover, it also mimics the way that citizens are required to 
assimilate within the dominant nationalist discourse.      
 
Because political organizations are trusted and respected in Palestinian society, their 
rules, processes and practices are largely unquestioned and taken-for-granted by 
young people.  As these organizations define what is „normal‟, they are inscribed in 
relations of power.  As one female Palestinian youth from Burj A-Shemali camp put 
it, 
 
The political organization gives us true news.  Not everything you see on TV 
is true.   The organization tells us how to behave as Palestinian people.  For 
example, if a Lebanese person saw on TV a certain event about Palestine, then 
they told us, what you do and how you behave and what you say?  Not 
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everything you heard from the TV is correct, so the political organizations 
give us the right way and how to behave. 
 
As was discussed in the Literature Review (Chapter 3), political discourse often 
constructs specific gendered representations of the nation.  For example, in nationalist 
discourse, the construction of „masculinity‟ is often symbolically linked with the 
construction of the nation.  In the Palestinian context, political discourse produces 
shared notions of male „Palestinian-ness‟ through the construction of Palestinian 
symbols of „masculinity‟.   
 
Certainly the male figure who most embodies Palestine for all the youth in the camps 
is Yasser Arafat, and in virtually all Palestinian institutions and homes, Arafat‟s photo 
is enlarged, framed and displayed in a prominent position, as if to be the symbolic 
focal point for Palestinian national consciousness. 
 
During his lifetime, Arafat founded and acted as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and leader of the 
Fatah political party until his death in 2004 (Rubin and Rubin, 2003).  During most of 
this time, Arafat remained single and proclaimed himself to be „married‟ to Palestine 
and the cause of „national liberation‟. In this way, Arafat symbolically became the 
„father of the nation‟.  In this role, Arafat was frequently photographed with the poor, 
the infirm, the young and the aged, as if to be „all things to all people‟.  As one male 
youth from Rashidieh camp put it, 
 
He is like my father.  I love him.  We can‟t find as him.  He spent his life 
working for his country.  He worked in policy and in the military.  He talked 
internationally.  He was a normal person who spent time with his children and 
in hospitals.  All his life, he wanted to liberate Palestine and let the refugees 
return.  He only talked about Palestine.  He gave everything for the Palestinian 
people.  He showed the people what is Palestine. 
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Moreover, in his role as „spiritual leader of the nation‟, Arafat took on the kunya 
(honorific name) of Abu Ammar (father of Ammar), even though he never actually 
had a son named Ammar.  This designation helped to construct a direct symbolic 
linkage between himself and Ammar ibn Yasser (Ammar, son of Yasser), a 
companion of (the Prophet) Mohammed and a prominent figure in Arab history, 
thereby legitimatizing his position as a leader for both Sunni and Shi‟ite Palestinian 
Muslims.  Although Arafat himself was Sunni Muslim, when he finally married in his 
later years, he married a Palestinian Christian and called upon both Muslims and 
Christians to fight to liberate their respective „holy sites‟ in Palestine (Rubin and 
Rubin, 2003).  In this way, the symbol and „personality cult‟ of Arafat works to 
construct a shared notion of „Palestinian-ness‟ and to unify diverse communities 
under the banner of the nation.  As one male Muslim Palestinian youth from 
Rashidieh camp explained, 
 
Arafat said that Palestine is for Muslims and Christians.  He said that we must 
continue the struggle until a Palestinian girl raises her Palestinian flag in all 
mosques and churches.  He also told us not to forget our Muslim and Christian 
holy places like Al Aqsa mosque and the Church of the Nativity.   
 
Another Christian Palestinian man from Al Bas camp added, 
 
Arafat has been connected to Palestine for over 40 years.  All of us love him.  
If he was alive, Hamas would not have dared to do what they are doing now in 
Gaza. 
   
The symbolic figure of Arafat also helps to unite Palestinians in their attachment to 
Jerusalem as both the historical capital of Palestine as well as the capital of a future 
Palestinian state.  Although he was born in Cairo, Arafat identified himself as being a 
„native‟ of Jerusalem. Moreover, his attachment to the city continued even after 
death.  Fearing the symbolic appropriation of Jerusalem as the capital of a future 
Palestinian state, the Israeli authorities refused to allow Arafat to be buried in 
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Jerusalem.  Consequently, Arafat was buried in Ramallah in a concrete block filled 
with soil brought in from Jerusalem for the occasion, with hopes that he would 
someday be able to be buried in Jerusalem, itself (The Independent, 2004).   
 
Arafat not only took on symbols of Palestine, he came to embody Palestine himself.  
In life, Arafat always adorned his body with symbols of „Palestinian resistance‟, such 
as military fatigues, a pistol and a kofiya (black and white checked headscarf) (Rubin 
and Rubin, 2003).  Therefore, by emulating their „idol‟ Arafat, young male 
Palestinian bodies are shaped into hyper-masculine „resistance fighters‟.  As they 
adopt military dress, postures of aggression, the carrying of weapons and the 
glorification of „martyrdom‟ for the nation, Palestinian young men perform Palestine 
in the camps in Lebanon.  As a young man from Rashidieh camp explained, 
 
My father wants me only to work and study, but I want to do something else.  
My father wants me to fight for Palestine through Education, but I want to 
fight Israel with Fatah. 
 
In addition to constructing hegemonic notions of Palestinian „masculinity‟, 
Palestinian political organizations and their institutions also help to construct shared 
notions of Palestinian „femininity‟.  As a frequently seen poster in the camps reads, 
“Women are our light until the liberation of Palestine.”  Through political discourse, 
Palestinian young women are called upon to be the „light‟ of „the nation‟ by guarding 
the sanctity of their bodies (see Chapter 3, Literature Review).  As discussed in 
Chapter 5 (Boundaries), in practice, this means that women‟s dress, movements and 
bodies are subject to community „surveillance‟ and are „disciplined‟ through both 
symbolic and physical violence.  Moreover, women, as „lights of the nation‟, also 
become the „transmitters‟ of Palestinian values and traditions to the younger 
generation.      
 
Palestinian political discourse also helps to construct shared notions of „appropriate‟ 
male and female „citizenship‟.  For example, political organizations appropriate and 
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articulate naturalist discourses of the „innate‟ qualities of males and females to 
construct and regulate gender inequalities in decision-making and political 
participation.  Moreover, these inequalities are posited as the „natural‟ consequence of 
women‟s „weak‟ and „unstable‟ bodies.  As one male youth from Burj A-Shemali 
camp put it, 
 
Women cannot be leaders at the high levels, just the medium and the low 
levels.  They don‟t give her all the authority.  If she is a leader, she must be 
controlled by one who is greater than her, who is a man.  She might fall in 
love with the enemy.   
 
A female youth from the same camp went on to elaborate, 
 
Girls can‟t be president because they think of their emotions more than their 
minds.  The mind of a man is larger than the mind of a woman.  According to 
the Palestinian issue and struggle, that is impossible.  This is different from 
any other country.  According to the struggle between the Palestinian and 
Israeli people, if a woman were in the place of a man, that is impossible 
because she is not tough.   
 
In other words, through political discourse, males are discursively constructed as 
„biologically stronger‟ and „more rationale‟ than females; whereas, females are 
constructed as „innately more fragile‟ and „more emotional‟ than males. The logical 
outcome of this train of thought is that women cannot be trusted in positions of 
leadership because of their „inherent‟ weaknesses.  Moreover, the „urgency‟ and 
„uniqueness‟ of the Palestinian nationalist struggle does not support women‟s active 
participation in the „public sphere‟.  In this way, political discourse works to construct 
Palestinian females as „secondary‟ and restricts and contains their goals and 
aspirations for the future.  This will be discussed further in Chapter 7, New Identities. 
 
The Media 
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Another „institution‟ identified by the youth as an important discursive space through 
which they construct shared notions of „Palestinian-ness‟ is the media.  As discussed 
in Chapter 5 (Boundaries), political organizations often use graphic media, such as 
posters, banners, flyers and graffiti in order to produce and reproduce shared symbols 
of „Palestinian-ness‟.  Streets and institutions within the camps are lined with this 
graphic media, as are other discursive sites, such as T-shirts and notebooks.      
 
In addition to graphic media, electronic media is also used to construct shared notions 
of „Palestinian-ness‟.  For many Palestinians, Western media is largely discounted as 
an accurate source of information, and its „biased‟ coverage of the „Palestinian crisis‟ 
is largely held to blame for the global political inertia surrounding the enforcement of 
UN Security Council Resolutions requiring Israel to withdraw from occupied 
territory.  Therefore, Palestinian political organizations have appropriated the media 
as a means of constructing and regulating Palestinian identities.   
 
In the camps, TV is the most important medium through which symbolic systems and 
notions of „Palestinian-ness‟ are produced and reproduced by the political 
organizations.  As mentioned in Chapter 5 (Boundaries), Palestinian homes receive 
Palestinian satellite and local TV stations, such as Al Quds, Filastine, Al Aqsa and Al 
Barak.  It is through these TV channels that Palestinian youth actively view political 
speeches, news broadcasts, documentaries and “learn how to sacrifice (oneself) for 
Palestine”.  Moreover, television „fillers‟, combining war footage and symbolic 
imagery with music soundtracks to honour „martyrs‟, are broadcast regularly and are 
consumed by the viewing public in an almost subconscious manner.  Through the 
images broadcast on TV, new shared symbols of Palestine have been created for 
Palestinian youth.  One such example is that of Mohamed Durra, the young 
Palestinian boy who was shot dead in his father‟s arms by Israeli soldiers in the Gaza 
Strip.  As one young Palestinian male from Al Bas camp exclaimed,  
 
Mohamed Durra was killed in his father‟s arms with his father crying „help 
please!‟ 
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Mohamed‟s death was captured on film and repeatedly broadcast on TV stations 
thoughout the Arab world to demonstrate the unjust suffering of the Palestinians 
under the „barbarous‟ Israeli occupation.  Although just a boy in life, in death, 
Mohamed Durra became transformed and objectified by the media as a shared 
„national‟ symbol of Palestinian suffering for Palestinians throughout the diaspora.   
 
For young males, another popular medium for learning about Palestine is the internet.  
Websites operated by political organizations, such as Al Aatesam (Fatah), Islamic 
organizations, such as Al Aqsa Islam and Islam Way, and videos posted on YouTube 
teach them about Palestinian history, geography, current events, the suffering of 
Palestinians and “how to hate Israel”.  Moreover, through search engines, such as 
Google, web mail providers, such as MSN Messenger, Hotmail and Yahoo and social 
networking sites, such as Facebook, Palestinian youth in Lebanon are able to chat 
with other Palestinian youth on-line.  In the absence of road and telephone links 
between Lebanon and Palestine, and no right of return for refugees, the internet has 
transcended geo-political borders and enabled Palestinian youth throughout the 
diaspora to communicate with one another and with Palestinians in „the homeland‟ 
through the power of technology.  In this way, a sort of „cyber nation‟ has been 
created through which shared symbolic systems of nationhood and „Palestinian-ness‟ 
are produced, consumed and regulated through global media and telecommunications 
(see chapter 3, Literature Review).   
 
Religious Institutions  
The final discursive site that the youth identified as an important space where they go 
to learn about Palestine is religious institutions.  For many male Muslim youth, the 
mosque is an important institutional site for learning about Palestine and being 
Palestinian.  As one male youth from Burj A-Shemali camp explained, 
 
From the mosque, we have religious lessons.  After praying, we talk in small 
circles about what happened in Palestine, the wars, the political consciousness 
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and the suffering of the Palestinian people, and if something happens they talk 
about it. 
 
Moreover, it is through religious discourse, ritual and performance that many Muslim 
youth understand and interpret the Palestinian nationalist struggle.  As one male 
youth from Al Bas camp explained, 
 
The Qu‟ran says that Palestine is occupied by the Jews, and Muslims must 
liberate it in different ways.  It is the duty of all Muslims to liberate Al Aqsa 
mosque. 
 
Because of the „imagining‟ of Palestine as Muslim, the mosque plays a key role in the 
construction and regulation of Palestinian nationalist discourse.  Reciprocally, the 
discursive construction of the mosque as an important symbol of Palestine reinforces 
Palestinian identity as Muslim.  As discussed in Chapter 5 (Boundaries), the 
landscape in the camps has largely been symbolically „Islamicized‟.  As Palestinian 
youth pass through the camp gates or walk down a street in the camp, they are 
bombarded with Islamic iconography.  Moreover, the frequently seen Islamic symbol 
of Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem discursively draws them „back‟ to the „homeland‟.  
In addition to the mosque, Islamic discourse is also reproduced intertextually through 
a wide variety of other institutions in Palestinian society.  As Article Fifteen of the 
1988 Hamas Covenant states:   
…It is necessary that scientists, educators and teachers, information and media 
people, as well as the educated masses, especially the youth and sheikhs of the 
Islamic movements, take part in the operation of the Islamic „awakening‟ (of 
the masses)…  
 
In this way, other institutions in the camps in Lebanon, such as political 
organisations, the school, the media and the family are also called upon to function as 
sites of Muslim identity production and performance.  As Palestine is being 
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constructed as Muslim through multiple institutional sites in Palestinian society,  this 
„knowledge‟ is legitimated and made to appear „factual‟, „stable‟, „neutral‟ and 
„natural‟ to Palestinian young people in the camps (Foucault, 1977).   
 
As described above, shared cultures and discourses of „Palestinian-ness‟ are being 
produced and reproduced in and through multiple institutional sites in Palestinian 
society.  This is being accomplished through the use of symbolic systems, the 
performance of ritual and embodiment.  However, institutional processes and 
practices are also producing contestations.  For example, symbols of national identity 
are often contested by different religious and political groups.  Moreover, the 
discourse of gender cuts across these other discourses to construct new identities.  In 
this way, institutional processes and practices are also constructing narratives of the 
internal „Other‟ in Palestinian society.  This will be discussed in the next section in 
relation to specific institutions in Palestinian society. 
  
6.2  Contestations and internal ‘Others’ 
 
The school  
As previously mentioned, despite the fact that there is no official curriculum on 
Palestine in UNRWA schools, the school is an important institutional site for 
ideological production and reproduction of the nation.  However, in addition to 
producing shared notions of „Palestinian-ness‟, the narratives produced in and 
through schools also produce contestations and construct difference between 
Palestinians.  Part of how the school helps to construct fragmented Palestinian 
identities is through UNRWA‟s policy of using the school curriculum of each of the 
„host‟ countries where Palestinians are exiled (see Chapter 2, Context).  As one 
UNRWA teacher from Al Qasmieh gathering said, 
 
Because every country where Palestinian refugees are present uses their own 
curriculum, this leads to a lack of unity amongst the Palestinian people and a 
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weak identity.  The division of school curriculum keeps Palestinians divided 
and weak. 
 
Those teachers who want to teach about Palestine in an unofficial capacity in the 
classroom find they must do so without the aid of approved teaching and learning 
materials.  Consequently, many teachers use the „learning materials‟ that are 
distributed by the political organizations in order to supplement their lessons.  As one 
UNRWA teacher from Al Bas camp put it,   
 
Teachers who are not afraid can teach about Palestine.  There is no 
standardization of materials in the classroom.  The ones that are used are 
distributed by the political organizations.  The political organizations don‟t 
teach them about the history of Palestine but only the principles of the 
political organization.  The schools are becoming politicized, and this is 
dangerous.   
 
A young man from Rashidieh camp went on to elaborate, 
 
In school, they don‟t have books or lessons on Palestine, but my teacher, who 
was from Dimocratiya (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine), 
spoke to me about Palestine.   
 
The use of political propaganda as official learning material in public schools is 
highly problematic for a couple of reasons.  First, as the school is an institution where 
„knowledge‟ is created and decimated to young people, it is inscribed in relations of 
power.  Because political materials are distributed through the school, they are 
attributed a certain legitimacy, which renders them largely unquestioned and 
unchallenged by the students.  This is more akin to the process of indoctrination than 
education.   
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Secondly, the use of learning materials from different political organizations means 
that there is no standardization of curriculum.  Rather, different „truths‟ and different 
histories of Palestine are being discursively constructed in classrooms based on the 
personal political affiliations of the teachers.  In this way, the process of public 
education for Palestinians is helping to create fragmented Palestinian identities. 
 
In addition to the formal instruction that some students in UNRWA schools receive 
on Palestine, students also participate in the enactment of the „hidden curriculum‟: the 
transmission of norms, values, and beliefs conveyed through both the formal content 
of Education, as well as the social interactions experienced within schools.  As part of 
the formal curriculum in UNRWA schools, Religious Education is taught and made 
examinable at all levels.  However, in keeping with the Islamic „imagining‟ of 
„Palestinian-ness‟, the curriculum defines religion as Islam.  As one UNRWA teacher 
at Al Bas camp explained,  
 
Sunni Islam is taught at UNRWA schools for all Muslim students, Sunni and 
Shi‟a.  Only Christian students are allowed not to attend it.  There is no 
religion class for Christian students.  They are few, and the religion which is 
part of the curriculum is Islam.  It has an annual plan for all grades and a 
Subject Supervisor.  Students sit for exams. 
 
As this comment indicates, Muslim identities are hegemonically ranked in Palestinian 
society.  As Palestinian identity is „imagined‟ as Sunni, Shi‟ite students must study 
religious history and doctrine from a Sunni perspective in order to pass their exams.  
Through this practice, Shi‟ite Palestinian students are made to feel like „outsiders‟ 
who must be „normalized‟ into „proper‟ Palestinian Muslims by becoming Sunni.  On 
the other hand, the absence of Christian Religious Education classes altogether 
symbolically excises the presence of Christians from the Palestinian community.  
Moreover, it puts into question their status as „true‟ and „authentic‟ Palestinians.      
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The processes and practices of public education also produce unequal gendered 
representations of „Palestinian-ness‟.  In UNRWA schools, males and females are 
assigned different tasks, activities and responsibilities and are allocated different 
resources and power.  One male UNRWA teacher from Al Bas camp explained it this 
way,     
 
In schools, males dominate the meetings and administration work and control 
students.  There is a schedule in my school, and the male teachers have 
priority.  Also, the same is true in the playground and the class.  Boys feel 
women don‟t control the class as well as males.  Boys don‟t have respect for 
female teachers.  Women have a secondary role, even if they are educated and 
are teachers. 
 
In other words, UNRWA school patterns of inclusion, exclusion and positioning 
produce and reproduce social inequalities between Palestinian males and females 
(Kabeer and Subrahmanian, 1996).  This means that Palestinian females are 
constructed as „secondary‟ Palestinians to their male compatriots.   
 
The process of formal schooling has also helped to create different constructions of 
„Palestinian-ness‟ for different generations of Palestinians in Lebanon.  For example, 
standardized, formal schooling is the most significant difference in life experience 
between contemporary Palestinian youth and their elders in the community.  
Although 58% of Palestinian adult males and 85% of adult females over the age of 45 
have not completed secondary school, only 25% of Palestinian males and 18% of 
females in the 15-29 age group fall into this category.  Moreover, while 28% of males 
and 72% of females over the age of 45 are functionally illiterate, just 10% of males 
and 7% of females aged 15-29 are classified as functionally illiterate.  In this way, 
schooling has had an important impact on the way Palestinian identities have been 
shaped and transformed over the past sixty years, particularly for females (Ugland, 
2003).       
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In Palestinian society, many older Palestinians who have not been to school are still 
strongly emotionally attached to the „homeland‟ of „Palestine‟.  However, because 
Palestinian youth are now being educated through the Lebanese curriculum in 
UNRWA schools, and there is no Palestinian content in the curriculum, they are 
losing identification with their land of ancestry and learning to be good „Lebanese‟ 
citizens, even though they will never receive Lebanese citizenship.  In many cases, 
their bonds with Palestine are becoming so weak that they no longer „feel 
Palestinian‟.  One youth from Al Bas camp put it this way,  
 
My father loves Palestine, but I feel that I am Lebanese.  Palestine doesn‟t 
affect my life, and it has nothing to do with me.  
 
In other words, formal schooling has helped to create a generation gap in Palestinian 
society in Lebanon between older Palestinians, who still largely hold on to their 
„Palestinian-ness‟, and Palestinian young people, who increasingly „feel Lebanese‟. 
 
The family 
Narratives of internal difference between Palestinians are also produced and 
reproduced through the institution of the family.  In the home, through story-telling 
and the recounting of „memories‟, Palestinian young people learn from their parents, 
grandparents and extended families about their villages in Palestine, “being 
Palestinian” and “being patriotic for Palestine”.  Through these narratives, Palestinian 
young people learn to describe their home and village in Palestine in intimate detail, 
although they have never been there in a physical sense, and in many cases, it no 
longer exists.  However, it also through these narratives of „home‟ that Palestine 
becomes fragmented as a concept, as Palestine comes to reflect the specific villages in 
Palestine from which their families were exiled.  For example, families exiled from 
the Palestinian village of Tarbikha construct Palestinian identity as Shi‟ite in contrast 
to families from other villages in Palestine, such as Safad, for whom Palestine is 
constructed as Sunni.  Moreover, some Palestinians in Lebanon were exiled from 
rural communities, while others were exiled from towns in Palestine.  In this way, 
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different religious and political orientations, as well as unique regional customs, are 
reproduced in the home as „Palestinian-ness‟.  This helps to construct multiple, and 
often conflicting, narratives of Palestinian identity.  Moreover, this difference is 
spatially encoded and reproduced in the camps, as camp residents from the same 
village in Palestine and from the same religious community largely live and socialize 
together.   
 
As discussed earlier, the family is the key institution through which Palestinian 
„tradition‟ and „values‟ are reproduced.  However, the institutional site of the family 
is also a place where gendered constructions of Palestinian identity take on a 
generational dimension and become contested.  As mentioned in the previous section, 
it is within the home that Palestinian boys and girls learn to perform gendered 
representations of Palestinian identity.  As discussed in Chapter 5 (Boundaries), 
„national‟ symbols, such as the hijab, are inscribed on the female body.  However, 
identity may also be negotiated or subverted through bodily practice.  In this way, 
some Palestinian girls reject the dress code for Muslim women that has been 
symbolically reified as an „identity marker‟ of „Palestinian‟ identity.  This can cause 
conflict between young Palestinians and their parents.  As one female youth from 
Burj A-Shemali camp explained, 
 
I don‟t always agree with the society.  For example, I don‟t wear hijab.  My 
mother wears it and my father is Haj (has made the pilgrimage to Mecca), but 
why I should wear it?  I don‟t know. 
Even those Palestinian girls who wear the hijab often do so casually with it covering 
only the top of the head, leaving hair tendrils to cascade down in full view of male 
observers.  Similarly, some Palestinian young women technically keep the „letter of 
the law‟ by wearing sleeves down to their wrists and skirts down to their ankles, yet 
they wear clothing made out of clingy material, which shapes their bodies and allows 
them to openly embrace and express their sexuality.  Many young Palestinian girls 
also simultaneously exercise resistance against „the West‟ and the „Islamic norms‟ of 
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their society by adopting „hybrid‟ bodily practices to create new identities.  For 
example, girls often wear „Western-style‟ clothes as an act of resistance against 
Islamic tradition and their parents.  At the same time, they wear the hijab to embody 
resistance against Western hegemony.   
 
On the other hand, the family is also the institutional site through which 
fundamentalism is often reproduced and performed.  For example, the increasing 
„Islamicization‟ of Palestinian society, and the way in which religious conservatism 
has been used as a boundary marker between the Palestinian and Lebanese 
communities, has encouraged many Palestinian young people, especially males, to 
adopt more conservative and fundamentalist ideas and attitudes than their parents.  As 
one male youth from Burj A-Shemali camp figuratively stated,  
 
Girls have to dress conservative, and if I have a sister who doesn‟t, I will kill 
her.   
 
In other words, for these young men, „Palestinian-ness‟ has taken on the interpretation 
of strict adherence to Islam and the control of female bodies through male 
disciplinary regimes.  In this context, females are increasingly being called upon to 
embody the boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims and Palestinians and non-
Palestinians through the „policing‟ of their behaviour and dress (see Chapter 7, New 
Identities).      
 
Political organizations 
As mentioned above, Palestinian political organizations are an important institutional 
site for the ideological production and maintenance of the nation.  However, these 
organizations are also implicated in the construction of the „internal Other‟.  This is 
because political identities are constructed in essentialist terms and in opposition to 
one another.  For example, it is not possible to be both a supporter of Fatah (PLO) 
and a supporter of Hamas.  Rather, each political organization constructs a unique 
symbolic system to represent its idea of the „true‟ and „authentic‟ Palestine.  In this 
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way, different sub-national symbols are being adopted by different political 
organizations to construct and reproduce different meanings.  As one Palestinian 
teacher from Al Bas camp put it, 
 
I am independent, so I draw the map of Palestine, but Fatah (PLO) people will 
draw the scarf of Yasser Arafat.   
 
A Christian man from Al Bas camp went on to add, 
 
The kofiya (black and white checked scarf) means nothing for us.  We wear it 
only to keep warm. 
 
As these comments illustrate, each political organization articulates its identity 
through the representation of itself through a unique symbolic system, such as a crest, 
flag or „pledge of allegiance‟.  Moreover, these representations of the nation often 
conflict with „Others‟.  For example, the crest of the Fatah party shows two fists 
holding rifles and a hand grenade superimposed on the map of Palestine accompanied 
by the texts, „The Palestinian National Liberation Movement‟ and „Revolution until 
victory‟.  This reflects the organization‟s secular, Marxist-Leninist ideology and self-
proclaimed role as the „official‟ representative of the Palestinian people.  In contrast, 
the Hamas crest consists of Al Aqsa mosque, two crossed swords, and two Palestinian 
flags embracing the mosque accompanied by the phrases, „There is no god but Allah‟, 
and „Muhammad is the messenger of Allah.‟ At the top of the crest is the map of 
Palestine accompanied by the phrase, „Islamic Resistance Movement-Hamas‟, 
reflecting the organization‟s Islamist ideology.  In other words, Fatah has „imagined‟ 
Palestine as a secular state, whereas for Hamas, the nation has been „imagined‟ as an 
Islamic waqf (endowment) specifically for Muslims.  These different representations 
of „Palestine‟ and „Palestinian-ness‟ have clear implications for who can and who 
cannot be considered an „authentic‟ Palestinian. 
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Ironically, many figures who appear in Palestinian political posters around the camps, 
and who have been constructed as „Palestinian heroes‟ through political discourse, are 
not Palestinian at all, such as Gamal Abdul Nasser (Egyptian president from 1954 – 
1970), Saddam Hussein (Iraqi president from 1979-2003) and Hassan Nasrallah 
(Shi‟ite leader of Lebanese Hezbollah). Moreover, some symbolic „heroes‟ of 
Palestine and the nationalist struggle, as seen in these posters, are not even Arab.  For 
example, photos of the Latin American resistance leader, Ché Guevara, can be found 
all over the Palestinian camps.  In the Fatah-run Kurami Centre in Burj A-Shemali 
camp, for instance, the centre piece of the meeting hall is a large image of Ché 
Guevara beside Yasser Arafat which frames the map of Palestine.  While these 
figures are all male leaders of anti-colonialist or anti-imperialist „liberation‟ 
movements, they differ widely in their political and religious ideologies and 
„imaginings‟ of the nation.  Thus, they help to construct different, and often 
conflicting, notions of „Palestinian-ness‟ for the youth. 
 
The essentialist construction of political identities in Palestinian society has serious 
implications for youth and society more generally.  The territorial coverage of these 
political symbols within the camps marks the extent of influence each organization 
has on the Palestinian community.  Where different symbolic systems collide, there is 
the potential for conflict.  For example, the erection of Islamist symbols in a 
particular space within the camp can be interpreted as a direct challenge to the ruling 
secular Fatah party in that area.  In other words, the construction of sub-national 
symbolic systems by political organizations fosters allegiance to specific political 
organizations rather than loyalty to a collective Palestinian nation.  Moreover, this has 
often proven to be divisive.  As one male youth from Rashidieh camp put it,  
 
Fatah talks about Fatah, Hamas talks about Hamas. There is fighting between 
Fatah and Hamas and between Palestinians. Every day, a Palestinian child will 
die due to this problem. 
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Ironically, some political symbols used to represent Palestine in the camps in 
Lebanon negate its very existence as an independent nation-state.  For example, when 
one walks through the camps, posters for the political organization Hizb A-Tahrir are 
often encountered.  Hizb A-Tahrir is an international, Sunni, pan-Islamist political 
organization whose goal is to unite all Muslim countries in a unitary Islamic state, or 
caliphate, ruled by Islamic law.  As such, the symbol used to represent this political 
organization is that of the Süleymaniya mosque in Istanbul, the capital of the former 
Ottoman empire.  In this „imagining‟, Palestine is collapsed as a physical nation and 
is incorporated into a larger, Sunni Islamic umma (nation).  This works to construct 
„authentic‟ Palestinians as specifically Sunni Muslim.  On the other hand, within this 
narrative, Palestinian Shi‟ites become „apostates‟, while Palestinian Christians are 
dismissed as „Western collaborators‟.     
 
Palestinian political organisations have also worked to discursively construct 
different, and often conflicting, notions of Palestinian „femininity‟ and „masculinity‟.  
This will be discussed at length in Chapter 7, New Identities. 
 
The media 
As discussed in the first section of this chapter, political discourse is often produced 
and reproduced through the media.  However, as media centres are situated 
differently vis-à-vis politics and religion, television stations and websites often 
construct very different „imaginings‟ of Palestine and „Palestinian-ness‟ for the 
viewing public.  For example, the largest of the political organizations, such as Fatah 
and Hamas, each have their own TV networks, which are either broadcast locally 
from the camps or are received via satellite from Palestine (West Bank and Gaza).  In 
addition, the youth also frequently watch Lebanese Al Manar (Hezbollah channel) or 
pan-Arab Al Jazeera Arabia (Qatari-based channel).  As the youth consume media 
from these different sources, different „imaginings‟ of Palestine are constructed and 
performed in the camps in Lebanon.  As one Palestinian man from Al Mashuq 
gathering stated, 
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Each political party uses the media to implant their image of Palestine in the 
mind of the youth.  For example, Fatah tells the youth to wear the kofiya, but 
Hamas tells people to wear Islamic dress.  The role model for the youth comes 
from TV.   
 
As through television, different Palestinian identities are also constructed through 
different internet sites.  However, the internet differs from television in a couple of 
important aspects.  First, while all Palestinian young people have access to television 
in their homes or through community centres, the „digital divide‟ means that many 
Palestinians do not have access to computers or the internet.  For example, few 
families have internet connections at home, and most girls do not have access to the 
„male space‟ of internet cafes.  Moreover, many members of the older generation are 
not versed in the use of computer technology, which has helped to create a sort of 
cyber generation gap in Palestinian society.  Whereas contemporary Palestinian 
young people are likely to learn about Palestine through technology, members of the 
older generation learned about Palestine and being Palestinian in very different ways.  
As one youth explained,  
 
Some grandparents were born in Palestine.  My parents learned only from 
their parents.  Before, there were no centres, internet, or TV.   
 
Furthermore, the internet also differs from TV in its potential to democratise 
knowledge.  For example, through the internet, and particularly through blogs, chat 
rooms and message boards, anyone can challenge dominant discourses in society and 
create new knowledge through desktop publishing for an international audience.  
Moreover, by only accessing certain internet sites, individuals can selectively narrow 
and regulate their world views by receiving only the information they want to receive.  
However, there are still power structures at work and hegemonic discourses still 
dominate „cyberspace‟.  For example, many of the websites about Palestine are run by 
Islamic organizations and are not accessed by Palestinian Christians or „secular‟ 
Muslims.  In this way, the internet not only unites Palestinians in the production, 
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consumption and regulation of shared symbolic systems of nationhood, the elitist and 
exclusive use of this technology also helps to divide the community by working to 
construct Palestine, and hegemonic forms of „Palestinian-ness‟, through its users, 
which are primarily young, male and Muslim.   
 
This segways nicely into a discussion of how the internal „Other‟ is constructed in 
and through religious institutions in Palestinian society.   
 
Religious institutions 
As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, religious institutions are very important sites 
for the ideological reproduction of the nation in Palestinian society.  The mosque, in 
particular, functions as a collective symbol of „Palestinian-ness‟ and works to 
construct Palestine as Muslim.  Within this discourse, it is specifically Al Aqsa 
mosque which has been constructed as the symbolic embodiment of Jerusalem, the 
symbolic „capital‟ of Palestine.  Consequently, this symbol is prominently displayed 
within many Palestinian institutions, businesses and homes.  However, this „national‟ 
symbol is not inclusive of all groups and has not been taken up by Palestinian 
Christians.  For example, when asked what the symbols of Palestine were for him, 
one Palestinian Christian responded with strong emotion,  
 
Bethlehem, Jerusalem and its Christian history.  If it is only Al Aqsa mosque, 
it is disgusting for me.  
 
In contrast to the mosque, the church has had very little involvement in the 
Palestinian nationalist project in recent years, and many Christian Palestinians agree 
that “the church should stay away from teaching issues of politics.”  As one Christian 
Palestinian woman in Tyre explained,  
 
Most Palestinian Christians don‟t follow political parties.  I am against 
violence.   
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Moreover, many Christian Palestinians believe that the „Islamicization‟ of Palestinian 
identity through political organizations has marginalized their participation in nation-
building.  As one Christian Palestinian man from the Lebanese city of Tyre explained,    
 
The Palestinian activities now are only in the Muslim camps.  Palestinian 
identity is becoming more Islamic.  After the creation of Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad, 40% of them become fanatic.  I want to return to my village in a free, 
democratic country.  I am not ready to kill and be killed and live under 
Shari’a (Islamic) law. 
The marginalization of Christian Palestinians from the Palestinian community is not 
just symbolic.  Rather, it has had real social and material consequences for these 
Palestinians in Lebanon.  As one Christian Palestinian woman explained, 
 
Because we are Christians, Muslims don‟t accept us as Palestinians.  We don‟t 
receive food or money.  In the festivals, they give gifts only to Muslims.  To 
work in UNRWA, you must be Muslim. 
 
As a result of being marginalized from the Palestinian community, many Christian 
Palestinians feel it is best to facilitate the integration of Christian refugees into 
Lebanese society by not teaching their young people about Palestine.  One Christian 
Palestinian woman from the Lebanese city of Tyre explained it this way,  
 
Christians are not telling their children about Palestine.  We have suffered a 
lot from Palestinian identity, so why would we teach our children about it?  
Young Palestinian Christians are well integrated into Lebanese society.  Even 
Lebanese Christians don‟t like Palestinian Christians, but because we have 
intermarriage, they accept us for this reason. We never talk to our children 
about Palestine.  In a couple of generations, they will forget about Palestine.   
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As mentioned in Chapter 5 (Boundaries), the construction of Palestine as Muslim also 
has specific gendered implications.  For example, as the mosque is considered to be 
„male space‟, few women attend regularly, if at all.  Those women who do attend are 
permitted limited participation, at best.  As a Palestinian male teacher from Al Bas 
camp explained, 
 
In the mosque, there are two sections, one for males and one for females.  Males 
who want to ask a question raise their voice and ask questions; whereas, women 
write their questions on paper and give them to the sheikh.  A male imam can 
lead prayers for both males and females, but a female can‟t lead the prayers for 
the males. 
 
In other words, women are essentially silenced and relegated to passive involvement 
in this institutional context.  Moreover, as the line which signifies the boundaries 
between Palestinians and „Others‟ has been constructed on the performance of Islam, 
Palestinian Christians are not embraced in this representation of the nation.  Neither, 
for that matter, are secular Muslims who do not wear the hijab or sufficiently perform 
Muslim „imaginings‟ of „Palestinian-ness‟.   
 
6.3  Institutional (Un)cooperation  
 
As discussed in the section above, in the absence of a formal curriculum on Palestine 
in UNRWA schools, Palestinian identity construction and regulation is taking place 
informally through the rules, policies and practices of non-state institutions in 
Palestinian society, such as the family, political organizations, the media and religious 
institutions.  As young people interact with, in and through these institutions, they 
become complicit in the construction of the nation through practices of „banal 
nationalism‟ (see Chapter 3, Literature Review).  As one Palestinian man from 
Rashidieh camp explained, 
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In my work in the PLO library, I teach young people to read books and 
encourage them to solve problems.  I volunteer with different organizations.  I 
speak with persons about the history of Palestine.  
 
However, what is currently not occurring in Palestinian society is large-scale 
communication, coordination and cooperation between formal and non-formal 
institutions in the construction and regulation of Palestinian identities.  For example, 
when asked to describe the level of coordination between UNRWA schools and 
different institutions in Palestinian society, one UNRWA Education official 
responded,  
 
Officially there is no coordination between institutions.  Bureaucracy prevents 
this.  However, there is some unofficial coordination. 
 
In response to this lack of institutional coordination and cooperation, many 
Palestinians have called for Palestinian unity to be fostered through the school.  
Specifically, Palestinians of all ages have called for a specific curriculum on Palestine 
to be introduced into UNRWA schools and made examinable at all levels.  As the 
Education Head of the Tyre UNRWA Regional Office argued,  
 
There should be an official curriculum on Palestine and official Social Studies 
books.  This curriculum should be the same for all Palestinians regardless of 
country of residence.   
 
This recommendation was seconded by a Palestinian male youth from Burj A-
Shemali camp, who asserted,  
 
We must study in school about Palestine.  We should have special summer 
courses about Palestine.  We should be tested on Palestine.   
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Moreover, many young people expressed the desire for increased institutional 
cooperation in teaching them about Palestine.  As one young man from Burj A-
Shemali camp stated,  
 
The school and the community and the Student Office must work together to 
teach youngsters about Palestine.  We must not forget our country.  We must 
not forget our identity.       
 
From the comments above, it is clear that Palestinians in Lebanon are invested in the 
construction of a „distinct‟ and shared Palestinian identity through institutions in 
Palestinian society.  Moreover, Palestinians look to schools to „take the lead‟ in this 
endeavour through the development of a specific, formal and examinable curriculum 
on Palestine for students at all levels.   
 
However, these comments also reflect the widely-held perspective among 
Palestinians that an „authentic‟, unified and stable Palestinian identity exists and 
merely needs to be „recovered‟ from the past and „transmitted‟ to young people 
through educational processes and practices.  As this chapter has revealed, the 
construction of one „authentic‟ Palestinian identity that is inclusive of all individuals 
in the camps in Lebanon is highly problematic.   
 
6.4  Overview 
 
In this chapter, I have examined how institutions such as the school, the family, 
political organizations, the media and religious institutions all function as sites of 
Palestinian identity production and performance.  Within this discussion, I have 
highlighted the ways in which Palestine and Palestinian identity are culturally, 
socially and symbolically produced and regulated in Palestinian society though the 
use of symbolic systems, the performance of ritual and embodiment (see Chapter 3, 
Literature Review).  Moreover, I have examined the ways that „knowledge‟ produced 
in and through these sites is legitimated and made to appear factual, stable, neutral 
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and natural.  I have also looked at how institutional regimes, networks and processes 
regulate and discipline Palestinian identities in formal and informal life. 
   
I argue that although institutional processes and practices produce shared cultures and 
discourses of „Palestinian-ness‟, these processes are also implicated in the production 
of internal „Others‟.  This is because there are vast challenges and complexities 
entailed in the process of trying to represent the diversity of the Palestinian 
experience through a single, hegemonic identity.  Rather, „national‟ symbols are often 
divisive rather than unifying because different religious and political groups have 
constructed different Palestinian histories.  Moreover, gender crosscuts each of these 
discourses to construct new identities.  In other words, the concept of „authenticity‟ is 
highly problematic in the Palestinian context, and it challenges the very essence of 
Palestinian nationalist „imagining‟.   
 
In spite of there being multiple Palestinian identities, identities are ranked 
hegemonically and there is a dominant Palestinian identity which is male and Sunni 
Muslim.  Consequently, females, religious minorities (specifically Shi‟ite Muslims, 
Christians and increasingly secularists) are largely excluded from the production and 
performance of the nation.   
 
Adding to this complexity is that there is currently no large-scale communication, 
coordination and cooperation between formal and non-formal institutions in the 
construction and regulation of Palestinian identities.  In response, both Palestinian 
teachers and youth have called on the school to „take the lead‟ in „recovering‟ and 
„transmitting‟ an „authentic‟ and unified Palestinian identity to young people.  
However, this is highly problematic as, the discussion above reveals, Palestinian 
identities are temporary, fluid and contingent. 
This leads me to the next, and final, empirically-based chapter, where I use both 
historical and empirical data to analyze how Palestinian identities in Lebanon have 
shifted across exilic generations through the processes of resistance, negotiation and 
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accommodation in response to the changing social, economic and political 
circumstances of the past 60 years.    
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Chapter 7 – New Identities 
 
 
In the first two empirically-based chapters (Chapter 5, Boundaries; Chapter 6, 
Institutions), I examined how Palestinian identities are constructed through discourses 
of difference and accomplished through the appropriation and articulation of 
discursive resources within and through formal and non-formal institutions in 
Palestinian society.  However, the identities that are produced through these 
institutions are not stable or already accomplished „facts‟.  Rather, they are a 
„production‟ which is never complete, but always in the process of shifting, 
transforming and „becoming‟ in relation to changing life conditions (Hall, 1996) (see 
Chapter 3, Literature Review).  In this chapter, I explore how Palestinian identities in 
Lebanon have shifted across exilic generations (research question 3).  To do this, I 
use both empirical and historical data to explore how constructions of „Palestinian-
ness‟ have shifted over time through changing discourses of ethnicity, religion, 
gender and „home‟ in Palestinian society.  I argue that a homogenized and „fixed‟ 
Palestinian identity does not exist.  Rather, the boundaries of difference between 
Palestinians and „Others‟, and between Palestinians themselves, are continually being 
repositioned in relation to different points of reference according to changing life 
circumstances.  Moreover, Palestinian youth are constantly investing in these 
temporary subject positions based on positions of advantage within specific contexts.    
 
7.1  Ethnicity  
 
As discussed in Chapter 5 (Boundaries), one of the key discourses through which 
both Palestine and „Palestinian-ness‟ have been „imagined‟ is ethnicity.  At certain 
times and in certain spaces, the boundaries of sameness with other Palestinians and 
those of difference between Palestinians and external „Others‟ have been constructed 
on the basis of ethnic bonds between members of the nation.  However, in the 
Palestinian case, the relationship between ethnicity and the nation has been a complex 
one.   
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For much of the history of the Middle East, Palestine was closely integrated 
culturally, linguistically and economically with the other countries of Bilad Al-Sham 
(Greater Syria), the historical region containing the modern nation-states of Syria, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Israel/Palestine.  Moreover, the idea of a distinct Palestinian 
state separated out from its Arab neighbors was initially rejected by many 
Palestinians. For example, the First Congress of Muslim-Christian Associations 
adopted the following resolution in February, 1919,   
We consider Palestine as part of Arab Syria, as it has never been separated 
from it at any time. We are connected with it by national, religious, linguistic, 
natural, economic and geographical bonds (Porath, 1977). 
 
However, historical events and processes worked to promote the rise of Palestinian 
nationalism.  As discussed in Chapter 2 (Context), as part of the colonial project, 
European powers arbitrarily divided the region into nation-states.  This included the 
creation of the State of Israel in 1948.  The demarcation of modern nation-state 
boundaries in the region helped to construct and shape distinct national identities.  
Moreover, it also helped to strengthen nationalist discourses in Palestine. (Bosworth, 
1997).  However, as Palestine never came into being as a modern nation-state, 
Palestinians found themselves temporally caught between the decline of empire and 
the rise of the nation-state and entangled in the competing political discourses of 
„pan-Arabism‟ (Arab unity) and „Palestinian nationalism‟.     
In 1964, the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) helped to 
strengthen nationalist discourse in Palestinian society.  As part of the nationalist 
project, the PLO articulated an ethnic nationalist narrative that argued that Palestinian 
national consciousness and identity were „innate‟ and had deep historical roots.  This 
is outlined in Article 4 of the 1968 Palestinian National Charter:  
The Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential, and inherent characteristic; it 
is transmitted from parents to children. The Zionist occupation and the 
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dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people, through the disasters which befell 
them, do not make them lose their Palestinian identity and their membership 
in the Palestinian community, nor do they negate them. 
However, this new Palestinian nationalist identity was not without its internal 
contradictions, and it problematized the „distinctiveness‟ of Palestinians from their 
Arab neighbors.  For example, in a March 31, 1977 interview with the Dutch 
newspaper Trouw, a PLO Executive Committee member, Zuhayr Muhsin, said this,    
 
The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is 
only a means for continuing our struggle against the State of Israel for our 
Arab unity. In reality, there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, 
Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak 
today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests 
demand that we posit the existence of a distinct „Palestinian people‟ to oppose 
Zionism. For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined 
borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa. While as a Palestinian, I can 
undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the 
moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a 
minute to unite Palestine and Jordan (Dorsey, 1977).  
 
The comments above clearly indicate how the discourses of „pan-Arabism‟ and 
„Palestinian nationalism‟ have both been at work in Palestinian society at least since 
the beginning of the 20
th
 century.  Moreover, each of these discourses has been 
strategically prioritized by different groups at different times.  
Today, the often tense relationship between pan-Arabism and Palestinian nationalism 
continues to influence the construction and performance of Palestinian identities in 
Lebanon.  As a male Palestinian youth from Rashiedieh camp explained, 
 
Palestine is next to Lebanon between Syria and Jordan.  It was called Al-
Sham: Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan.  Then they separated them into 
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many countries.  Who separated them?  Britain and France.  At first, the world 
is not divided into countries, it is only divided into civilizations.  This means 
that some people who are called Egyptian people were not called Egyptian 
and did not have the personality of Egyptians.  Now they are only called 
„Egyptian‟ people and not „Arabic‟. 
As this comment reveals, the European colonial project in the Middle East has had 
profound and lasting consequences for the production of identities in the region.  For 
example, a colonial legacy for all Arabs, and particularly for Palestinians, is that they 
construct their identities on the basis of both „nation‟ and „shared Arabness‟.  
Although Palestinians share much socially, culturally and historically with other 
Arabs, especially in the Levant, the world is now divided into nation-states, so 
Palestinians must find a basis on which to construct a „distinct‟ and shared sense of 
„nationhood‟ apart from other Arabs.  As discussed in Chapter 5 (Boundaries) and 
Chapter 6 (Institutions), for many Palestinians, shared suffering serves as a boundary 
marker for the nation and an important signifier of difference between Palestinians 
and Arab „Others‟.  As one male youth from Rashidieh camp explained, 
 
There is no difference between Palestinians and other Arabs.  In general, we 
are common with Lebanese people because we are Arabic, but we have some 
special traditions.  It is the same as the difference between Canadians and 
Americans.  But the problem is we are outside our country.  Palestinians are 
„the people that lose‟. 
 
A male UNRWA Education official went on to elaborate further, 
 
We feel the same as Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.  What unifies 
Palestinians is that they are living in the same miserable conditions with the 
same objective. 
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The comments above illustrate how Palestinians in Lebanon bear both ethnic and 
„national‟ identities simultaneously.  Moreover, Palestinians constantly negotiate both 
their ethnic and national identities through a process of „hybridization‟.  This enables 
Palestinians to slip and slide between these identity positions in order to strategically 
gain positions of advantage in any situation (see Chapter 3 Literature Review).  At 
certain times, pan-Arabism and shared sameness with other Arabs is espoused by 
Palestinians in order to achieve certain objectives.  For example, when asked what 
she wanted to do in her future to help her community, one female Palestinian youth 
from Rashidieh camp responded, 
 
I want to work to unite all Arabs to help the Palestinian people.  
 
In other words, for this youth, identification with a larger community (all Arabs) is 
strategic in the context of a national „liberation‟ struggle.  As part of a larger 
collective, „other Arabs‟ can be called upon to help their fellow „Arabic brothers and 
sisters‟ to „liberate‟ Palestine.  At the same time, the lack of support offered to the 
Palestinians in their goal of „national liberation‟ by other Arab governments 
(particularly Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf countries) has caused some individuals to 
retreat behind boundaries of national identity and „Palestinian-ness‟ in order to 
construct difference between themselves and Arab „Others‟.  As another Palestinian 
female youth from Rashidieh camp stated,  
 
I don‟t want to help Arabs because they didn‟t help me.     
Here, „Arabs‟ are constructed as an external „Other‟, as they have failed in their 
culturally assigned „duty‟ to help fellow „kin‟ in a time of need.   
 
As a political discourse, pan-Arabism reached its apex in the 1960s, when the 
movement was spearheaded by Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser (see Chapter 2 
Context).  However, although it continues to exert a strong influence in Arab print 
media and intellectual circles particularly in the Levant and especially in Syria, since 
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the late 1980s, pan-Arabism has been eclipsed by Islamist ideologies in Palestinian 
society (Khalidi, 1990).  As one young man from Rashidieh camp put it, 
 
Palestine should be free, but I don‟t care if I live in Palestine, Lebanon or 
Jordan.  There is nothing different.  I care more about being Muslim.   
 
The next section will discuss how boundaries of „Palestinian-ness‟ are increasingly 
being constructed around the discourse of religion in Palestinian society.   
 
7.2  Religion   
 
As discussed in Chapter 5 (Boundaries), one of the key discourses through which 
„Palestinian-ness‟ has been „imagined‟ in the camps in Lebanon is religion.  The 
boundaries of sameness with other Palestinians and those of difference between 
Palestinians and external „Others‟ have been constructed on the basis of religious 
affiliation.  However, the signification of religion and „fundamentalism‟ as important 
boundary markers between communities is relatively new.   
 
Historically, the first Palestinian political organizations, like the PLO, adopted a 
secular ideology and „imagined‟ the future state of Palestine along secular lines.  This 
enabled both Muslims and Christians to participate in the collective struggle for 
Palestinian „liberation‟ (Khalidi, 1990).  As one Christian Palestinian man explained,  
 
In the past, there were no wars between Christians and Muslims. In the past, 
Palestinian Christians worked hard for Palestine, but after many wars, they got 
tired. 
 
Instead of religion, it was originally Marxism that served as an organizing principle 
for Palestinian unity.  In addition to being secular (in a pragmatic sense), the first 
Palestinian political organizations, such as the PLO, PFLP and DFLP, were heavily 
influenced by Marxist ideology (Khalidi, 1990).  Consequently, Palestinian political 
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organizations often united with other global Marxist movements in their struggle 
against colonialism and imperialism. As one Palestinian man from Al Mashuq 
gathering explained,    
 
Palestinians saw organizations such as the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and 
Baader Meinhof (Red Army Faction) and other liberation organisations in 
Africa and Latin America as an extension of the Palestinian struggle against 
the imperialist powers.  Despite the difference in language, culture and 
religion, they still felt connected to those organizations because they had the 
same cause. 
 
However, in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War, Palestinian nationalism has shifted away from its original Marxist secular 
ideological roots, as expressed by the PLO, and turned toward a focus on political 
Islam, as expressed by Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement), Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad, and other Islamist organizations (Khalidi, 1990).  One Palestinian man from Al 
Mashuq gathering explained it this way, 
 
When I was young, we used to sing „(Ché) Guevara and Mao taught us how to 
liberate Palestine‟.  Now the Marxists are almost not there.  Fatah (PLO) is 
like a tired warrior.  Now there is a new warrior in town fighting for the 
Palestinian cause and energizing people to do things.  These are the Islamists.  
 
A male UNRWA Education official went on to elaborate:  
 
Political Islam is new.  After the Israeli invasion in 1982, many Islamic 
organizations grew because the secular and Marxist organizations were 
defeated.  This is good even if we don‟t agree with the Islamic approach 
because the problem still exists.  Israel helped Hamas to rise because Fatah 
wanted to make peace with Israel.  Hamas wants to liberate all of Palestine, 
not only the 1967 borders.  Religion has a great influence on all people.   
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For Islamists, Palestine is discursively constructed as an inalienable religious 
endowment specifically for Muslims.  This is outlined in Article Eleven of the 1988 
Hamas Covenant:  
The land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Muslim 
generations until Judgement Day.  It, or any part of it, should not be 
squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up…This is the law 
governing the land of Palestine in the Islamic Shari'a (law), and the same goes 
for any land the Muslims have conquered by force, because during the times 
of (Islamic) conquests, the Muslims consecrated these lands to Muslim 
generations till the Day of Judgement.  
 
In other words, Islamist political narratives are „imagined‟ in essentialist terms and 
attempt to „recover‟ an „authentic‟ past identity when Muslim caliphates ruled the 
areas stretching from Al Hijaz (Arabian Peninsula) in the south, to Bukhara (Central 
Asia) in the east, to Al Maghreb (present day Morocco) in the west.   
 
As Palestine is being constructed as Muslim in this narrative, other Muslims are being 
called upon to view the „liberation‟ of Palestine, Al Aqsa mosque and the holy shrines 
of Islam as their „sacred duty‟.  In this way, the „borders‟ of Palestine have been 
discursively expanded and extended to include the entire Islamic Umma (Muslim 
world).  This has worked to create a new „supra-national‟ Islamic identity that 
challenges the boundaries of the nation-state.  Within this pan-Islamist discourse, it is 
the duty of all Muslims to fight for the „liberation‟ of Palestine, even if they are 
neither Palestinian nor Sunni.  As one male UNRWA Education official explained,  
(Lebanese) Islamic Shi‟ites have been fighting Israel, and Hezbollah has given 
us hope to defeat Israel.  Hassan Nasrallah (leader of Hezbollah) is a „good 
Palestinian‟ because he fights the Israelis.  He works for Palestine more than 
the people in the camp.  Identity doesn‟t mean you must be Palestinian by 
nationality.  
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On the other hand, the Islamist „imagining‟ of Palestine has also worked to challenge 
the boundaries of the nation-state through the construction of new „sub-national‟ 
identities.  As discussed in Chapter 6 (Institutions), each Palestinian faction 
constructs a unique symbolic system to reflect the organization‟s political and 
religious ideology, and subjects are recruited within different systems of 
representation.  In this way, secularists are likely to support the PLO while Islamists 
are likely to support an organization like Hamas.  This is how many Palestinian youth 
are becoming more likely to identify themselves as members of a particular political 
faction than Palestinian.  As the male head of a Palestinian NGO explained, 
 
There is no unity between different Palestinian groups, such as Fatah and Hamas.  
„If I am not with you exactly, I am against you‟.  We fly flags of all political 
parties instead of flying only the Lebanese and Palestinian flags.  Palestinians 
have many political identities.  The young generation should stop following 
political parties. 
 
This comment illustrates how the discourses of religion and nation intersect in 
complex ways and are mediated through politics in the Palestinian context.  On the 
one hand, religion marks sameness with other members of the Palestinian collectivity, 
while it marks difference between Palestinians and „Others‟.  On the other hand, all 
Palestinians are not Muslims, and all Muslims are not Palestinians (see Chapter 5, 
Boundaries; Chapter 6, Institutions).  Moreover, there are internal differences 
between Muslims.  As discussed in Chapter 6 (Institutions), Shi‟ite Muslims are 
constructed as „the Other‟ in relation to the Sunni subject.  Additionally, Palestinian 
Muslims are constructed as different from Muslims in „Other‟ nations.  As one female 
youth from Burj A-Shemali camp explained, 
 
Muslims in the Gulf (Arabian peninsula) are not very affected by Islam like 
Palestinians.   
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Just as Palestinians strategically negotiate identities of ethnicity, they also slip and 
slide between identity positions of religion and nation in order to strategically gain 
positions of advantage in any situation (see Chapter 3 Literature Review).  At certain 
times, pan-Islamism and shared sameness with other Muslims is espoused by 
Palestinians in Lebanon in order to achieve certain objectives.  As with pan-Arabism, 
pan-Islamism is often a key strategy implemented by the youth in the context of 
garnering support for the national „liberation‟ struggle.  For example, one female 
Palestinian youth from Rashidieh camp said this, 
 
Before I am Palestinian, I am Muslim and Arabic.  I don‟t say I am 
Palestinian.  Being Muslim is more important because Islam is international 
and there is no discrimination between Palestinians and others in Islam. 
 
In other words, for this youth, Muslim identity is more „stable‟ and more „inclusive‟ 
than Palestinian national identity, which can be taken away by „Others‟.  Moreover, 
pan-Islamic identity offers Palestinians strength in numbers.    
 
On the other hand, the take up and performance of Palestinian national identity 
sometimes takes precedence over the performance of Muslim identity for Palestinian 
youth.  For example, some Palestinian youth rebel against the lifestyle constraints 
they feel in relation to performing Muslim „scripts‟.  As one Palestinian male youth 
from Al Bas camp said,   
 
I am Palestinian more than Muslim because Islam makes me not free.  We are 
a prisoner to Islam.  
 
Another male youth from Burj A-Shemali camp concurred and added, 
 
I don‟t want to be a slave to the culture.  It‟s better to forget it.  I rebel against 
everything in this culture and I would prefer to live in a non-Arab (and 
therefore, non-Muslim) society. 
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Moreover, as discussed in the previous two chapters, (Chapter 5, Boundaries; Chapter 
6, Institutions), not all Palestinians are Muslim.  Like Muslim Palestinians, Christian 
Palestinians also negotiate their identities through the discourses of religion and 
nation in order to gain the most advantageous position in any situation.  As one 
Christian Palestinian woman from Al Bas camp said, 
 
It depends on the political situation whether we feel closer to Palestinian 
Muslims or Lebanese Christians.  We experience the same level of 
discrimination as Palestinian Muslims, but we can‟t work in UNRWA because 
we aren‟t Muslim.   
 
Generation is also a significant variable in the interaction of the discourses of religion 
and nation in the construction of Palestinian identities.  Although all Palestinians 
strategically negotiate religion and nation in the construction of their identities, there 
is often a generation gap in how these identities are taken up and performed.  For 
example, many older Palestinians remember Palestine as the land of their youth and 
largely hold on to the nation and their „Palestinian-ness‟ as their primary 
identification.  As one older Palestinian Christian man from Al Bas camp explained,  
 
Being Palestinian is everything to me.  I want to go back because we were 
happy there.  We had our own freedom. 
 
On the other hand, his teenage grandson who was born in Lebanon expressed a 
contrasting view,  
 
Palestine doesn‟t mean anything for me.  Muslims follow what their families 
say.  But we say for what?  We have never been there before.  We live in 
Lebanon and this is our country.  I am Christian first. 
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These comments indicate the different and complex ways in which generations of 
Palestinians negotiate their identities in the context of exile.  While older Palestinians 
often long to „return back‟ to their „homeland‟, many younger Palestinians seek to 
strategically negotiate their identities to gain the most advantageous position available 
to them in Lebanon.  This is particularly the case for young Palestinian Shi‟ites, 
Christians and secularists who do not feel current Sunni Islamist „imaginings‟ of 
Palestine are inclusive of them.  
 
The sections above have discussed the complex ways in which the discourses of 
ethnicity and religion have intersected with nation to produce new Palestinian 
identities in the context of exile in Lebanon.  They have also explored how 
Palestinian youth strategically negotiate these identities across and through these 
discourses in Palestinian society.  In the next section, I will examine how these „new 
identities‟ are further complicated through the cross-cutting discourse of gender.      
 
7.3  Gender   
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (Literature Review), gender does not produce categories of 
people in uniform ways.  Rather it mediates the performance of other discourses, such 
as ethnicity, religion and nation.  In the Palestinian context, gender intersects with 
other discourses in Palestinian society to construct new notions of „Palestinian-ness‟.       
  
Within the momentous ideological shifts that have occurred in Palestinian society 
over the past 60 years (see sections above), there have been significant changes in the 
construction of Palestinian „femininities‟ and „masculinities‟ and in the performance 
of gender relations.  The shifts in gender construction and performance have perhaps 
been the most considerable during the recent shift in Palestinian political discourse 
from Marxist secularism to political Islam.  The ways in which „femininities‟ in 
Palestinian society have been transformed in relation to this discursive shift will be 
discussed below.   
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Palestinian „femininities‟  
Since Al Nakba took place in 1948, Palestinian women have participated in the 
Palestinian nationalist struggle in a multitude of ways.  Although Palestinian 
women‟s activism was originally limited to the traditionally „female‟ realm of relief 
and charitable work, this shifted in the late 1960‟s and early 1970‟s after the signing 
of the Cairo Agreement and the relocation of the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) to Beirut (see Chapter 2, Context).  During this historical period, the „feminine 
ideal‟ of a Palestinian patriot became constituted and regulated through Marxist 
nationalist discourse.  This meant that the traditional division between the male-
dominated „public sphere‟ and the female-dominated „private sphere‟ was being 
contested.  Moreover, there was a loosening of restrictions placed on female‟s 
movements and contact with men outside their families, as well as a permissible 
removal of the hijab in public space (Richter-Devroe, 2005).  As one middle aged 
Palestinian man from Al Mashuq gathering reminisced,   
When I was younger, some women joined as comrads in the armed struggle 
like Leila Khalid (leader of a hijacking operation for the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine - PFLP) and participated actively in demonstrations.  
Most of those women did not wear the hijab.  Also Hanan Ashrawi 
(Palestinian Christian activist and scholar) was one of the main negotiators for 
the Palestinian people.    
However, despite appearances of Palestinian women being equal partners in the 
nationalist struggle, Marxist nationalist discourse did not necessarily hold female 
empowerment as an objective, and militant activism was not used to fight against 
female oppression in patriarchal society or in fundamentalist organizations.  Rather, 
military operations were used strictly as a political communications strategy to 
publicize the plight of the Palestinian people to an international audience.  As such, 
female combatants during this period were “neither feminists, nor religious fanatics 
but, at best, nationalists” (Richter-Devroe, 2005, p.26).   
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Working from within a different ideological perspective, Islamists initially struggled 
to reconcile Islam‟s prescribed gender roles, and the essentialist view that women are 
inherently „more peaceful‟ than men, with the perceived requirements of the 
nationalist struggle.  In Islamic discourse, a Palestinian woman‟s identity derives 
from her traditional „role‟ as „mother‟ who bears and raises the „nation‟s children‟ 
and offers them in „sacrifice‟ for the nationalist cause.  As Article Eighteen of the 
1988 Hamas Covenant states:  
Woman in the home of the fighting family, whether she is a mother or a sister, 
plays the most important role in looking after the family, rearing the children 
and instilling them with moral values and thoughts derived from Islam. She 
has to teach them to perform the religious duties in preparation for the role of 
fighting awaiting them. That is why it is necessary to pay great attention to 
schools and the curriculum followed in educating Muslim girls, so that they 
would grow up to be good mothers, aware of their role in the battle of 
liberation.  She has to be of sufficient knowledge and understanding where the 
performance of housekeeping matters are concerned, because economy and 
avoidance of waste of the family budget, is one of the requirements for the 
ability to continue moving forward in the difficult conditions surrounding us. 
She should put before her eyes the fact that the money available to her is just 
like blood which should never flow except through the veins so that both 
children and grown-ups could continue to live. 
 
As aggression, brutality and violence are incompatible with „femininity‟ in Islamist 
discourse, Islamists initially either ignored women‟s participation in combat for the 
„resistance‟ or publicly condemned it.  For example, Sheikh Ahmed Yassine (co-
founder of Hamas) stressed that, 
 
 The woman is the second defence line in resistance to the Occupation.  She 
shelters the fugitive, loses the son, husband and brother, bears the 
consequences of this and faces starvation and blockade (Hasso, 2005).   
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It was only after women‟s widespread protests and demonstrations that leaders of 
Islamic organizations (mostly in the Occupied Territories) were reluctantly convinced 
to send out female combatants, some in their teens, justifying them through the 
pragmatic logic that females are less likely to be suspected of political violence and 
can, therefore, reach highly secured locations more easily (Richter-Devroe, 2005).   
 
Today, as part of the „Islamicization‟ of Palestinian society, constructions of 
„femininity‟ have become more Islamic in the camps in Lebanon.  Moreover, this has 
involved girls and women performing Islamic „scripts‟, as discussed above, in order 
to show that they are „good Palestinian patriots‟.  As one female Palestinian youth 
from Al Bas camp explained,  
 
I show I am a good Palestinian by becoming more Muslim.   
 
For many Palestinian females, the take up of Islamic subject positions has been 
voluntary.  In some cases, this is because Islam provides them with comfort and 
clarity in an often ambiguous and ambivalent world.  Through Islam, Palestinian girls 
and women are offered a guiding purpose, explicit rules for living, a framework for 
understanding the world and a social network of „sisters‟ who share the same values 
(Lewis, 2005) (see Chapter 3, Literature Review).  This is very appealing for many 
Palestinian girls and women who live their lives in the context of chronic conflict, 
poverty, marginalization and uncertainty in the camps in Lebanon.  Moreover, some 
Palestinian females feel empowered through Islamic discourse.  As one Palestinian 
girl in Burj A-Shemali camp told me, “Islam is good.  In Islam, I take my rights.” 
 
Although many Palestinian females in Lebanon have a genuine belief in Islam, for 
some girls and women, the performance of Islam is a strategic way to successfully 
negotiate their positions in an „Islamicized‟ society.  For example, for many 
Palestinian girls in the camps, wearing the hijab is a „bargain with patriarchy‟ which 
allows them to move freely in public spaces and remain hidden from the „male gaze‟ 
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(Kandiyoti, 1998) (see Chapter 3, Literature Review).  On the other hand, girls who 
don‟t wear the hijab often become the focus of gossip and social exclusion.  As one 
female youth from Burj A-Shemali camp explained, 
 
A girl, especially a girl who don‟t wear hijab, she will get a bad reputation if 
she pass on the same street too many times.  If girls go out at night, people 
will talk about them.  Parents will ask society about the girl and if she has a 
bad reputation based on her behaviour she will not be able to marry. 
 
Performing Islam by wearing the hijab also serves to symbolically „purify‟ the 
women who wear it in the eyes of society.  Consequently, Palestinian women often 
take up the hijab to „wipe the moral slate clean‟ upon marriage or after divorce.  As I 
mentioned in Chapter 4 (Methodology), one Palestinian girl shared with me how she 
took up the hijab after experiencing a sexual assault.  For this young woman, wearing 
the hijab symbolically removed the „stain‟ of her sexual violation and worked to 
symbolically „restore‟ her prized virginity.   
 
In the context of the „Islamicization‟ of Palestinian society, the occurrence of young 
women performing Islam and taking up the hijab is increasing.  In fact, many 
Palestinian girls are choosing to take up the hijab even when their mothers do not 
wear it.  This indicates a generational shift in the performance of Palestinian 
„femininity‟.  As a Palestinian female teacher from Burj A-Shemali camp explained, 
 
Some women like to cover (wear the hijab).  There are girls wearing hijabs or 
chadours (long black robes) while their mothers are not doing so.  Maybe this 
is because of association with Islamic movements or because of pressure from 
society.   
 
For many Palestinian females, performing Islam and wearing the hijab is also part of 
a larger search for an „authentic‟ identity „uncontaminated‟ by Westernization or 
modernity.  For example, when asked how she showed that she was a „good 
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Palestinian‟, one Palestinian girl from Rashidieh camp said, “By keeping our 
traditions, our clothes and the hijab.”   
 
In the context of Western hegemony, Islamic feminism has proved to be strategic for 
many Palestinian females, as it does not alienate the majority of society like Western-
style feminism (Afshar, 1989) (see Chapter 3, Literature Review).  As one female 
youth from Burj A-Shemali camp stated, 
 
Palestinian women are different from ajnabi (foreign) women.  We stay with 
our family and everyone eat together.  We are close to religion.  In the case of 
the ajnabi woman, she go to the disco and she live alone when she is 18. 
 
However, the relationship between the discourses of religion, gender and nation in the 
Palestinian context is a complex one.  As the historical example at the beginning of 
this section clearly illustrates, there are often tensions between being „a good female 
Muslim‟ and being „a good Palestinian patriot‟.  Thus, although Palestinian girls in 
the camps revealed through PLA activities that they still revere Palestinian female 
militant activists and shaheedas (female martyrs), such as Leila Khaled and Dalal 
Maghrebi, as „role models‟ of „good Palestinian women‟, Islamist discourse currently 
dictates that Palestinian females are to support „the resistance‟ from within the 
„private sphere‟.  As one female Muslim Palestinian youth from Rashidieh camp 
explained, 
 
Men and women sacrifice in different ways.  For example, men sacrifice, and 
mothers sacrifice her son to be a martyr.  She will suffer a lot.  According to 
men, they sacrifice directly their lives.  A good Palestinian woman has 
children for Palestine.   
 
This comment demonstrates how Palestinian female identities in Lebanon have been 
constructed and regulated through the „shifting sands‟ of political discourse.  Political 
discourse, in turn, has been constructed in response to pragmatics vis-à-vis the 
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nationalist project.  For example, when women‟s active participation in the nationalist 
„liberation‟ movement has been needed, cultural restrictions on women‟s movements 
and behaviour have been relaxed.  On the other hand, once women‟s active 
participation has been perceived to be no longer needed, women have once again 
been relegated to the „private sphere‟.  This illustrates how „culture‟, as a social 
construct, is highly unstable.   
 
This example also illustrates how the discourses of womanhood and nationalism have 
often interacted in such a way that the personal goals and aspirations of Palestinian 
females have been subordinated and deferred until the „greater cause‟ of national 
„liberation‟ has been achieved.  As one Palestinian woman explained, 
 
Because of the Palestinian cause and national struggle now, the Palestinian 
woman should put on hold the feminist agenda and equality between males 
and females until Palestine is free.     
In this way, the intersection between ethnicity, religion, gender and nation has often 
burdened Palestinian young women in Lebanon with the choice between enjoying the 
full benefits of group membership as Palestinians or Muslims or achieving personal 
fulfilment.  
 
Palestinian „masculinities‟  
In addition to the construction of new Palestinian „femininities‟, the significant 
ideological shifts that have occurred in Palestinian society over the past 60 years have 
also resulted in the construction and performance of new Palestinian „masculinities‟.  
As Julie Peteet (2006) argues, „Arab masculinity‟ is,  
 
…acquired, verified and played out in the brave deed, in risk-taking, and in 
expressions of fearlessness and assertiveness.  It is attained by constant 
vigilance and willingness to defend honour (sharaf), face (wajh), kin and 
202 
 
community from external aggression and to uphold and protect cultural 
definitions of gender-specific propriety (p. 107).   
 
In other words, the defining characteristic of „Arab masculinity‟ is its oppositional 
status relative to „Arab femininity‟.  Therefore, tremendous emphasis is placed on 
preserving difference between men and women in Palestinian society.  This involves 
maintaining a strict separation between the „public sphere‟, where men are 
responsible for earning the household income and protecting the family, and the 
„private sphere‟, where women are charged with maintaining the household, bearing 
and raising the children and protecting the family‟s „honour‟ (Conway-Long, 2004).  
Moreover, this difference between males and females has been internalized by 
Palestinian youth.  For example, when asked to explain the „responsibilities‟ of males 
and female in the Palestinian home, one female Palestinian youth from Al Bas camp 
said, 
 
Females should take care of their husband and family.  If women don‟t do it, 
who will?  In the case of the man, he is the worker and he is responsible for 
the family. 
   
However, in the Palestinian context, men‟s ability to be „men‟ and to be appropriately 
gendered as „masculine‟ has been seriously undermined by the social, economic and 
political upheavals that have occurred in Lebanon over the last sixty years.  First, 
Palestinian males suffered the indignity of becoming refugees in Lebanon in 1948 
following the creation of the State of Israel, and again in 1967 following the 
Arab/Israeli Six-Day War.  Then in 1982, the PLO was forced to retreat from 
Lebanon when the „Israeli Defense Forces‟ (IDF) captured Beirut (see Chapter 2, 
Context).  All of these events have worked to disempower Palestinian men.  As one 
Palestinian man from Al Mashuq gathering explained,  
 
When the PLO was in the camps, they financed Education and paid 
maintenance for clinics and hospitals.  Palestinians had opportunities to study 
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in the Soviet Bloc.  When the PLO left Lebanon, Palestinian power and work 
opportunities became less because Palestinian influence became less in 
Lebanon.  Palestinians lost a say in issues that affect them, and they became 
more dependent on Lebanese businesses for work and Lebanese political 
parties to consider their rights.  Palestinian influence in Lebanese politics 
became nil.  This affects the younger generation.  Now Palestinian young 
people are looked at as „thieves‟.  This wouldn‟t have happened before.  
Fighting for Palestine gave men meaning and a sense of purpose.  Now they 
are doing nothing but suffering in silence.   
 
In other words, the historical events of the past 60 years have meant that Palestinian 
men have lost their ability to protect and provide for their families, and they have 
become dependent on the „charity‟ of the Lebanese government and UNRWA.  In this 
way, Palestinian men have become symbolically „emasculated‟ in the eyes of their 
wives and children.  As one female Palestinian youth from Rashidieh camp put it, 
 
I feel men have no chance to find work or to study.  He always search to find 
work, and when he found work, he found small salaries.  It is the job of men 
to find work.  But many Palestinians stay at home without work and no human 
rights.  Seventy five jobs are gone for Palestinian men (according to Lebanese 
law).   
 
Consequently, the last refuge for Palestinian men, whose „impotence‟ has been forced 
upon them through socio-economic and geo-political processes, has been an adoption 
of „hyper-masculine‟ subject positions and body postures and a return to „traditional‟ 
patriarchal control within the family.  As mentioned above, the gender division of 
labour within the home has been re-emphasized in the recall of traditional 
masculinities.  Interestingly, these gender „roles‟ have been constructed as „religious 
duties‟ in Palestinian society.  As one male youth from Burj A-Shemali camp said,  
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It is part of the Islamic religion, men have control over women.  Respecting 
your husband is part of Islam. 
 
The adoption of „hyper-masculinity‟ by Palestinian males has, arguably, led to and 
resulted from an increased male attraction to and participation in Islamic discourse, 
which clearly delineates and hegemonically organizes male and female „roles‟ in 
contrast to one another.  Moreover, the taking up of Islamic subject positions has 
given men religiously sanctioned authority over women‟s bodies and behaviour.  This 
has resulted in increased pressure on women to conform to standards of womanhood 
within Islamic discourse and to take on their „roles‟ as „gatekeepers‟ of culture and 
traditional values within the society (see Chapter 3, Literature Review).  As one 
young Palestinian Muslim woman from Rashidieh camp explained, 
 
Palestinian women all the time stay in the house.  Her major work is to raise 
children and take care for her parents.  Also women are emotional.  Because 
of the control of her husband and society she always feel psychologically sick.  
And her life is top secret.  She don‟t tell what she feels.  She don‟t show what 
she feels. 
 
As the „Islamicization‟ of Palestinian society is relatively new, this has also worked to 
construct a generation gap between Palestinian youth and their parents in terms of the 
performance of religious „scripts‟.  Interestingly, Palestinian young people are often 
more devout and more strict in their performance of their Islamic religious „duties‟ 
than their parents.  Again, this is often played out through increased control over 
female bodies and behaviour.  As one male youth from Burj A-Shemali camp told 
me, 
 
   I am stricter with my sisters than my parents because we are Muslims. 
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On the other hand, the „Islamicization‟ of Palestinian society has also worked to 
produce contestations among the youth, as discussed earlier in Chapter 5 
(Boundaries) and Chapter 6 (Institutions). 
 
The previous sections have looked at how Palestinian identities are constantly in the 
process of transformation through the intersecting discourses of ethnicity, religion 
and gender (Brah, 1996).  Moreover, Palestinian youth are strategically negotiating 
these identities to gain the most advantageous positions available to them in any 
situation.   
 
However, as Palestinians in Lebanon are living in exile in the context of 
globalization, there is a need to discuss how Palestinian identities are constantly 
transforming in relation to shifting discourses of space and „home‟.  In the next 
section, I will examine how the processes of international labour migration and 
urbanization are working to construct new identities in Palestinian society in 
Lebanon.   
 
7.4  Home  
 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 3 (Literature Review), Palestinians‟ statelessness 
means that they are connected to and positioned in relation to more than one country.  
Therefore, Palestinians must constantly negotiate notions of „here‟ and „there‟, 
„detachment/attachment‟ and „home‟ and „away‟ (Ahmed, 1992).    
 
Although Palestinians in Lebanon already live in a state of exile, in the context of 
globalization, Palestinian lives are further destabilized through the processes of 
international labour migration.  As mentioned in Chapter 2 (Context), as refugees, 
Palestinians are legally barred from working in more than 70 professions in Lebanon.  
As one Palestinian Christian man from the Lebanese city of Tyre explained, 
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We work hard, but our salaries are obviously less than Lebanese, and our 
children will not advance if they are educated.  It is forbidden to be a 
lawyer, for example.  I have a law degree, but I couldn‟t practice because I 
am a Palestinian.  Therefore, I became a teacher with UNRWA.  But how 
many Palestinians can get jobs with UNRWA?   
 
Due to the lack of employment opportunities for Palestinians in Lebanon, Palestinians 
must often seek legal or illegal employment in foreign countries, particularly the Gulf 
States, Europe and North America in order to make ends meet (Suleiman, 2006).  As 
the Palestinian man quoted above went on to elaborate, 
 
If you open the doors to Canada, the US and Europe, most Palestinian men 
will go.   
 
Moreover, in the Palestinian context, the process of international labour migration is 
gendered.  In order to perform their gendered roles as economic providers for the 
family, many Palestinian men find that they have no other option than to travel 
abroad to find work.  At least initially, they often do this without their wives and 
children.  On the other hand, Palestinian females are culturally bound by the „honour 
and shame‟ paradigm through which the „honour‟ of a family is preserved through the 
„purity‟ of its‟ women folk (see Chapter 5, Boundaries).  Consequently, most 
Palestinian females are not culturally permitted to travel abroad alone or without male 
accompaniment.    
 
As foreign remittances are one of the key sources of income for Palestinian refugees 
in the camps (Ugland, 2003), international labour migration is perceived by many 
Palestinian males to be a panacea for all their economic woes.  As there are only 
limited opportunities for Palestinian males to perform their gendered „roles‟ as 
„breadwinners‟ in the camps, many youth focus all their attention on getting out of 
Lebanon.  In this way, the discourse of migration often shapes the future goals and 
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aspirations of Palestinian male youth.  One male Palestinian youth from Al Bas camp 
explained it this way, 
 
I love where I was born, but life in Lebanon is very difficult, so maybe I will 
travel to Europe because life is easier and I will find people who respect 
Palestinians, especially Germany. 
 
Another male youth from the same camp added, 
 
I want to go to London to take my rights.  Maybe I can achieve my dream in 
Europe, but not in Lebanon. 
 
However, despite these dreams, the prospect of international labour migration is 
unachievable for most Palestinians due to financial constraints and a lack of 
internationally recognized travel documents.  As Palestinian male youth are always 
dreaming of being elsewhere, they often do not pursue „excellence‟ in their present 
activities in the camp.  As one Palestinian teacher from Al Mashuq gathering 
explained,   
 
Palestinian youth use the „immigration dream‟ to run away from reality and 
from doing things to improve their lives.  It is a problem for teachers to keep 
students concentrating and in school.  The students use the lack of job 
opportunities for educated Palestinians to excuse their carelessness.  When 
confronted with what other alternatives they have, they pull „immigration‟ 
from their pocket, although immigration, itself, is not viable for Palestinians, 
in general, and for the uneducated, in particular. 
 
For those Palestinians „fortunate‟ enough to be able to work abroad, identities are 
often dramatically shaped and transformed.  As discussed in Chapter 3 (Literature 
Review), when individuals migrate abroad, their local identities and concepts of 
„home‟ often become de-centered and destabilized, and new diaspora „hybrid‟ 
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identities are produced (Bhaba, 1990).  However, the „hybrid‟ identities that are 
produced through international migration often result in tension and conflict in and 
between individuals and communities.  For some Palestinians, particularly Islamists, 
there is a perception that the forces of globalisation are invading and inappropriately 
transforming Palestinian cultural heritage and identity.  This has sometimes resulted 
in a reactionary attempt to „recover‟ and „preserve‟ an „authentic‟ past 
„uncontaminated‟ by the West and to navigate the fractures in national identity caused 
by migration through Islam.  For example, one Palestinian man from Al Mashuq 
gathering said, 
 
My uncle and my cousin went to Germany as refugees.  Although they were 
more secular in Lebanon, now they are more religious in Germany.  They 
work hard to preserve their Islamic identity.    
 
This comment is interesting, as it reveals an attempt to „preserve‟ „authenticity‟ 
within the context of diaspora.  However, as was discussed in the Literature Review 
(Chapter 3), attempts to strengthen and reaffirm national and local identities by 
„returning back‟ to an „authentic‟ past are fundamentally flawed.  As new migrant 
„hybrid‟ identities are not located in any one „home‟, they cannot simply be traced 
back to one source.  In this sense, it is impossible to „return back‟ to „Palestine‟ (or 
Lebanon, for that matter), as for migrants, it no longer exists.   
 
Not only does international labour migration affect those Palestinians who have 
relocated abroad, it also impacts family members who have been left behind.  
Because Palestinian women often remain behind to take care of the children and older 
relatives, they become defacto households heads during the absence of their 
husbands.  However, as emancipatory as this may sound, in reality, Palestinian 
women often find themselves under the control of another male relative, such as a 
brother or even an eldest son. This is to comply with the „honour and shame 
paradigm‟ discussed earlier.  As husbands are not physically present to ensure the 
preservation of the family‟s „honour‟, Palestinian girls and women often experience 
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more pressure to regulate their movements, bodies and behaviours than ever before.  
In this sense, male labour migration subjects Palestinian females to even more public 
surveillance and control.  One young Palestinian woman from Al Mashuq gathering, 
whose father is an economic migrant in Nigeria, explained it this way, 
 
My father is more open than my mother.  When my father is around, I am 
more free.  I think my mother feels she has to be strict with us girls because 
my father is not here to protect us.   
 
In other words, international labour migration often serves to enhance existing 
patriarchal control and inequality between men and women in Palestinian society.   
 
The process of migration is often indefinite, and many Palestinian men do not return 
to the camps or even go back to Lebanon.  Rather, they remain abroad and take 
„foreign‟ brides.  As Palestinian women are culturally confined to marrying from 
within their own community, many women are „left on the shelf‟ and are not able to 
perform their socially defined „roles‟ as wives and mothers.  Moreover, the increased 
likelihood of intermarriage with „Others‟ among migrants also has implications for 
the construction of Palestinian identity.  As „Palestinian-ness‟ is largely perceived to 
be „transmitted‟ through continuous blood lines with someone who originated in the 
land of Palestine (see Chapter 5, Boundaries), international marriage results in „blood 
contamination‟ and, therefore, a weakening of „Palestinian-ness‟.  As one male 
Palestinian youth from Rashidieh camp put it, 
 
(Palestinian) identity is growing weaker with each generation. People are 
becoming hopeless.  The US will never agree to let the refugees go home.  
People are marrying from abroad and we are becoming diluted.  
 
International labour migration also has implications for how „home‟ is constructed by 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.  When Palestinian men go abroad for work, they 
regularly send remittances back to family members in Lebanon.  The families who 
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regularly receive income from abroad are more likely to advance economically in 
relation to their neighbours in the camps.  This means that these families are often 
able to move out of the camps and into Lebanese cities.  In other words, labour 
migration creates new urban and class identities in Palestinian society, which further 
complicates Palestinians‟ relationship to space and place.  The impact of urbanization 
is perhaps the most profound on Palestinian young people.  By attending Lebanese 
schools and interacting with Lebanese peers, affected Palestinian youth become more 
integrated into Lebanese society.  As one male youth from Al Bas camp explained,  
 
I live outside the camp, and I study in Lebanese school, so my life is more 
similar to Lebanese men than Palestinian men.   
 
Moreover, urbanisation affects the way notions of „Palestinian-ness‟ are constructed 
and performed in Palestinian society.  For example, on meeting a fellow Palestinian 
young woman who had grown up in the Lebanese city of Tyre, one Palestinian female 
youth from Rashidieh camp responded, “Is she Palestinian?  She is not like us.”  This 
comment reveals how the processes of international labour migration and 
urbanisation have helped to create a new transnational „urban elite‟ Palestinian 
identity, which is based on socio-economic class rather than ethnicity or religion.  In 
this way, Palestinian young people who grow up in Lebanese cities often find that 
they have little in common with other Palestinians from the camps and rather more in 
common with Lebanese from a certain income bracket.  Moreover, as young 
Palestinians are increasingly being raised in Lebanese cities, the „authenticity‟ of 
these youths‟ „Palestinian-ness‟ is being put into question by the Palestinians who 
remain in the camps.  
 
7.5  Overview 
 
This discussion has highlighted how constructions of „Palestinian-ness‟ have shifted 
over time through changing discourses of ethnicity, religion, gender and „home‟ in 
Palestinian society.  I have argued that a „homogenized‟ and „fixed‟ Palestinian 
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identity does not exist.  Rather, multiple Palestinian identities have been constructed, 
shaped and transformed over time through these shifting discourses.  Moreover, the 
boundaries of these identities are permeable and fluid and enable an individual to slip 
and slide between identity positions to gain positions of advantage in any given 
context.  However, the creation of new „hybrid‟ identities has often led to resistance 
and attempts to „return back‟ to an „authentic‟ past.  This has served to contain the 
subject positions that Palestinian youth can take up and has worked to shape and limit 
their goals and aspirations for the future.  
 
In the last chapter, I discuss the conclusions of this study and offer suggestions for 
further research.   
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
 
 
In this final chapter, I present an overview of the research and summarize the key 
findings of the study.  Next, I discuss how the study makes important empirical, 
theoretical and methodological contributions to knowledge.  I, then, suggest 
implications of the study at the levels of the personal, the contextual and the 
theoretical.  Finally, I offer suggestions for further research with Palestinian youth in 
different geo-political, temporal and methodological contexts and with different 
demographic populations. 
 
8.1  Research Overview   
 
This has been a qualitative, interpretivist case study exploring how Palestinian youth 
construct their identities in refugee camps and gatherings in south Lebanon.  Locating 
myself within a constructivist theoretical framework of identity production and 
regulation, I used data gleaned from fieldwork in three refugee camps and two 
Palestinian gatherings in south Lebanon to examine the ways in which Palestinian 
youth construct, perform and contest their identities in the context of exile and 
statelessness.  Specifically, my explorations were framed according to 3 research 
questions:  1) How do Palestinian youth in south Lebanese refugee camps and 
gatherings understand and perform their identities vis-à-vis nationality, gender and 
religion?  2) How are the discursive resources of identity appropriated and articulated 
in everyday life within the camps?, and 3) How have Palestinian identities in Lebanon 
shifted across exilic generations?   
 
Given my interpretivist theoretical perspective, the research methods employed in this 
study consisted of semi-structured interviews, focus groups and Participatory 
Learning and Action (PLA) approaches.  This enabled me to capture and reconstruct 
the subjective meanings placed on social life by Palestinian youth in Lebanon (see 
Methodology, Chapter 4).  Moreover, in light of the vulnerability of Palestinians as a 
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stateless refugee population situated within the larger context of Western imperialism 
and colonialism in the Middle East, I used post-structuralist, post-colonial and 
feminist theory to interrogate the data (see Literature Review, Chapter 3).   
 
In the next section, I present the key findings of this study. 
 
8.2  Findings   
 
My explorations, framed through the three research questions outlined above, resulted 
in the following discoveries: 
 
Research question 1 
 
How do Palestinian youth (male and female) in south Lebanese refugee camps 
understand and perform their identities vis-à-vis nationality, gender and religion? 
 
Within the context of statelessness, Palestinian youth in south Lebanese refugee 
camps understand and perform their identities vis-à-vis nationality, gender and 
religion through narratives of difference and the erection of boundaries within and 
between communities (see Chapter 5, Boundaries).  Moreover, these boundaries are 
continually being repositioned, which means that identities are always in the process 
of „becoming‟ (see Research Question 3, below). 
 
As was discussed previously (see Literature Review, Chapter 3), identity is relational 
and relies for its existence on something outside itself, namely, something which it is 
not.  For example, to be Palestinian is to be not Israeli or not Lebanese.  Identity is, 
thus, marked by difference.  Therefore, in order to mark difference between 
communities, boundaries are erected both to unify and to exclude, to demarcate 
between „insiders‟ and „outsiders‟ and to preserve the „purity‟ of „imagined‟ 
communities.   
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Within the refugee camps in south Lebanon, difference between communities is 
socially marked through the construction and regulation of physical, symbolic and 
structural boundaries in Palestinian society.  At times, boundaries, such as camp 
perimeters and discourses of „citizenship‟, are used by the Lebanese government to 
construct difference between Palestinians and Lebanese.  At other times, Palestinians 
themselves construct boundaries of difference between „their‟ community and 
„Others‟ through discourses and cultures of „Palestinian-ness‟, such as shared history, 
kinship, culture and religion.  Finally, Palestinians themselves often contest these 
discourses and erect boundaries within their community to construct internal „Others‟.  
For example, the hegemonic positioning of Sunni Islam as an identity marker of 
„Palestinian-ness‟ simultaneously constructs Shi‟ites, Christians and secularists as 
„Others‟.   
 
This chapter argues that although boundaries work to construct specifically 
„Palestinian‟ identities, the construction of these boundaries between groups is 
ultimately problematic.  On one hand, the assertion of difference attempts to erase 
similarities between groups, such as between Palestinians and Lebanese.  For 
example, in Palestinian narrative, all Lebanese are constructed as „Other‟ under the 
umbrella of national identity.  However, this negates the numerous cultural 
similarities that Palestinians and Lebanese share as the product of shared history and 
lived experience in south Lebanon.  On the other hand, Palestinian identities are not 
unified, and there are contradictions within them which have to be negotiated.  For 
instance, Palestinian nationalism requires that individuals of diverse faiths unite under 
a common political platform in the interests of national unity.  However, individual 
Palestinians often share more in common, on a personal level, with non-Palestinians 
who are adherents of the same religious sect.  Similarly, internal differences of gender 
and generation work to destabilise the notion of a single Palestinian identity. 
 
Research question 2 
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How are the discursive resources of identity appropriated and articulated in everyday 
life within the camps? 
 
In the absence of a Palestinian state and its institutions, and Palestinians‟ continued 
status in Lebanon as stateless refugees, the discursive resources of Palestinian identity 
are appropriated and articulated in everyday life through formal and non-formal 
institutions within the camps (see Chapter 6, Institutions). 
 
As was discussed in the Literature Review (Chapter 3), national identity is not an 
innate „fact‟.  Rather, in order to create a unified and collective national identity, 
myths are constructed of an „authentic‟, shared culture which is marked out by 
symbols.  These symbols are then performed by individuals through language, ritual 
and embodiment.  Since there are no inherent qualities in any symbol that link it 
emotionally or cognitively to the nation, this linkage has to be learnt, and institutions, 
both formal and non-formal, play an important role in the production and 
reproduction of these symbolic systems.   
 
For Palestinian youth in Lebanon, institutions such as the school, the family, political 
organizations, the media and religious institutions all function as important sites of 
identity production and performance.  It is through these institutions that nationalist 
symbols play off one another „intertextually‟ (Hall, 1996).  Moreover, it is through 
these institutions that the nation produces and reproduces itself through everyday 
practices (Billig, 1995).  Because institutions define what is „normal‟, they are 
inscribed in relations of power.  Therefore, the shared knowledge of „Palestinian-
ness‟ that is socially produced in and through these institutional sites is legitimated 
and made to appear „factual‟, „stable‟, „neutral‟ and „natural‟ through culture 
(Foucault, 1977).  In this way, Palestinian youth come to accept dominant discourses 
of „Palestinian-ness‟ as „truth‟.   
 
This chapter argues that although institutional processes and practices produce shared 
notions of „Palestinian-ness‟, these same processes also work to produce contestations 
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and construct internal „Others‟.  This is because there are vast challenges and 
complexities entailed in the process of trying to represent the diversity of the 
Palestinian experience through a single, hegemonic identity.  Rather, symbols that are 
rooted in a cultural past are often divisive rather than unifying because different 
ethnic, religious and political groups have constructed different Palestinian histories.  
For example, the Muslim take up of Al Aqsa mosque as a symbol of Palestine is not 
taken up by Christians or secularists.  Moreover, political symbols, such as the kofiya 
(black and white checked headscarf), are not taken up by Palestinians outside the 
Fatah (PLO) political organisation.  In other words, the concept of „authenticity‟ is 
highly problematic in the Palestinian context, and it challenges the very essence of 
Palestinian nationalist „imagining‟.   
 
Research question 3 
 
How have Palestinian identities in Lebanon shifted across exilic generations?  
 
As Palestinians have lived in exile for more than 60 years, Palestinian identities in 
Lebanon have continued to transform across exilic generations through the strategic 
negotiation of shifting discourses in Palestinian society (see Chapter 7, New 
Identities).   
 
As discussed in the Literature Review (Chapter 3), identity is not an already 
accomplished „fact‟.  Rather, all identities are constructed and performed within 
specific spatial and temporal contexts.  Therefore, when economic, social or political 
conditions change over time, identities become contested, and new „hybrid‟ subject 
positions emerge (Bhaba, 1990).  In this way, identities are unstable positions that are 
always in the process of shifting, transforming and „becoming‟ in relation to changing 
life conditions (Hall, 1996).     
 
In the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, multiple new Palestinian identities have been 
constructed through ideological shifts in Palestinian society.  For example, through 
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shifts in ethnic discourses in Palestinian society, Palestinian identities have slid along 
a continuum ranging from pan-Arabism to Palestinian nationalism.  Similarly, 
through discourses of religion, Palestinian identities have slid along a continuum 
ranging from Palestinian nationalism to pan-Islamism.  Moreover, the discourse of 
gender has cut across all of these discourses to construct new Palestinian 
„masculinities‟ and „femininities‟ and new configurations of gender relations in 
Palestinian society.  In addition, shifting discourses of nation and „home‟ have 
worked to construct new Palestinian identities in relation to space and place through 
the processes of international labour migration and urbanization.  
 
This chapter argues that there is no single „homogenized‟ or „fixed‟ Palestinian 
identity.  Rather, as each version of the nation and „Palestinian-ness‟ has been 
„imagined‟, socially constructed and performed within a specific socio-economic and 
geo-political context, it has also been „re-imagined‟, reconstructed and performed 
differently when discursive and material conditions have changed over time.  As 
these shifting discourses in Palestinian society have continually repositioned 
Palestinians within the world and called upon them to interact with it in new ways, 
Palestinians have exercised agency and strategically taken up specific subject 
positions in specific contexts to gain positions of advantage.  In this way, Palestinian 
identities have continued to shift and transform through the processes of resistance, 
negotiation and accommodation.   
 
In the next section, I will discuss the important empirical, theoretical and 
methodological contributions this study makes to knowledge. 
 
8.3  Contribution to Knowledge 
 
Situated within the Western hegemonic discourse of „the war on terror‟, most recent 
research on Palestinian identity has been through the disciplinary perspectives of 
Political Science and International Relations with the aim of finding „solutions‟ to the 
problems of global security (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Debrix, 2005; Gregory, 2004; 
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Tilly, 2004).  Within this discourse, studies on Palestinians have tended to 
concentrate on the political situation(s), violent events and their aftermath.  On the 
other hand, the „before‟ of violence, the way that identities and „senses of belonging‟ 
are „naturalized‟ in the „banality‟ of everyday processes and practices, has rarely been 
addressed.   
 
The few studies that have focused on Palestinian children have examined the effects 
of war, displacement and trauma on young people and have been conducted from 
within the paradigms of psychology and psychiatry (Ahearn and Athey, 1991; 
Ahmad, 1992; El-Bedour et al., 1993; Rousseau et al., 1998; Young, 1992).  This 
research has generally been based on psychological or psychiatric measures derived 
from Western concepts of personhood and trauma (Abu Hein et al., 1993; Baker, 
1990; Punamaki and Suleiman, 1990; Qouta et al., 1995).  Moreover, these studies 
have tended to focus on individuals in isolation, rather than the lives of Palestinian 
children and youth in the context of the family group, the community and the wider 
social, economic and political arena.  In other words, these studies have neglected the 
strong community-centric focus central to the Palestinian cultural context (Chatty and 
Hundt, 2005).   
 
By contrast, this research study makes a strong contribution to knowledge by 
situating the study of Palestinian identity within a sociologically informed perspective 
on the educative processes of „becoming‟ and belonging.  By looking at the learning 
processes involved in young people creating a „sense of self‟ through both formal and 
non-formal education institutions in Palestinian society, this study addresses a crucial 
gap in the literature.  Moreover, this research is unique in that it examines the 
implications of identity on the choices made and the goals and aspirations set by 
Palestinian young people in Lebanon. 
 
In addition to approaching the study of Palestinian identity from a different 
disciplinary perspective, this study also differentiates itself from others in terms of its 
contextual focus.  By far, most academic research on Palestinian identity has focused 
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on Palestinians in the „Occupied Territories‟ (the West Bank and Gaza).  A few recent 
studies have been conducted on how Palestinian women negotiate their identities in 
refugee camps in Lebanon (Holt, 2006; Peteet, 1986; Sayigh, 2001).  However, few, 
if any, of these studies have focused on the perspectives of Palestinian youth, how 
they see the world and how they understand their place in it.  Moreover, most 
research with Palestinians in Lebanon has focused on refugee camps within the 
vicinity of the capital city of Beirut.  Thus, the stories of Palestinians in south 
Lebanon, which has been shaped by unique geopolitical circumstances, have rarely 
been heard.   
 
This study is also unique in its methodological framing and use of research methods.  
Most research on Palestinian identity has been conducted on a macro-level through 
the „gaze‟ of Western-based Political Science or Psychoanalytic theory.  However, 
this research study has taken a micro-level approach and been framed as an 
ethnographic case study.  Moreover, it has used interviews, focus groups and PLA 
approaches to privilege the personal perspectives and interpretations of Palestinian 
young people in south Lebanon.  In all of these ways, this study addresses key gaps in 
the literature and makes an important contribution to knowledge.     
 
The next section will discuss the important implications this study has at the levels of 
the personal, the contextual and the theoretical. 
 
8.4  Implications  
 
Implications at the level of the personal 
First of all, this study has important implications at the level of the personal.  This 
research has challenged my understandings of identity, my self-perceptions and my 
worldview of „Others‟. 
 
As I reflect back on the original questions that motivated me to undertake this study 
(what does it mean to be(come) Canadian?  How do diverse groups of people come to 
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feel Canadian?  What part do educators play in this process?), I am struck by the 
extent to which my thinking has developed in relation to issues of identity.  First, an 
implication of this study is that I am no longer looking to construct a „checklist‟ of 
characteristics that define Canadian identity, as I realize that in an actual sense, it 
does not exist.  Rather, Canada is an „imagined community‟, and difference between 
Canadians (myself) and „Others‟ has been politically and socially constructed and 
regulated through the erection and maintenance of physical, symbolic and structural 
boundaries between communities.  Moreover, these boundaries are fluid and 
frequently repositioned in relation to shifting political, social and economic priorities.  
An example of this is how requirements for Canadian immigration and citizenship are 
continually repositioned in relation to shifting perceptions of economic need and 
shifting notions of who constitutes a „suitable‟ Canadian citizen.  This is played out 
through the ever-shifting immigration point system, which determines which 
individuals are to be included in and which are to be excluded from the Canadian 
national „imagining‟.     
 
Another implication of this study is that my worldview has been challenged, as has 
my understanding of „Others‟.  Through this research, I have come to appreciate the 
complexity of identity.  For example, the findings of the study clearly show that there 
is no such thing as a „homogenous‟ or „fixed‟ Arab or Muslim identity.  Rather, each 
individual is a „bricolage‟ of multiple positionings in relation to nation, gender, 
ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, location of residence and sexuality, among 
others.  Moreover, these positionings are strategically performed by individuals in 
order to gain the most advantageous position in any situation.  In this way, identities 
are temporary attachments to shifting subject positions.  Therefore, an important 
implication of this study at the level of the personal is that I have learned that an 
essentialist Palestinian/Arab/Muslim identity and an „authentic‟ 
Palestinian/Arab/Muslim perspective, among others, do not exist.   
 
Implications for the Palestinian community in Lebanon 
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This study also has important implications at the level of the contextual.  Identity was 
at the very heart of the Lebanese Civil War and is central to the modern 
„Palestinian/Israeli conflict‟.  Therefore, this study is of extreme relevance to 
Palestinians in Lebanon and in the Middle East more generally.   
First of all, this study directly challenges the theoretical underpinnings which inform 
UNRWA‟s field operations in Lebanon and in other countries.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2 (Context), UNRWA is responsible for providing Palestinian refugees with 
social services.  In this capacity, UNRWA has established clear guidelines which 
dictate who is to be included in its operational definition of a „Palestinian refugee‟, 
and who is not.  Being officially recognized as Palestinian by UNRWA is extremely 
critical because it regulates individuals‟ access to resources and opportunities.  On the 
other hand, those not considered to be sufficiently Palestinian by UNRWA, such as 
refugees from the 1967 Six Day War, are not automatically entitled to receive 
humanitarian assistance and services from the agency.  This study directly challenges 
the essentialist way in which UNRWA has constructed Palestinian identities and 
excluded certain groups from the national „imagining‟.   
This study also directly challenges UNRWA‟s policymaking and practice.  Although 
this research has clearly shown that identities are multiple and fluid, UNRWA‟s 
policies and practices often „freeze‟ Palestinians into a monolithic whole.  For 
example, as discussed in Chapter 6 (Institutions), UNRWA‟s implicit theoretical 
assumptions about Palestinian identity are reflected in its Religious Education 
curriculum, where Palestinians are assumed to be homogenously and „eternally‟ 
Sunni Muslim, despite the presence of Shi‟ites, Christians and secularists in UNRWA 
schools.  This institutional practice of excluding religious minorities from equal 
representation and participation in Religious Education classes undermines their 
Palestinian „citizenship‟ and marginalizes their participation in the nationalist project.  
In this way, UNRWA‟s current policies and practices implicitly promote social 
exclusion, unequal development and social/material disadvantage for some groups in 
Palestinian society.   
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This study also challenges the theorizations of identity implicit in the 
Palestinian/Israeli „peace process‟.  Ignoring the complexity, diversity and transience 
of Palestinian subject positions, recent international negotiations have only included 
secularized, Sunni Muslim, male members of the Fatah political organization resident 
in the West Bank, such as Mahmoud Abbas, as „official spokespersons‟ for the 
Palestinian people.  In this way, Islamists, Palestinian Christians, Palestinian Shi‟ites, 
Palestinians exiled in diaspora, women and young people have been constructed as 
„Other‟, and their voices and perspectives have been effectively silenced through 
political processes.  As discussed in Chapter 5 (Boundaries), an example of this is 
how the proposed „two-state solution‟ to the Palestinian crisis envisioned by both 
Palestinian and international negotiators has failed to take into account that 
Palestinians resident in Lebanon share few, if any, cultural, economic, social and 
kinship ties with residents in the West Bank or Gaza (Ugland, 2003).  Moreover, 
many Palestinian youth in Lebanon conceive of Palestine specifically as the villages 
in Galilee from which their families were exiled in 1948 and have no desire to 
„return‟ to the „foreign‟ land of what is presently known as the „Occupied Territories‟ 
(West Bank and Gaza).  Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 6 (Institutions), many 
young Palestinians in Lebanon express more interest in being officially integrated 
into Lebanese society than „returned‟ to a land that they have no experience of and 
have never seen.  In this way, this study has important implications for the 
theorization of identity in relation to the envisioning and construction of a future 
Palestinian state and the issue of repatriation of Palestinian refugees.   
 
In addition, this study also challenges the ways in which Palestinians themselves are 
implicated in the construction of „fixed‟ and „essentialist‟ identities through 
institutions in Palestinian society.  As discussed in Chapter 7 (New Identities), 
practically speaking, all Palestinians are forced to choose both a political and a 
religious affiliation, and these attachments to identity positions are often constructed 
in essentialist terms and in opposition to one another.  For example, it is not possible 
to be both a Muslim and a Christian, or a supporter of both Fatah and Hamas. Rather, 
these identities have been constructed as „binary opposites‟ and „fixed‟ subject 
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positions, which are not open to negotiation.  This has often resulted in full-blown 
armed conflict in the camps both between and within communities.  Moreover, the 
construction of mutually exclusive identities has also promoted internal conflict 
within individuals.  For example, Palestinian women have often been confronted with 
conflicting loyalties and forced to choose between allegiances to political 
determination and self-actualization, political and social citizenship, and tradition and 
progress (Yuval-Davis, 1997).  In a similar way, Palestinian Christians have been 
forced to choose between allegiances to the „Christian West‟ or other Arab  Muslims, 
just as Muslims have been caught between the competing discourses of Palestinian 
nationalism and pan-Islamism, and fundamentalism and secularism.  In this way, the 
findings of this study challenge the rigidity and essentialism through which 
Palestinian identities have been imagined through institutions in Palestinian society.  
Moreover, the research challenges the ways these institutions limit the life choices, as 
well as the goals and aspirations of Palestinian young people.   
 
Implications for Education research, policy and practice 
This study also has broader implications at the level of the theoretical and for 
Education research, policy and practice. 
 
First of all, this study has important implications for the „knowledge‟ that is produced 
and reproduced in textbooks and classrooms of „Other‟ peoples, cultures and genders.  
As this study has clearly shown, identities are unstable positions that are neither 
purely individual nor collective.  Rather, the agency of social actors opens the way for 
indeterminacy and fragmentation in projects of identity-formation.  This 
problematizes the images often presented in textbooks and mediated though teachers 
of „congealed‟ and „essentialised‟ people groups and genders „frozen‟ in space and 
time.  In this way, this study has important implications for the construction of 
„knowledge‟ about „Other‟ peoples and how this „knowledge‟ is passed on to students 
through educational processes and practices.  Moreover, it also has implications for 
how people groups are represented in research more generally.     
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The findings of this study also challenge the mind/body binary prevalent in formal 
schooling and its emphasis on „disembodied‟ intellectual acquisition of „objective 
facts‟.  As this study highlights, emotions and passions are crucial in the everyday 
project of nation-building, in the construction and appropriation of discursive 
resources and in the recognition and take-up of specific subject positions.  As Benei 
argues, “emotionality is produced through, and feeds into, political, cultural, social, 
economic and gender negotiations of nationhood and citizenship” (Benei, 2008, p.5).  
This study has highlighted the ways in which learning is much more than an 
intellectual exercise.  Rather, it is an emotional, sensory and embodied process that is 
involved in the production and regulation of the nation, citizens and identities.  This 
has implications for how Education is theorised and practiced in schools. 
 
Beyond theories of learning, this study also has implications for how Education is 
organized.  The findings of this study challenge the general emphasis placed on 
secondary and higher education in the process of nation-building (Benei, 2008).  The 
introduction of Citizenship Education relatively late in the programme of formal 
studies in many countries suggests that children are „alien‟, or at best irrelevant to 
political processes, including those of patriotism and nationalism.  However, this 
study clearly illustrates that educational processes crucial to the production of local, 
regional and national attachments are taking place from a much earlier age.  Thus, 
this study has implications for how Citizenship Education is organized.  
 
Perhaps most significantly, this study „decentres‟ the school as the most important 
educational institution in the production of identities.  As this study has clearly 
shown, the school is not necessarily the most important learning site for young 
people, particularly in the contexts of statelessness and diaspora.  Moreover, the 
school does not exist in isolation.  Rather, it is integrated into the political, social and 
economic fabric of society.  Therefore, discourses produced in and through schools 
do not carry meaning or signify on their own.  Rather, they accumulate meanings 
across a wide variety of institutions in society, such as the family, political 
organizations, religious institutions and the media (Hall, 1996).  In this way, all 
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institutions function as important learning sites for young people, and schools work 
together with non-formal and informal institutions to produce and regulate identities 
in daily life.  This has important implications for the erection and maintenance of 
disciplinary boundaries and organizational „silos‟ around Education and Educational 
inquiry and practice.   
 
Emanating from this, this study challenges the artificial divide between the school 
and the community.  As this study has shown, identity construction and regulation 
takes place formally and informally through the rules, policies and practices of the 
school and other institutions in the community.  This blurs the social and political 
divisions between these „fields‟ and renders them almost meaningless.  Moreover, it 
destabilizes accepted power structures and notions of „student‟ and „teacher‟.  This 
has important implications for how Educational spaces are constructed and for how 
school-community engagement is theorized and practiced.   
 
In the next section, I make suggestions for further research on Palestinian identity. 
 
8.5  Further Research  
This study has been situated within the specific political, social, temporal and 
geographical context of Palestinian refugees living in south Lebanon in the absence of 
a Palestinian state.  Due to the specific geo-political and historical processes that have 
shaped south Lebanon, a unique Palestinian culture has developed there.  Therefore, 
further research is needed on Palestinian identity within different geopolitical, 
demographic, temporal and methodological contexts.  Moreover, further research is 
needed on the important Educational implications that have arisen through this study.  
 
Geo-political contexts  
Lebanon‟s particular political complexity, sectarianism and history of conflict and 
civil war mean that Palestinian refugees in Lebanon face specific problems. For 
example, unlike in some other countries where a large portion of Palestinian refugees 
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are resident (Syria, Jordan), Palestinians in Lebanon do not have social and civil 
rights, nor do they have access to public social services.  Moreover, Palestine 
refugees in Lebanon are considered to be „foreigners‟ under state law, and are, 
therefore, prohibited from working in more than 70 trades and professions.  This 
explains why out of all of UNRWA‟s fields of operation (including The West Bank, 
Gaza Strip, Syria and Jordan),  
 
Lebanon has the highest percentage of Palestine refugees who are living in 
abject poverty and who are registered with the Agency's „special hardship‟ 
programme (UNRWA, 2003). 
 
Among the „host countries‟ where Palestinian refugees are resident, Lebanon also has 
a unique history of conflict and warfare.  As discussed in detail in Chapter 2 
(Context), from 1975-1990, Lebanon was embroiled in a devastating civil war.  
Moreover, Israel invaded south Lebanon in 1978, again in 1982, occupying it from 
1982-2000 in the South Lebanon conflict (a sub-conflict of the Lebanese Civil War), 
and again in 2006.  As a result, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL) is still deployed in south Lebanon to monitor military activity between 
Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian forces and the „Israeli Defense Forces‟ (IDF).  As a 
result of Lebanon‟s unique history of conflict, Palestinian camps in Lebanon have 
come under siege and bombardment, experienced vast destruction of property and 
been the sites of massacres, such as those that took place at Sabra and Shatila camps 
near Beirut.  Moreover, three Palestinian camps were destroyed during the civil war 
and  never rebuilt (Nabatieh, Dikwaneh and Jisr Al Basha camps) and one camp was 
destroyed in the 2007 conflict between the Palestinian faction Fatah Al Islam and the 
Lebanese Army (Nahr Al Bared camp) resulting in the internal displacement of 
thousands of Palestinian refugees within Lebanon (UNRWA, 2003).  In addition, 
Palestinians have come to be distrusted and despised by a large portion of the 
Lebanese population, as they are blamed for Lebanon‟s conflicts with Israel, the 
Lebanese Civil War and the demographic imbalance that Palestinian settlement in 
Lebanon has brought to the balance of power in the country.    
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By contrast, Palestinians in other areas of settlement have not suffered from the same 
social and economic hardships or experiences of war as the refugees in Lebanon.  For 
example, all Palestine refugees in Jordan enjoy full Jordanian citizenship, and they 
comprise the majority of the country‟s population.  In Syria, Palestinian refugees have 
full access to government services such as schools, universities and hospitals 
(UNRWA, 2003).  Moreover, since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, both Jordan and Syria 
have enjoyed relative peace, unlike Lebanon, which has been embroiled in almost 
constant conflict.  As a result of these contextual differences, research findings from a 
study on Palestinian identity in Lebanon may not be applicable to Palestinian refugee 
populations in other areas of settlement.   
Besides the marked differences in lived experience between Palestinians in Lebanon 
and Palestinians in other countries, the unique demographics and political history of 
south Lebanon are significantly different from those of other parts of Lebanon.  For 
example, only south Lebanon is primarily rural, has a majority Shi‟ite population and 
has a history of both PLO settlement and Israeli occupation.  Therefore, the ways in 
which Palestinians construct „self‟ and „difference‟ in south Lebanon may differ 
markedly from how Palestinians in Sunni-dominated north Lebanon or Christian-
dominated East Beirut do so.  Therefore, further research on Palestinian identity 
construction and regulation is needed both in other countries where Palestinian 
refugees are resident as well as in other parts of Lebanon where significant 
Palestinian populations are settled.   
 
Demographic contexts 
In addition to researching Palestinian identity within different geo-political contexts, 
it is important to look at how specific populations within the Palestinian community 
in south Lebanon construct and negotiate their identities.   
 
One area for further research is how the processes of urbanization affect the 
construction, regulation and performance of Palestinian identities.  This study has 
primarily focused on how Palestinian refugee youth in UNRWA refugee camps 
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understand their sense of self and community in the context of living within a 
garrisoned community and being serviced almost exclusively through UNRWA 
institutions.  However, further research is needed to determine how Palestinian 
identity is understood, regulated and enacted among youth who are resident in 
Lebanese towns and cities.  Whereas camp residents live within a largely „closed‟ 
community, urban Palestinian youth have regular interaction with Lebanese and often 
attend Lebanese private schools.  Therefore, further research is needed to understand 
how interaction with Lebanese affects the youths‟ construction, take-up and 
performance of Palestinian identities.    
 
Related to the processes of urbanization are those of socio-economic class.  A 
minority of Palestinians have acquired Lebanese citizenship, either through 
intermarriage with Lebanese or through shifting notions by the Lebanese government 
as to who constitutes a Lebanese.  Therefore, these Palestinians are much more 
integrated into the Lebanese community and have access to employment 
opportunities and government services, such as public schools.  Moreover, some 
Palestinian families have family members who are resident in Europe or North 
America (see Chapter 7, New Identities).  These Palestinians regularly receive 
remittances in foreign currency which elevates their socio-economic standing in the 
community in relation to others and increases their chances of gaining access to 
higher education.  These Palestinians are also more likely to obtain visas and have 
opportunities for international travel.  Within these contexts, further research is 
needed to determine how socio-economic class affects the construction of Palestinian 
subject positions, how they are taken up and how they are lived by young people.    
 
Temporal contexts 
In addition to researching Palestinian identities within different geo-political 
communities and demographic populations, it is important to research how these 
identities change and evolve over time.  As discussed in Chapter 7 (New Identities), 
nations are „imagined‟, socially constructed and performed within a specific socio-
economic and geo-political context.  Therefore, when environmental conditions 
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change over time, nations are „re-imagined‟, reconstructed and performed differently 
(Anderson, 1983).  In this way, Palestinian identities have continued to be shaped and 
transformed through the socio-historical processes of the past sixty years.  Within 
these ideological shifts, there have been significant changes in the constructions of 
„masculinity‟ and „femininity‟ and in the performance of gender relations within 
Palestinian society.  Moreover, new „hybrid‟, sub-national and supra-national 
identities have been created in response to shifting political discourses within the 
context of globalisation.   
 
Within this context of constant change and uncertainty, any research on Palestinian 
identity is bound to be limited to taking a „snapshot‟ of the community at a particular 
moment in time.  Therefore, longitudinal research must be undertaken to understand 
how, why and under what circumstances Palestinian youth take up specific subject 
positions and the impact the take up of these identities has on their life choices and 
experiences.   
 
Methodological contexts 
It is also important to conduct further research on Palestinian youth within different 
methodological contexts.  As discussed in Chapter 4 (Methodology), although 
identity is the topic of this research study, my researcher identities proved to be the 
most significant and challenging factor affecting research processes and outcomes.  
My location in the intersecting, and often antagonistic, discourses of gender, race, 
class, ethnicity and religion at any given time and place regulated my access to 
participants, the quality of data that I was able to collect, how I interpreted the data 
and how I constructed knowledge from it.  Moreover, my complex status as both an 
„insider‟ and an „outsider‟ to the community proved to be both advantageous and 
disadvantageous to me at different times and in different situations in terms of 
achieving my research aims.   
 
As the researcher is always particularly located within these different discourses, the 
knowledge that is created through the research process is inherently ideological, 
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political and permeated with values, assumptions and agendas.  This means that my 
research findings are, in part, reflective of my various identities as a Canadian, non-
Arab, Christian, female and „wife of a Palestinian‟.  Therefore, researchers situated 
differently from me in relation to these discourses would be able to construct new and 
different knowledge about Palestinians in Lebanon.  Thus, further research on this 
topic is needed by other researchers in order to enrich and nuance the picture I have 
painted of Palestinian young people‟s experience of social life in refugee camps and 
gatherings in south Lebanon.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Semi-structured Interview Questions - Youth 
 
 
1. For you, what does it mean to be „Palestinian‟?   
 
2. How are Palestinians different from other people? 
 
3. How do you feel about being Palestinian? 
 
4. If you have the chance, do you want to obtain Lebanese citizenship?  Why or 
why not? 
 
5. For you, what were the most important historical events affecting the 
Palestinian community? Why were these important? 
 
6. For you, what are the symbols of Palestine?   
 
7. For you, who is a good Palestinian man?  Why?  What are the characteristics 
of a good Palestinian man? 
 
8. Who is a good Palestinian woman?  Why?  What are the characteristics of a 
good Palestinian woman? 
 
9. Who is a good Palestinian Muslim?  Why?  What are the characteristics of a 
good Palestinian Muslim? 
 
10. Who is a good Palestinian Christian?  Why?  What are the characteristics of a 
good Palestinian Christian? 
 
11. How do you show that you are a good Palestinian?  
 
12. How are your ideas of being a good Palestinian different from your parent‟s 
ideas? 
 
13. Do your interests as a „Palestinian‟ ever come into conflict with your interests 
as a „Muslim‟ or as a „woman‟?  Which identity is more important for you?  
Why? 
 
14. Where do you learn about „Palestine‟ and being „Palestinian‟? 
 
15. How is this different from where your parents learned about being 
Palestinian? 
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16. Do you think Palestinian identity is getting stronger or weaker among young 
people today?  Why? 
 
17. What do you think is the best way of helping Palestinian young people to 
develop a strong sense of identity?  
 
18. What are your dreams for the future? 
 
-What level of Education do you want to achieve? 
   
-What job do you want to do?  
 
-Where do you want to live?   
 
-What contribution do you want to make to: 
 
 your family,  
     
     your community, 
     
     your nation? 
247 
 
 Appendix 2 
 
Semi-structured Interview Questions - Teachers 
 
 
1. What curriculum do you follow in UNRWA schools? 
 
2. Are there any contentious issues in the Lebanese national curriculum? 
 
3. Is there an official History book used in primary or secondary schools?  If yes, 
how is the history of Palestine presented? 
 
4. Is there an official Geography book used in primary or secondary schools?  If 
yes, how is the country to the south of Lebanon depicted? 
 
5. Is there an official curriculum on Palestine? 
 
6. Do you teach about Palestine in your school?  If there is no official curriculum 
on Palestine, how do you teach it? 
 
7. Is there official communication and cooperation between UNRWA in 
Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority on Education? 
 
8. What political groups are represented in the camps in south Lebanon? Which 
group predominates in each of the camps? 
 
9. Do you agree with UNRWA‟s official position that UNRWA schools should 
follow the national curriculum of the host country? 
 
10. What effect do you think using the Lebanese national curriculum has on 
Palestinian young people? 
 
11. What do you think is the best way of teaching Palestinian young people in 
Lebanon about Palestine? 
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Appendix 3 
 
Semi-structured Interview Questions - Parents 
 
 
1.         For you, what does it mean to be „Palestinian‟? 
 
2. How are Palestinians different from other people? 
 
3. How do you feel about being Palestinian? 
 
4. If you have the chance, do you want to obtain Lebanese citizenship?  Why or 
why not? 
 
5. For you, what were the most important historical events affecting the 
Palestinian community? Why were these important? 
 
6. For you, what are the symbols of Palestine? 
 
7. For you, who is a good Palestinian man?  Why?  What are the characteristics 
of a good Palestinian man? 
 
8. Who is a good Palestinian woman?  Why?  What are the characteristics of a 
good Palestinian woman? 
 
9. Who is a good Palestinian Muslim?  Why?  What are the characteristics of a 
good Palestinian Muslim? 
 
10. Who is a good Palestinian Christian?  Why?  What are the characteristics of a 
good Palestinian Christian? 
 
11. How do you show that you are a good Palestinian?  
 
12. How are your ideas of being a good Palestinian different from your children‟s 
ideas? 
 
13. Do your interests as a „Palestinian‟ ever come into conflict with your interests 
as a „Muslim‟ or as a „woman‟?  Which identity is the most important for 
you?  Why? 
 
14. When you were young, where did you learn about Palestine and being 
Palestinian? 
 
15. How is this different from where your children learn about being Palestinian? 
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16. Do you think Palestinian identity is getting stronger or weaker among young 
people today?  Why? 
 
17. What do you think is the best way of helping Palestinian young people to 
develop a strong sense of identity?  
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Appendix 4 
 
Semi-structured Interview Questions – NGO/Community Leaders 
 
 
1.  For you, what does it mean to be „Palestinian‟? 
 
2. How are Palestinians different from other people? 
 
3. How do you feel about being Palestinian?   
 
4. If you have the chance, do you want to obtain Lebanese citizenship?  Why or 
why not? 
 
5. For you, what were the most important historical events affecting the 
Palestinian community? Why were these important? 
 
6. For you, what are the symbols of Palestine?   
 
7. For you, who is a good Palestinian man?  Why?  What are the characteristics 
of a good Palestinian man? 
 
8. Who is a good Palestinian woman?  Why?  What are the characteristics of a 
good Palestinian woman? 
 
9. Who is a good Palestinian Muslim?  Why?  What are the characteristics of a 
good Palestinian Muslim? 
 
10. Who is a good Palestinian Christian?  Why?  What are the characteristics of a 
good Palestinian Christian? 
 
11. How do you show that you are a good Palestinian?  
 
12. How are your ideas of being a good Palestinian different from your children‟s 
ideas? 
 
13. Do your interests as a „Palestinian‟ ever come into conflict with your interests 
as a „Muslim‟ or as a „woman‟?  Which identity is the most important for 
you?  Why? 
 
14. When you were young, where did you learn about Palestine and being 
Palestinian? 
 
15. How is this different from where your children learn about being Palestinian? 
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16. Do you think Palestinian identity is getting stronger or weaker among young 
people today?  Why? 
 
17. What do you think is the best way of helping Palestinian young people to 
develop a strong sense of identity?  
 
18. What does your organization do to help  young people learn about „Palestine‟ 
and being „Palestinian‟?  
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Appendix 5 
 
Semi-structured Interview Questions - Christians 
 
1. For you, what does it mean to be „Palestinian‟? 
 
2. How are Palestinians different from other people? 
 
3. How are Palestinian Christians different from Palestinian Muslims? 
 
4. Do you have more in common with Lebanese Christians or Palestinian 
Muslims? 
 
5. Do Palestinian Christians experience the same discrimination as Palestinian 
Muslims?  In what way? 
 
6. How do you feel about being Palestinian?  If you have the chance, do you 
want to obtain Lebanese citizenship?  Why or why not? 
 
7. In the Palestinian Christian community, what symbols of Palestine are used? 
 
8. When you were young, where did you learn about Palestine and being 
Palestinian? 
 
9. How do young Palestinian Christians learn about being Palestinian? 
 
10. For you, who is a good Palestinian man?  Why? 
 
11. Who is a good Palestinian woman?  Why? 
 
12. Who is a good Palestinian Muslim?  Why? 
 
13. Who is a good Palestinian Christian?  Why? 
 
14. How do you show that you are a good Palestinian? 
 
15. Do your interests as a „Palestinian‟ ever come into conflict with your interests 
as a „Christian‟ or as a „woman‟? 
 
16. Do you think Palestinian identity is getting stronger or weaker among young 
Palestinian Christians?  Why? 
 
17. Do you think it is important for young Christians to develop a strong sense of 
Palestinian identity? 
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18. What do you think is the best way of making sure that young Palestinian 
Christians develop a strong sense of identity? 
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Appendix 6 
 
 RRA/PLA Interview Schedule 
 
 
Research Questions Sub-Questions Methods Menu 
1.  How do Palestinian youth (male and 
female) in Lebanon understand and perform 
their identities vis-à-vis „nationality‟, „gender‟ 
and „religion‟? 
1.1  Introduce yourself. 
 
 
1) Interview your partner and introduce them 
to the rest of the group (name, age, camp of 
residence, family background, school history, 
personal interests and hobbies, etc.)  
2) Write 4 statements about yourself, 3 true 
and 1 false.  The others try and guess which 
statement about you is false.    
3) Draw a self-portrait and write three things 
about you that no one knows underneath it.  
(Hang the portraits around the room and have 
the youth try and guess the person behind each 
portrait.) 
4) Sit in a circle of chairs with one less chair 
than the number of participants.  The person 
left standing calls out a fact about themselves 
(e.g.: I like falafel).  All participants who share 
this fact switch chairs, while the person in the 
middle also tries to sit in one of the chairs.  
Repeat the process with the new person 
standing in the middle. („upset the 
fruitbasket‟).   
 
1.2  Where are you from? What brought you to 1) Draw a timeline outlining the most 
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Lebanon? 
 
significant historical events affecting the 
community.  Discuss how these events have 
affected different members of the community 
(e.g.: men, women, boys, girls, Muslims, 
Christians) 
 
1.3  Describe Palestine. 
 
1) Draw a picture of Palestine and write 5 
sentences about it.  (Analyze the symbols that 
emerge in relation to the gender and religion of 
the artist.)  
2) Choose an item (object, view, taste, smell, 
feeling) that represents Palestine for you and 
describe it for the group. 
 
1.4  What does it mean to be Palestinian? 
 
1) Role-play/draw „good‟ Palestinian men, 
women and Muslims/Christians engaged in 
typical activities.  (Analyze how nationality, 
gender and religion are embodied and enacted 
by each group.) 
2) Create a collage of pictures from magazines 
(or create a list) of „good‟ Palestinian men, 
women and Muslims/Christians.  (Analyze 
why each person has been identified as a „good 
Palestinian‟.) 
3) Create human sculptures/role-play to show 
how your ideas of being a „good‟ Palestinian 
compare with your parents‟ ideas of being a 
„good‟ Palestinian. 
 
1.5  What do men do to show that they are 
good Palestinians?   
 
1.6  Give examples of good Palestinian men. 
 
1.7  What do women do to show that they are 
good Palestinians?  
 
1.8  Give examples of good Palestinian 
women. 
 
1.9  What do Muslims/Christians do to show 
that they are good Palestinians?  
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1.10  Give examples of good Palestinian 
Muslims/Christians. 
 
1.11 What do you do to show that you are a   
         good Palestinian? Give examples. 
1.12 How is your idea of a „good‟ Palestinian 
the same or different from your parents‟ 
idea of a „good‟ Palestinian?  
 
2.   How do these identities interact with one 
another? 
2.1  How are Palestinians the same as other 
non-Arab people, and how are they 
different? 
 
1) Draw the characteristics of one group (e.g.: 
Palestinians) on chart paper and compare them 
with another (e.g.: non-Arabs). (Analyze how 
nationality, gender and religion are embodied 
and enacted by each group.) 
2) Role-play an interaction between two 
groups (e.g.: Palestinian women and other 
women) and analyze what similarities and 
differences are perceived to exist between 
them.  
3) Create cards with adjectives written on 
them, and draw two overlapping circles on the 
board/floor labelled with the names of two 
groups (e.g.: Palestinian Christians and 
Palestinian Muslims).  Indicate the extent to 
which these two groups are perceived to be the 
same or different from one another by placing 
the cards within the circles, representing 
differences, or within the overlapping portion, 
2.2 How are Palestinians the same as other 
Arab people, and how are they different? 
 
2.3  How are Palestinians in Lebanon the same 
as Palestinians in other countries, and how 
are they different? 
 
2.4  How are Palestinian men the same as other 
men, and how are they different? 
 
2.5  How are Palestinian women the same as 
other women, and how are they different? 
 
2.6  How are Palestinian women the same as 
Palestinian men, and how are they 
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different? 
 
representing similarities.     
2.7  How are Palestinian Muslims/Christians 
the same as other Muslims/Christians, and 
how are they different? 
 
2.8  How are Palestinian Muslims the same as 
Palestinian Christians, and how are they 
different? 
 
3.   How are the discursive resources of 
„identity‟ appropriated and articulated in 
everyday life through different institutions 
within the camps?  
 
3.1 Where do you learn about Palestine and 
being Palestinian? 
 
1) Do a transect walk around the community 
with the youth noting places where young 
people congregate and activities they are 
engaged in.  
2) Map the community including residential 
areas, community centres, schools, religious 
institutions and centres of popular culture.  
Identify which institutions (or parts of 
institutions) are considered to be „Lebanese‟ 
space, „Palestinian‟ space, „male‟ space, 
„female‟ space, „adult‟ space, „young peoples‟ 
space, „Muslim‟ space and „Christian‟ space) 
3) Identify on the map the places where you 
learn about Palestine.  Describe what you learn 
about Palestine and being Palestinian from 
each of these different institutions.  (Analyze 
the findings in relation to the gender and 
religion of the participants.) 
4) Role-play how young people learn about 
3.2 What do you learn about Palestine and 
being Palestinian from your family?   
 
3.3 How do you learn it?  
 
3.4 What do you learn about Palestine and 
being Palestinian from your community?   
 
3.5 How do you learn it? 
 
3.6 What do you learn about Palestine and 
being Palestinian from your school?   
 
3.7 How do you learn it? 
 
3.8 What do you learn about Palestine and 
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being Palestinian from your 
mosque/church?   
 
Palestine and being Palestinian in each 
institutional context and discuss how this 
might be the same or different for your 
parents‟ generation (Analyze the findings in 
relation to the gender and religion of the 
participants.) 
5) Create a Venn diagram by cutting out paper 
circles of different sizes to represent different 
education institutions. Rank the education  
institutions in order of significance in teaching 
young people about Palestinian identity, with 
the largest circle representing the institution of 
most significance, the smallest circle 
representing the institution of least significance 
and any overlap of circles representing the 
degree of coordination 
 
3.9 How do you learn it? 
 
3.10 What do you learn about Palestine and 
being Palestinian from media and popular 
culture (cinema, TV, music, graphic 
novels, internet, radio, etc.)?   
 
3.11 How do you learn it? 
 
3.12 Where does this media come from, and  
       who produces it? (Palestinian Authority, 
Lebanese government, American 
television network, etc.) 
 
3.13 If you want to learn about Palestine and 
being Palestinian, where do you go to find 
information?  Why? 
 
3.14 How did your parents learn about 
Palestine and being Palestinian?  How is it 
the same or different from your 
experience? 
 
3.15 What responsibilities do Palestinian males 
have in the family?  
 
1) Complete a daily activity profile of 
activities done by males and another one done 
by females. Compare the responsibilities male 
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3.16 What responsibilities do Palestinian   
females have in the family?  
 
and females have within different institutional 
contexts. (Analyze the findings in relation to 
the religion of the participants.) 
2) Role-play what is expected of males and 
females in each institutional context and what 
happens when societal expectations are not 
fulfilled.  Discuss how this might be the same 
or different for your parents‟ generation. 
(Analyze the findings in relation to the religion 
of the participants.) 
3) Discuss scenarios with identity dilemmas 
(nation/gender/family/religion) and identify the 
circumstances under which different subject 
positions are prioritized.   
4) Conduct a „Sociogram‟ of male and female 
„responsibilities‟ in different institutional 
contexts  
3.17 Do you always do these things?  Why or 
why not? 
 
3.18 What responsibilities do Palestinian males 
have in the community?  
 
3.19 What responsibilities do Palestinian 
females have in the community?  
 
3.20 Do you always do these things?  Why or 
why not? 
 
3.21 What responsibilities do Palestinian males 
have at school?  
 
3.22 What responsibilities do Palestinian 
females have at school?  
 
3.23 Do you always do these things?  Why or 
why not? 
 
3.24 What responsibilities do Palestinian males 
have in the mosque/church?  
 
3.25 What responsibilities do Palestinian 
females have in the mosque/church?  
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3.26 Do you always do these things?  Why or 
why not? 
 
3.27 How are your ideas about the 
responsibilities of males and females the 
same or different from your parents‟ 
ideas? 
 
3.28 Do your responsibilities as a Palestinian, a 
male/female and a Muslim/Christian ever 
come into conflict?  In what contexts? 
  
3.29 What happens when you don‟t do what is 
expected of you by others in these 
contexts? 
 
4.   How do these identities influence the 
youth‟s construction of goals and 
aspirations for the future vis-à-vis:  
a) the family 
b) the community 
c) the nation 
a) educational attainment 
b) career selection and achievement 
4.1  In the future, what contribution do you 
want to make to your family?  Why? 
 
1) Role-play/draw future scenarios depicting 
contributions you would like to make in each 
institutional context.  (Analyze the findings in 
relation to the gender and religion of the artist.) 
 
4.2  In the future, what contribution do you 
want to make to your community?  Why? 
 
4.3  In the future, what contribution do you 
want to make to your nation?  Why? 
 
4.4  What level of education do you want to 
achieve and in what subject?  Why? 
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4.5  What job do you want to do in the future?  
Why?   
 
4.6  Where do you want to live in the future?  
Why?   
 
4.7 How are your dreams for the future the 
same or different from the dreams of your 
parents‟ generation? 
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Appendix 7 
Sociogram Statements (sample) 
 
Ask the youth to decide if they agree or disagree with the following statements about 
the „responsibilities‟ of males and females in Palestinian society in different 
institutional contexts (1=completely disagree and 5=completely agree):   
 
Family: 
1.  Females should cook and clean in the home.  (agree - 8) 
1  
2 3G 
3  
4 3G, 5B 
5 
2.  Males should pay all the expenses for the home.  (strongly agree - 9) 
1 B 
2 G 
3  
4 3G, 2B 
5 2G, 2B 
3. Females should take care of children.  (strongly agree - 11) 
1  
2  
3  
4 3G, 2B 
5 3G, 3B 
4. Males should control the money in the home.  (agree – 5 slim margin) 
1 2G 
2 G,B 
3 G,B 
4 2G, B 
5 2B 
5. Females should teach Palestinian culture to the family.  (strongly agree - 
10) 
1  
2  
3 B 
4 3G, 2B 
5 3G, 2B 
6. Males should make decisions for the family.  (11 agree) 
1   
3  
4 6G, 5B 
5  
7. Wives should obey their husbands.  (strongly agree – 10) 
1  
263 
 
2 G 
3  
4 3G, 2B 
5 2G, 3B 
8. If there is a divorce, there is usually a problem with the woman.  (disagree – 
9) 
1 G 
2 5G, 3B 
3 B 
4  
5 B 
 
School: 
1.  It is more important for boys to do well at school than girls.  (6 agree) 
1 2G, B 
2 B 
3 G 
4 3G, 2B 
5 B 
2. It is more important for boys to go to university than girls.  (8 agree) 
1  
2 G 
3 2B 
4 3G, 2B 
5 2G, B 
3. Boys are better at science and math than girls.  (strongly agree – 9) 
1  
2 G, B 
3  
4 3G, 2B 
5 2G, 2B 
4. Girls are better at languages and social science than boys.  (strongly agree 
– 10) 
1  
2 B 
3  
4 3G, 2B 
5 3G, 2B 
 
Community: 
1. Community leaders should be males.  (agree – 9) 
1  
2  
3 2G 
4 4G, 5B 
5  
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2. It is more important for the males in a community to get the best jobs.  
(agree – 9) 
1  
2 G 
3 B 
4 4G, 2B 
5 G, 2B 
3. Females can go out at night the same as males.  (strongly disagree -11) 
1 5G, 5B 
2 G 
3  
4  
5  
4. Females can go to all the same places as males in the community (internet 
café, coffee houses, mosque…)  (strongly disagree – 10) 
1 3G, 4B 
2 3G 
3  
4 B 
5  
5. Females can do all the same activities as makes in the community 
(sports…)  (strongly disagree – 7) 
1 4G, 3B 
2  
3  
4 2G, 2B 
5  
6. It is the females‟ responsibility to protect her honour and her family‟s 
honour by dressing conservatively and not going out with boys.  (strongly 
agree – 8)   
1  
2  
3 B 
4 G 
5 5G, 3B 
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Appendix 8 
 
Interview Sample #1 
 
 
Camp/gathering:   Rashidieh  
Sex:   Male 
Age:   16 years old 
Religious affiliation: Sunni 
Political affiliation: Fatah  
 
 
1. For you, what does it mean to be a Palestinian?   
 
Why do all Lebanese live in their homeland and we live in camps?  We have 
water leaking through the roofs of our homes in winter.  Those who don‟t have 
money can‟t emigrate.  We can‟t get homes, we only stay in the camp.  The 
government doesn‟t allow us to buy or sell our homes. 
 
2. How are Palestinians different from other people? 
 
They are away from their homeland.  They are good people.  They still fight 
Israel.  Lebanese have more rights.  They work in teaching, hospitals and other 
jobs that we can‟t do.  In international maps, there is no name for our country.  
They write, “Israel”.   
 
3. How do you feel about being Palestinian?   
 
I feel happy.  We still protect our families because Israel stole our homeland.  I 
feel sad why I‟m not in Palestine and other Palestinian people die.  I will take 
Lebanese citizenship, but I will still be Palestinian.  It will help me to study.  I 
will have more rights, but I will regret it if I am in Palestine.  I will take it only 
because I am a refugee. 
 
4. For you, what were the most important historical events affecting the 
Palestinian community? Why? 
 
Until now, it didn‟t come.  When they put “Palestine” in the place of “Israel” in 
international maps.  They say they will give us Palestinian land, but this is only 
words. I hope to return back.   
 
5. For you, what are the symbols of Palestine?   
 
The flag, and Yasser Arafat.  He is like my father.  I love him.  We can‟t find as 
him.  I am in Fatah, and I have friends in Hamas.  But when I sit with them, we 
say we are Palestinian.  International people try to create a problem between us, 
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so we won‟t return to Palestine.  Israel killed Arafat and Sheikh Ahmed Yassine 
(co-founder of Hamas) because they want Palestinian people to forget Palestine 
and fight each other.  Everyday a Palestinian child will die due to this problem. I 
want to say to the international world, why do you live in homelands and we 
don‟t have one? 
 
6. For you, who is a good Palestinian man?  Why? 
 
My father, because he taught me about Palestine through stories and through his 
life and his example.  He encouraged me to study. 
 
7. Who is a good Palestinian woman?  Why? 
 
Women in our society who are teachers.  Female teachers are better.  They teach 
us to search about Palestine.  They teach us about Palestine and give us books 
about Palestine and our right to return. 
 
8. Who is a good Palestinian Muslim?  Why?   
 
Sheikh Ahmed Yassine, because he was a good man.  He loved Arafat and 
Palestine.  He loved all people.  He built generations of fighters, and I hope this 
generation fights Israel and not each other as they do now.  Arafat also made 
generations of fighters.  He was a student like us.    
 
9. Who is a good Palestinian Christian?  Why?   
 
I love the Christian religion, but I don‟t hear about them.  It is like Islam.  They 
help us to fight Israel.  Bethlehem is a Christian city, and I hope to meet them 
there.  I don‟t differentiate between Muslims and Christians. 
 
10. How do you show that you are a good Palestinian?  
 
I will be a good person, not for me but for Palestine.  They will say this 
generation will help us to go back to Palestine.  When I become a man, I will 
help others. 
 
11. How are your ideas of being a good Palestinian different from your parent’s 
ideas? 
 
When my father looks at the problems between Fatah and Hamas, he says he 
doesn‟t want to be Palestinian.  But I think differently, because this in-fighting 
will end. 
 
12. Do your interests as a Palestinian ever come into conflict with your interests 
as a Muslim? 
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There is no conflict. 
 
13. Where do you learn about Palestine and being Palestinian? 
 
From my family.  They tell me stories, especially my grandfather.  The teacher 
teaches us about the history of Palestine and gives us stories about Palestine and 
our right to return.  In this library, I read many books.  On the TV, the Israelis 
had a competition who could kill Mohamed Durra.  I watch Filastine, Al Aqsa 
and Al Jazeera stations.  It is hard to find Palestine homepages, but I try.  Only a 
very few girls use the internet. 
 
14. How is this different from where your parents learned about being 
Palestinian? 
 
They didn‟t go to school.  They learned from their families and the wars that 
happened in Lebanon and with Israel.   
 
15. Do you think Palestinian identity is getting stronger or weaker among young 
people today?  Why? 
 
It is getting weaker.  They forget Palestine.  They say, “what should we do, stay 
without work?”  They feel we will not return to Palestine.  If we think about it, 
we will lose life.  No, let us love life. 
 
16. What do you think is the best way of helping Palestinian young people to 
develop a strong sense of identity?  
 
Make festivals that relate to the past. They talk about the history of Palestine and 
Palestinian identity and the conditions they live in as refugees when the Israelis 
kill them and put them in prison.  They die due to powerlessness.  Some drink 
alcohol to forget about what Israel did to us.  They make us like animals.   
 
17. What are your dreams for the future? 
 
I will try to reach the highest level of Education to help the Palestinian people.  I 
want to study Chemistry, Biology, Physics and Math, because those who do this 
are few.  We can go only to UNRWA schools and private schools, but not 
Lebanese government schools.  I want to be an Engineer to live life and help 
others.  I will work in Europe or America, because I can‟t work as a Palestinian 
here.  I will help my siblings to study and reach higher levels than me.  For my 
mother and father, I will give them a good life.  Using the internet, I will speak 
with Palestinians to stop fighting each other and fight only Israel. 
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Appendix 9 
 
Interview Sample #2 
 
 
Camp/gathering:   Rashidieh  
Sex:   Female 
Age:   22 years old 
Religious affiliation: Sunni 
Political affiliation: Fatah  
 
 
1. For you, what does it mean to be a Palestinian?   
 
I don‟t care about being Palestinian.  It doesn‟t mean anything to me.  
Palestinians don‟t have any rights.  I don‟t like being Palestinian.  I sometimes 
wonder why I have to live as a Palestinian.  Life is not easy.  I say that I am 
Palestinian, but these are only words.  I don‟t feel it.  I have never been there.  It 
is only in my imagination.  Why do I have to suffer for a country I don‟t know.  
Most of the young people feel this.  I shouldn‟t say this, but it is true.   
2. How do you feel about being Palestinian?   
 
I don‟t care about it.  It‟s not my life.  I didn‟t see Palestine.  I would take 
Lebanese citizenship to become free and to get my rights.   
 
3. Where do you learn about Palestine and being Palestinian? 
 
From my family...TV...Fatah organization. 
 
4. How is this different from how your parents learned about being 
Palestinian? 
 
They learned about being Palestinian from their father and mother.  My mother 
and father were born in Palestine, but they came to Lebanon when they were 
small. 
 
5. For you, who is a good Palestinian man?  Why? 
 
Abu Omar (Yasser Arafat) because he tried to get rights for the Palestinian 
people but he was killed by Israel.   
 
6. Who is a good Palestinian woman?  Why? 
 
I have no idea. 
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7. Who is a good Palestinian Muslim?  Why? 
 
No idea. 
 
8. Who is a good Palestinian Christian?  Why? 
 
No idea. 
 
9. How do you show that you are a good Palestinian? 
 
I talk about Palestine if I have feelings about it. 
 
10. Do your interests as a Palestinian ever come into conflict with your interests 
as a Muslim or as a woman? 
 
I choose my dream as a woman.  I was not born as a Palestinian.  I studied these 
things.  I want to live as a woman as any other and marry who I like.  At the same 
time, I don‟t hate Palestine but I don‟t know it.  Between living in any country 
and Palestine, I choose the other country.  Even if we live in Palestine, we have 
no rights.  I am born to live not born to be a Palestinian.   
 
11. Do you think Palestinian identity is getting stronger or weaker among young 
people today?  Why? 
 
It is weaker.  We will never go back to our homeland. 
 
12. How does having a strong Palestinian identity benefit young people today? 
 
It doesn‟t help us at all.  We can‟t travel freely.  It benefits some of them because 
they feel it, and some they don‟t care.  Those who work in Fatah have strong 
identity.  I am Palestinian because they teach me that I am Palestinian, but if I am 
not Palestinian it is better, because you can get what you want.  
 
13. What do you think is the best way of making sure that Palestinian young 
people develop a strong sense of identity?   
 
Bring old people to talk to young people.  After this, I will do nothing.  I might 
not teach my children about Palestine.   
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Appendix 10 
 
Interview Sample #3 
 
 
Camp/gathering:   Rashidieh  
Sex:   Male 
Age:   20 years old 
Religious affiliation: Sunni 
Political affiliation: Hamas  
 
 
1. For you, what does it mean to be a Palestinian?   
 
Before I am Palestinian, I am Muslim and Arabic.  I don‟t say I am Palestinian 
because the British divided Palestine into Jordan, Syria and many countries.  I 
don‟t hate British people, but I hate British politics.     
 
2. How are Palestinians different from other people? 
 
We are all equal, and America tried to make Palestinians different.  If they return 
to Palestine, I might go to Jordan or another country.  In Palestine, there is Israel, 
and they should go away.  Russians moved to Palestine, which is not their right.  
Palestine should be free, but I don‟t care if I live in Palestine, Lebanon or Jordan.  
There is nothing different.  I care more about being Muslim.   
 
3. How do you feel about being Palestinian?   
 
I am proud I am an Arabic, Palestinian Muslim.  We are all Arab, not Palestinian, 
Lebanese, Syrian or Jordanian.  My God doesn‟t say I am Palestinian, he says I 
am Muslim.  Arabs are from ASham (Levant) and Al Maghrabi (North Africa).  
We know who are the Arab people.  It is not only the language.   
 
4. If you have the chance, do you want to obtain Lebanese citizenship?  Why or 
why not? 
 
No, because I will forget Palestine, and America and Israel will become happy.  
 
5. For you, what were the most important historical events affecting the 
Palestinian community? Why? 
 
Al Nakba (the „catastrophe‟), when Israel took Palestine.     
 
6. For you, what are the symbols of Palestine?   
 
The Kinanioon (Canaanites) when they were in Palestine.   
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7. For you, who is a good Palestinian man?  Why?  
 
Those who are fighting Israel, because he kills women and children.  Abdul 
Khadr Al Husseini.  He was a shaheed (martyr).  He became a shaheed because 
of Israel.   
 
8. Who is a good Palestinian woman?  Why?  
 
No woman. 
 
9. Who is a good Palestinian Muslim?  Why?   
 
All Muslims.  I am Muslim in my blood. 
 
10. Who is a good Palestinian Christian?  Why?   
 
Jesus.  I don‟t have a problem with Christians, but I prefer old Christians, not 
from this time. 
 
11. How do you show that you are a good Palestinian?  
 
When I show democracy. 
 
12. How are your ideas of being a good Palestinian different from your parent’s 
ideas? 
 
I am more strict with my sisters than my parents because we are Muslims. 
 
13. Do your interests as a Palestinian ever come into conflict with your interests 
as a Muslim or as a woman?  How? 
 
I am Muslim first.  First I am a man, then I am a Muslim and then I am a 
Palestinian. 
   
14. Where do you learn about Palestine and being Palestinian? 
 
From when I drank milk from my mother, I learned I was Palestinian.  In school, 
they don‟t have books or lessons on Palestine, but my teacher, who was from 
Dimocratiya (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) spoke to me 
about Palestine.  We tried to make books about Palestine, but UNRWA didn‟t 
accept this.  I also learned from the TV, especially Al Jazeera (Qatari-based 
channel) and Al Manar (Hezbollah channel).  In other countries, they don‟t talk 
about Palestine in the media.  They ignore the issue.   
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15. How is this different from where your parents learned about being 
Palestinian? 
 
They knew about it from being born there.  My grandfather saw the first war. 
 
16. Do you think Palestinian identity is getting stronger or weaker among young 
people today?  Why? 
 
My friends and I talk about Palestinian identity.  The foreigners want the 
Palestinians to forget Palestine, but I love and need Palestine.  The young are 
developing their ideas about Palestine.   
 
17. What do you think is the best way of helping Palestinian young people to 
develop a strong sense of identity?  
 
The situation teaches young people about Palestine.  We can make a meeting and 
talk about Palestine.  Fatah talks about Fatah, and Hamas talks about Hamas, not 
all of Palestine.  When I was a student, I was Fatah.  Now I am Hamas.   
 
18. What are your dreams for the future? 
 
I am studying to be a dentist now.  My father wanted me to be a dentist, but I 
dreamt of studying Political Science and Shari’a law.  But it is not possible for 
me to work in the UN because I will be a pawn of the US.  I want all the Arabs to 
be united and in agreement, and I can make an organization to help them.  All 
western countries help George Bush. 
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Appendix 11 
 
Interview Sample #4 
 
 
Camp/gathering:   Al Bas  
Sex:   Male 
Age:   45 year old father (f) and 16 year old son (s) 
Religious affiliation: Christian 
Political affiliation: Independent  
 
 
1. For you, what does it mean to be a Palestinian?   
 
Being Palestinian is everything to me.  I want to go back because we were happy 
there.  We had our own freedom. (f) 
 
I don‟t care about Palestine.  I lived all my life here, and I don‟t want to go back.  
Palestine doesn‟t mean anything for me.  Muslims follow what their families say.  
But we say for what?  We have never been there before.  We live in Lebanon and 
this is our country.  I am Christian first.  (s) 
 
2. How are Palestinians different from other people? 
 
Palestinians have no identity.  We don‟t have any rights.  If anybody asks about 
this place, they always think we are terrorists.  Because we are Christians, 
Muslims don‟t accept us as Palestinians.  We don‟t receive food or money. We 
are also not accepted by Lebanese.  We wish we are not in an Arab country but in 
Europe where we will get citizenship. (f) 
 
3. How are Palestinian Christians different from Palestinian Muslims?  
 
We have no rights because we are Christians.  Because we are Christians, 
Muslims don‟t accept us as Palestinians.  We don‟t receive food or money.  In 
the festivals, they give gifts only to Muslims.  To work in UNRWA, you must be 
Muslim. (f) 
 
4. Do you have more in common with Christian Lebanese or Muslim 
Palestinians? 
 
Lebanese Christians.  Most of my children have a Lebanese wife or husband. (f) 
 
5. Do Palestinian Christians experience the same discrimination as Palestinian 
Muslims? 
 
274 
 
Christian Palestinians are like Muslim Palestinians.  But, Christians are not 
telling their children about Palestine.  We have suffered a lot from Palestinian 
identity, so why would we teach our children about it?  Young Palestinian 
Christians are well integrated into Lebanese society.  Even Lebanese Christians 
don‟t like Palestinian Christians, but because we have intermarriage, they accept 
us for this reason. We never talk to our children about Palestine.  In a couple of 
generations, they will forget about Palestine. (f)   
 
6. In the Palestinian Christian community, what symbols of Palestine are used? 
 
Church of the Holy Sepulchre.  The kofiya (black and white checked scarf) 
means nothing for us.  We wear it only to keep warm.  We go out of the camp 
and then only to our home, so we don‟t see pictures of kofiya and Al Aqsa 
(mosque).  But we don‟t hate Muslims.  We are neighbours, and we have good 
relations with them.  We share sorrow and happiness.   
 
7. How do you feel about being Palestinian?   
 
I feel proud but I also feel lost because there is no nationality. (s) 
 
We want Lebanese nationality for our children‟s future.  Even if we have high 
education, we will not get jobs.  If the young people marry Palestinians, they 
want to return.  If not, they want to stay in Lebanon.  All my children here are 
married to Lebanese.  I want to stay with them. (f) 
 
We would rather live in Europe because there is no peace here.  In Europe, there 
is health insurance.  There, they treat people as humans.  If not Europe, I would 
choose Lebanon with peace. (s) 
 
8. When you were young, where did you learn about Palestine and being 
Palestinian? 
 
Older people learned in UNRWA schools and from their families.  Now young 
people don‟t learn in school  (f) 
 
9. How do young Palestinian Christians learn about being Palestinian? 
 
We don‟t learn from school.  We don‟t know anything about Palestine, and our 
families don‟t talk about Palestine.  They ask us not to get involved in politics.  
We don‟t learn about Palestine from the TV or internet.  If we use the internet, 
we don‟t search for anything about Palestine. (s) 
 
Young people will follow their families, but because of the bad economic 
situation, we don‟t think about anything else. (f) 
 
10. For you, who is a good Palestinian man?  Why? 
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My grandfather, because he is a good person.  We don‟t think about this. (s) 
 
11. Who is a good Palestinian woman?  Why? 
 
Hanan Ashrawi, because she is a strong woman.  It is not important to have many 
children because of the economic situation.  Christians are different.  We don‟t 
expect women to stay segregated from men or stay home at night like the 
Muslims. (f) 
 
12. Who is a good Palestinian Muslim?  Why? 
 
We don‟t know. (f) 
 
13. Who is a good Palestinian Christian?  Why? 
 
We live as Lebanese.  We don‟t think of these things.  We never interfere in 
politics.  It‟s enough to think about our lives and meet our children‟s needs.  (f) 
 
14. How do you show that you are a good Palestinian? 
 
Our good behaviour.  We don‟t interfere with other people.  We mix with 
Palestinian Muslims in events.  We are their neighbours.  (f) 
 
15. Do your interests as a Palestinian ever come into conflict with your interests 
as a Christian? 
 
I am a Christian first, but being Palestinian means something to me.  This shows 
we have a country and history, but it doesn‟t affect my life. (s) 
 
I don‟t like to make troubles or interfere.  I want to be a Palestinian in a peaceful 
way.  Being Palestinian in Palestine is good, but outside Palestine, nationality 
means nothing.  As a Palestinian born in Lebanon, we saw that Palestinians and 
Lebanese are not equal.  We never feel happy to be Palestinian...As Christians, 
we love everyone.  Jesus forgives Jews.  We are proud of our Christianity, and 
we must forgive.  We don‟t hate Israel or anyone, and the Bible teaches us to 
bless our enemies. (f) 
 
16. Do you think it is important to teach Christian young people about their 
Palestinian identity?  Why? 
 
It is very important. (f)   
 
I sometimes listen to my father when he talks about Palestine, but we children 
don‟t care about it. (s) 
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17. Do you think Palestinian identity is getting stronger or weaker among young 
Palestinian Christians?  Why? 
 
For Muslims, yes, for Christians, no.  Most Palestinian Christians are married to 
Lebanese.  We never talk to our children about it. (f) 
 
18. What do you think is the best way of making sure that young Palestinian 
Christians develop a strong sense of identity? 
 
Teach them stories about Palestine, but Christians are not telling their children 
about Palestine. (f) 
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Appendix 12 
 
Interview Sample #5 
 
 
Camp/gathering:   Burj A-Shemali 
Sex:   Male 
Age:   47 years old 
Religious affiliation: Shi‟ite 
Political affiliation: Hezbollah 
 
 
1. For you, what does it mean to be a Palestinian?   
 
I was born in Palestine and my grandfather‟s grandfather was born there.  
Palestinian people don‟t have their rights.  Palestine is for some Jews but not for 
the ones who immigrated from abroad.  I lost 5 sons and my wife was burned 
with napalm during the 1982 Israeli invasion.  Many countries are against us.  
America dictates for us.  Cluster bombs kill our children.  We must teach our 
children Palestine is our country and Zionism is our enemy.     
 
2. How do you feel about being Palestinian?   
 
I took Lebanese nationality.  This camp is like a prison surrounded by the army 
with only one exit.  We can‟t work in 70 professions.  I don‟t feel Lebanese but I 
took Lebanese citizenship to be free.  I have 2 daughters who are now working in 
a hospital, and they went to a Lebanese university.  Because of this, I didn‟t pay 
for their university. 
 
3. When you were young, where did you learn about Palestine and being 
Palestinian? 
 
I learned about it from my family.   
 
4. How does the younger generation learn about being Palestinian today? 
 
Coordination between institutions is impossible because teachers see themselves 
only as employees and not as responsible for the Palestine issue.  The head of 
UNRWA doesn‟t care about the poor standards in Education in Lebanon.  There 
are 724 students in Privé in Lebanon but only 262 passed.  Where do the other 
students go, fanaticism?  Prison?  Education is the only option.   
 
5. For you, who is a good Palestinian man?  Why? 
 
He has not been born yet.  Everyone who fights for Palestine.  Without a 
homeland, you are nothing.  How do others look at you?  We have no honour.  
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Islamic Shi‟ites have been fighting Israel, and Hezbollah has given us hope to 
defeat Israel.  Hassan Nasrallah (leader of Hezbollah) is a „good Palestinian‟ 
because he fights the Israelis.  He works for Palestine more than the people in the 
camp.  Identity doesn‟t mean you must be Palestinian by nationality.  Humanity 
between people is more important than identity cards.   
 
6. Who is a good Palestinian woman?  Why? 
 
Women in the community who work for Palestine.   
 
7. Who is a good Palestinian Muslim?  Why? 
 
Haj Amin Al Husseini who was the leader of Muslims in Al Quds who refused to 
partition Palestine into Muslim and Jewish lands.   
 
8. Who is a good Palestinian Christian?  Why? 
 
Atala Hana, a priest from Al Quds who doesn‟t distinguish between Muslims and 
Christians and who was in jail for being against the occupation.  He refused to 
sell church land to Israel.   
 
9. How do you show that you are a good Palestinian? 
 
To be a good Palestinian you have to have knowledge, a profession, and be 
honest like the Armenians.  You should be an entrepreneur and take initiative to 
help yourself and not sit and wait and sleep.   
 
10. Do your interests as a Palestinian ever come into conflict with your other 
interests? 
 
Both females and males are without rights. They must work together for 
Palestine.  Fanaticism is gaining.  To wear the hijab (Islamic head covering worn 
by women) is fashion and women wear it out of social pressure, not necessarily 
because they believe.  The US and Europe are against democracy which has 
caused increased corruption and fanaticism in the Middle East.    
 
11. Do you think Palestinian identity is getting stronger or weaker among young 
people today?  Why? 
 
Palestinian identity is getting stronger because the situation and conditions of 
Palestinians are getting worse.  With a Palestinian identity card, you are punished 
more.  This makes the younger generation boil from inside.  There is no justice. 
 
12. What do you think is the best way of making sure that Palestinian young 
people develop a strong sense of identity?   
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Give them spaces to play, to be free and teach them when they are playing.  Try 
to fight both corruption and fanaticism to have power from inside.  Cooperate 
with the Popular Committee.  However, there is no unity between different 
Palestinian groups, such as Fatah and Hamas.  „If I am not with you exactly, I am 
against you‟.  We fly flags of all political parties instead of flying only the 
Lebanese and Palestinian flags.  Palestinians have many political identities.  The 
young generation should stop following political parties. 
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Appendix 13 
 
Interview Sample #6 
 
 
Camp/gathering:   Al Bas (m); Burj A-Shemali (f) 
Sex:   Male; Female 
Age:   31 years old (m); 30 years old (f) 
Religious affiliation: Secular  
Political affiliation: Independent 
 
 
1. What is expected of Palestinian males and females in Palestinian society? 
 
A Palestinian male should work to get a good income, to get married and have a 
family.  A woman should love her husband.  She does everything to support the 
children.  She is respected in society.  She sacrifices for her family.  She doesn‟t 
talk about her problems to others.  She tries to give a good impression of her 
family.  She is for one man, her husband...If a woman is not a virgin, they take it 
that she is a bad woman.  She is often kicked out of the home and considered 
dead.  This is why there is so much control on women‟s behaviour.  On the 
contrary, mothers feel proud of their son if he has many experiences with 
women...If you are not married when you are young, it is weird and people make 
comments about you.  They will doubt the man‟s sexuality.  Women have to wait 
for proposals. They can never propose.  The single man still finds many ways to 
enjoy his life.  People are forced to be heterosexual and to marry...When girls 
become older, they feel it is shameful if they don‟t wear a hijab (Islamic 
headcovering worn by women) or a chadour (black robe worn by Shi‟ite 
women).  When they marry, they wear the hijab to keep their beauty for their 
husbands.  Some families force the girls to wear a hijab or chadour. (m)   
 
Women in our society, especially the Palestinian culture, cannot do whatever 
they want, because sometimes it is shameful to do this or that.  But men can do 
whatever he wants to do to express himself.  A woman has limited rights.  She 
can take care of the children, do housework, look after her husband.  She cannot 
be independent.  She always has to follow a man, her father, her brother and her 
husband when she gets married.  Nowadays, she can work, but in limits, but 
always the man complains because he sees that his wife doesn‟t fulfil her 
obligations...Women should always be a virgin.  It is catastrophic when she is 
not.  It is a sign of a good woman.  The husband can make a scandal if he 
discovers she is not a virgin.  More than 98% will ask her to leave the house.  We 
have no open-minded man in this society.  The man can do whatever he wants 
because he is a man.  They think it is something related to honour.  But a man‟s 
mistake is little compared to a woman‟s.  Even a girl who is raped wants to have 
surgery to get back her virginity.  They show the bed sheet to the family of the 
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man to prove she is a good woman.  If a woman is not a virgin, maybe she can‟t 
get married...The perfect marriage age for women is 18-25 for females and 25-30 
for males.  If a woman doesn‟t marry by a certain age, she should marry 
whoever.  Her life will be almost destroyed if she is not married.  A man will 
marry one but then have a mistress.  A woman can‟t do this.  He doesn‟t want to 
marry more than one because of financial obligations, although the Qu’ran says 
he can have four.  The single woman follows her brother and father and then her 
husband...Most women in society like to cover (wear the hijab), but some people 
don‟t follow this. There are more hijabs in the Palestinian society than the 
Lebanese society.  Palestinian society is more conservative than Lebanese 
society, especially in the camps.  Some women like to cover.  There are girls 
wearing hijabs or chadours while their mothers are not doing so.  Maybe this is 
because of association with Islamic movements or because of pressure from 
society. (f) 
 
2. Do you always do these things?  Why or why not? 
 
Males follow the culture because they are marginally convinced.  To follow the 
culture is good for men because they get a lot, but women don‟t.  Men, even if 
they are married can go out and meet women. A woman can‟t live her life as she 
wants.  The married woman is more free...Women are forced to obey the culture 
or rebel in secret.  Even if a woman is divorced or a widow, she won‟t have many 
men coming to propose to her because she is second-hand.  If someone proposes 
to her, he will be a widower and want someone to raise his kids and take care of 
the home...I don‟t always follow the culture because I don‟t believe in all that the 
society imposes.  I take some but not all.  I believe life should be harmony 
between couples.  We discuss and decide what to do.  I hate that most men still 
beat their wives.  We are in the 21
st
 century. Men behave like dictators.  I don‟t 
care what people say.  I rebel against the society.  Most people think I should be 
married.  I want to marry someone I‟m convinced about, not what the society 
says.  I don‟t like traditional marriage.  It should be everlasting and never say 
goodbye, not to dump her when she gets old.  Even beautiful people lose their 
beauty.  Spiritual beauty doesn‟t fade. (m) 
 
For me, I don‟t like to follow the society because I think I have a lot of energy 
inside me as a woman to express my feelings, to achieve a lot of things.  In my 
society, there are chains around the woman.  People find only in woman that her 
body is sometimes weak.  She cannot achieve things by herself.  I think woman is 
like man and she can do what man can do.  In other side, I don‟t appreciate in my 
society when men commit mistake, they forgive and they say he is man.  But for 
woman, when she does that, nobody will forgive her, and every time remind her 
of it, and it influences her whole life.  But we, as a new generation, rebel against 
all those complications. (f) 
 
 
 
